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TRAFFICKING IN NARRATIVES: CONCEPTUALIZING AND
RECASTING VICTIMS, OFFENDERS, AND RESCUERS IN THE
WAR ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING
SABRINA BALGAMWALLAt
ABSTRACT
Anti-trafficking laws emerge from a complex historical context,
shaped in no small part by public perception of this highly complex prob-
lem. This Article explores and questions the headlines and examples that
drove anti-trafficking reforms over the past century. These "trafficking
narratives" have stimulated and shaped the response to trafficking both
globally and domestically and have powerful implications for the evolv-
ing framework of protection and punishment. Specifically, this Article
argues that the roles of "victims," "offenders," and "rescuers" serve as
proxies for racialized and gendered assumptions about trafficking, which
in turn are reflected in anti-trafficking law and enforcement. This Article
builds on legal scholarship focused on trafficking victims to consider
how public understanding of offenders have unintended consequences in
rendering victims-and indeed, entire communities-suspect. It argues
that these stark narratives further aggressive, carceral responses to human
trafficking as a way of bringing offenders to justice and rescuing victims
even though the distinction between victims and offenders is not always
clear. It concludes that advocates should reconsider the use of victim
narratives in advancing anti-trafficking causes, particularly in association
with criminal justice responses.
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INTRODUCTION: CREATING THE CRIME OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Trafficking, once considered a crime concerning sale of illicit
goods, is now a broader concept that includes the unlawful movement of
people and exploitation of their labor.' Human trafficking in fact encom-
passes a number of crimes; under U.S. law for example, "severe traffick-
ing in persons" includes forced prostitution, involuntary servitude, and
exploitation of minors, as well as harbor, transport, or procurement relat-
2ed to these activities. State and local governments further expanded the
1. For an extensive exploration of definitions of "human trafficking," see John Salt & Jen-
nifer Hogarth, Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A Review of the Evidence, in
MIGRANT TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN SMUGGLING IN EUROPE 11, 18-24 (Frank Laczko & David
Thompson eds., 2000). See also Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1469 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of various titles of
U.S.C.); G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especial-
ly Women and Children, annex, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25, art. 3(a) (Dec. 22, 2003).
2. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2012) (defining "severe trafficking in persons"). For a cri-
tique of this expanding definition of human trafficking and its application, see Janie A. Chuang,
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criminalization framework by increasing sentences for trafficking and
related offenses and requiring offender registration.3 This criminalization
framework, however, is not unique to the United States. Around the
world, anti-trafficking reforms rely heavily on prosecution and incarcera-
tion as mechanisms to punish and prevent trafficking-what scholars
have described as a "carceral" response to this social phenomenon.
Even as mechanisms to prosecute and punish trafficking have
evolved, a growing number of scholars have criticized the lack of quality
research on the problem of trafficking. Researchers have pointed out a
number of startling misconceptions as to how trafficking is understood,
portrayed, and addressed. This Article compares anti-trafficking rhetoric
and field research examples to examine the role narratives play in the
global understanding of-and response to-the problem of human traf-
ficking. Specifically, this Article argues that trafficking narratives em-
ploy tropes of "victims," "offenders," and "rescuers" in a manner that
moralizes anti-trafficking discourse and reinforces a legal response large-
ly focused on punishing offenders. Casting these roles in stark terms in-
hibits a nuanced understanding of a complex social problem and creates
distance between the highly idealized realm of law and the lived experi-
ences of individuals who seek its protection.4 Furthermore, in overly
simplifying distinctions between roles, the law may also cast an offend-
er's wrongdoing in severe terms, reinforcing the rationale for a harsher
punishment. Where the distinction between victims and offenders is
overly simplified, this increases the potential for prosecution of individu-
als who in fact may be in need of legal protection. This Article also con-
nects human trafficking policy to a broader criminalization framework
that serves as a proxy for immigration enforcement and crime control,
rendering minority communities as suspect.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL ANTI-TRAFFICKING FRAMEWORK
A. From "White Slavery" to "Sex Trafficking"
Trafficking is frequently referred to as "modem slavery," a moniker
suggestive of backwardness and moral repugnance. While this language
may resonate in the modem age, it does not represent he historical anti-
trafficking movement accurately. In fact, international anti-trafficking
Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 passim
(2014).
3. See Human Trafficking Laws in the States, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.nesl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/human-trafficking-laws-in-the-states-
updated-nov.aspx (last updated Feb. 14, 2012).
4. For powerful treatment of this topic in gender violence, trafficking, and immigration
contexts, see, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 79-88 (2008); Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and
Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 209-12 (2012); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The
Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REv. 157, 205-07 (2007).
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instruments borrow very little conceptually from international instru-
ments condemning enslavement of African-Americans. Although early
anti-slavery conventions theoretically condemned the African slave
trade, current international aw on human trafficking is more substantial-
ly influenced by early international instruments addressing prostitution.6
At the turn of the twentieth century, due in part to social anxiety about
women's greater freedom to travel, a movement emerged to combat a
problem known as "white slavery"-the (presumed involuntary) prostitu-
tion of white women in the United States and abroad.7 Despite the dearth
of evidence that American women were being forced into prostitution in
great numbers, the public "moral panic" that ensued prompted federal
and state legislation. The 1910 Mann Act, also known as the White Slave
Traffic Act, criminalized the transport of women for the purpose of en-
gaging in "immoral acts," and still serves as the basis for many claims
involving trafficking of minors.8 Enforcement became a focus of the
newly formed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);9 meanwhile, states
began to pass their own laws criminalizing prostitution.10
Contemporaneously with the passage of the Mann Act in the United
States, the League of Nations developed the 1904 International Agree-
ment for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1904 Agreement).
This instrument contains the first definition of "traffic"-"the procuring
of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad."l2 The 1904 Agreement
also alludes to immigration control, calling upon states to monitor rail-
way stations, ports, and routes for trafficked women,'3 as well as obtain
5. See Cheryl Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1464, 1489-91 (2015) (describing the historical and persistent racial distinction in human trafficking
law between African-American and white victims).
6. Corin Morcom & Andreas Schloenhardt, All About Sex?!: The Evolution of Trafficking
in Persons in International Law 11-12 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished research paper) (on file with the
University of Queensland, Human Trafficking Working Group),
https://law.uq.edu.au/files/431 /Evolution-of-Int-Law-relating-to-Trafficking-in-Persons.pdf.
7. Id.; see also MAGGY LEE, TRAFFICKING AND GLOBAL CRIME CONTROL 6, 26-27 (2010).
Debt bondage was not addressed until the passage of the 1956 U.N. Supplementary Convention on
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. LEE,
supra at 6. For an in-depth discussion of the comparison between the modern conception of traffick-
ing in persons and the enslavement of African-Americans, see generally Karen E. Bravo, Exploring
the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 207, 212-13 (2007).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2421-2425 (2012).
9. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL
HISTORY 18-19 (2004). The Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the FBI's Criminal Divi-
sion now investigates crimes brought under the Mann Act, White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395,
36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424). See OFFICES OF THE U.S.
ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
§ 2027, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2027-mann-act (l s updated 1997).
10. See Prohibited Consensual Sexual Activity, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CRIMINAL
LAWS, 0030 SURVEYS 14, tbl.13 (Thomson Reuters 2007).
11. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904, 35
Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83.
12. Id. art. 1.
13. Id art. 2.
4 [Vol. 94:1
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information about foreign women and make efforts to repatriate them.14
The 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White
Slave Traffic subsequently introduced elements of violence, threats, and
compulsion in the definition of trafficking.15 It also called on states to
share information about perpetratorsl6 and extradite them as necessary
for prosecution.17
Both of these instruments were limited in application to white
women involved in prostitution. The 1921 International Convention for
the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children expanded to in-
clude male as well as female children,'8 but this did not necessarily alter
the perception that adult men were not in need of protection as victims of
trafficking. The 1949 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Oth-
ers later consolidated the four preceding white slavery instruments, and
eliminated specific references to the age and gender of victims.'9
B. Trafficking as Violence Against Women; Violence Against Women as
a Crime
The second wave of international anti-trafficking policy developed
in association with the global feminist initiative to address women's
rights as human rights.20 As this framework developed and engaged the
problem of trafficking in persons, the law retained a focus on procure-
ment for prostitution.2 1 The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 22 and the expanded
scope of the 2000 United Nations Trafficking Protocol again discussed
trafficking in gender-specific terms and with particular reference to pros-
titution.23
14. Id. art. 3.
15. International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, art. 2, May 4,
1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 1912 GR. Brit. T.S. No. 20.
16. Id. arts. 6-7.
17. Id. art. 5.
18. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children art. 5,
opened for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415. This convention was followed by the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of the Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150
L.N.T.S. 431 (excluding male victims).
19. International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploita-
tion of the Prostitution of Others pmbl., arts. 1, 5, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S.
271 (entered into force July 25, 1951); see also id. art. I (utilizing the gender-neutral term "person").
20. See Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Reali-
ties and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, 617 (1996); see also
Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 781, 789-90 (1998).
21. Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 784.
22. G.A. Res. 34/180, annex, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women art. 6 (Dec. 18, 1979) (requiring states to "take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women").
23. See supra Section I.A.
2016] 5
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The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in
Beijing in 1995, followed the 1976-1985 United Nations "Decade for
Women" and the development of CEDAW. 24 The resulting Beijing Plat-
form for Action included "diagnosis" of twelve problems affecting wom-
en; human trafficking was included in the Platform as part of the Vio-
lence Against Women diagnosis, which called for the elimination of traf-
ficking in women and assistance to "victims of violence due to prostitu-
tion and trafficking" as a strategic objective.25 The Platform recommend-
ed that governments "[c]onsider the ratification and enforcement of in-
ternational conventions on trafficking in persons and on slavery"26 and
"[s]tep up cooperation and concerted action by all relevant law enforce-
ment authorities and institutions with a view to dismantling national,
regional and international networks in trafficking"27 as a means of ad-
dressing the problem.
It is significant that the Beijing Platform presented trafficking as
part of the Violence Against Women diagnosis and a phenomenon of
gender-based violence. Following the International Labor Organization's
international conventions on forced labor-the 1949 Convention Con-
cerning Migration for Employment,28 the 1957 Abolition of Forced La-
bor Convention,29 and the Migrant Workers Supplementary Provisions
Convention3o-it would have been just as viable to make trafficking part
of the Women and Poverty diagnosis and frame the issue as a problem of
limited economic opportunities for women.31 Instead, the Beijing Plat-
form made only a cursory reference to the connection between labor and
trafficking.32 As one human rights activist observed, "Beijing is where
24. See JULIETTA HUA, TRAFFICKING WOMEN's HUMAN RIGHTS 7-9 (2011).
25. United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action (Sept. 4-15, 1995) [hereinafter Beging Platform],
http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/pfaefinalweb.pdf.
Janie Chuang and Elizabeth Bernstein are among the scholars who noted the role of the American
neo-feminist anti-prostitution movement in the evolution of this framework. See Elizabeth Bernstein,
Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The "Traffic in Women" and Neoliberal Circuits of Crime,
Sex, and Rights, 41 THEORY & Soc'Y 233, 235-36 (2012); Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking
from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1655, 1672-77 (2010).
26. Beiing Platform, supra note 25, ¶ 130(a).
27. Id.¶130(e).
28. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised),
C097 (Jan. 22, 1952),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::Pl2100_INSTRUMENT_I
D:312242.
29. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,
C105 (Jan. 17, 1959),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=1000:12100:0::NO::PI2100_ILOCODE:C105.
30. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, C143 (Dec. 9, 1978),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::Pl2100_ILOCODE:C143.
31. See Beijing Platform, supra note 25, IT 47-57.
32. See id ¶ 130(b) (urging states to "[t]ake appropriate measures to address the root factors,
including external factors" that contribute to the problem of trafficking).
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trafficking as a labor issue was first transformed into a sexual violence
and slavery issue."33
C. United Nations Protocols on Trafficking and Human Smuggling-
Solidification of a Criminal Law Framework
In January 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
convened a subcommittee to develop a new protocol on organized crime,
including accompanying protocols on human trafficking and human
smuggling.34 Both protocols take a criminalization approach to the issues
of trafficking and smuggling though the protocols differ in the assign-
ment of legal culpability for what may essentially be the same conduct.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol)36 defines traffick-
ing with reference to the means of recruitment3 7 and calls on member
states to recognize and meet the special needs of trafficked persons.38
Article 5 of the Trafficking Protocol, devoted to the subject of "criminal-
ization," specifically calls upon states to enact "legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish . . . criminal offences"39 for
trafficking and for the related offenses of attempt40 and conspiracy,41
which may subject individuals to prosecution even if they have been
exploited.4 2 The United Nations Protocol against he Smuggling of Mi-
grants by Land, Sea and Air (UN Smuggling Protocol)43 reinforces a
criminal framework to address smuggling ("procurement, in order to
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the
illegal entry of a person"), illegal entry, and document fraud."4 The in-
strument, however, fails to address the ways in which individuals who
are complicit in these acts may be exploited and, hence, be considered
"smuggled" as well as "trafficked." The UN Smuggling Protocol does
state that individuals who are the "objects" of criminalized activities
33. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 252.
34. See Melissa Ditmore & Marjan Wijers, The Negotiations on the UN Protocol on Traffick-
ing in Persons, 4 NEMESIS 79, 79 (2003).
35. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
36. G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. 2000 Trafficking Protocol].
37. Id. art. 3(a) (noting that trafficking recruitment takes place "by means of the threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the con-
sent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation").
38. Id. arts. 6-8.
39. Id. art. 5(1).
40. Id. art. 5(2)(a).
41. Id. art. 5(2)(b)-(c).
42. See Ditmore & Wijers, supra note 34, at 85 (discussing the protection and assistance
provisions in the Protocols and recognizing the discretionary nature of such provisions).
43. G.A. Res. 55/25, annex III, Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. 2000 Smuggling Protocol].
44. Id. art. 3(a)4c).
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should not be held criminally liable for the conduct,4 5 but this framing
does not reinforce the agency of migrants, trafficked and otherwise.46
Through these key international legal instruments, the global community
manifestly embraced a border-conscious law enforcement approach to
both trafficking and smuggling.47
These protocols explicitly linked anti-trafficking initiatives with the
larger international legal framework on crime and, by proxy, anxiety
about the possible criminogenic effects of globalization.4 8 But while the-
se twin Protocols resemble each other in their criminalized approach,
they differ in their gendered assumptions about migration. The UN Traf-
ficking Protocol, with its special reference to the protection of women
and children, clearly reflects the perspectives on trafficking from Beijing
+5 conference.49 The gendered focus of the Protocol harkens not only to
the Beijing Platform's gender-based violence framing but also to the
international trafficking instruments that preceded it. By contrast, the UN
Smuggling Protocol makes no reference to gender whatsoever.50 The
underlying inference is that women and children are the "objects" of
criminalized migration activity in the Trafficking Protocol, while men
are willing migrants or traffickers.
Critical scholars attribute the creation of this dichotomy between
trafficking (as a problem of gender-based violence) and smuggling (as a
problem of border control) to a strategic move by states, as this framing
rationalizes harsh immigration and border enforcement measures in the
52name of combatting trafficking in persons. This linkage between immi-
gration and trafficking control persists, although trafficking schemes
regularly override or elude border control measures. Many trafficked
individuals have presented valid entry documents at border inspection,
and trafficking schemes regularly exploit legitimate visa programs to
bring workers to host countries. The role of the global economy and
demand for labor never figures into this framework, shifting focus to
protection of borders rather than protection of workers.
45. Id. art. 5.
46. See infra Section II.A.2.b.
47. Both protocols make specific reference to the need for increased border control to prevent
unauthorized migration. See U.N. 2000 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 36, art. 11; U.N. 2000
Smuggling Protocol, supra note 43, arts. 7-8, 10-15.
48. See LEE, supra note 7, at 22; see also Bravo, supra note 7, at 224 n.90.
49. U.N. 2000 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 36, pmbl. According to the accounts of those
involved with the development of the Protocol, this inclusion of this gender-specific language was
tied to the lobbying efforts of a pro-abolitionist NGO coalition; this was a second choice to using
"Trafficking in Women and Children" in the title of the document, rather than the gender-neutral
reference to trafficked "persons." See Ditmore & Wijers, supra note 34, at 82.
50. See U.N. 2000 Smuggling Protocol, supra note 43.
51. See U.N. 2000 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 36, pmbl., arts. 2-3, 6, 9-10.
52. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chac6n, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in
the Era oflmmigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1619 (2010).
53. See id. at 1637-38.
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D. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and Crime Control Initiatives
in the United States
1. Precedent: The Anti-Domestic Violence Movement
The anti-trafficking movement that emerged in the United States in
the 1990s is notable in its connection to this theme of gender-based, sex-
ual dominance. The concept of "female sexual slavery" began gaining
traction in the 1970s54 as prostitution and pornography emerged as key
issues in the mainstream feminist movement.5 5 The contemporary main-
stream anti-trafficking movement in the United States drew considerable
support from a particular sector of dominant feminist, anti-domestic vio-
lence activism.56 As advocates called for state recognition of the problem
of spousal abuse, they enlisted law enforcement as an ally to intervene in
these situations and to treat batterers as criminals-a phenomenon that
scholar Elizabeth Bernstein refers to as "carceral feminism."5 7
Courts became part of an advocacy strategy to ensure that violence
against women was taken seriously.8 In 1976, two domestic violence
cases concerning failure of local law enforcement to respond to calls for
help-Bruno v. Codd59 and Scott v. Hart60-motivated arrest policies for
local law enforcement offices.61 Over the next two decades, law en-
forcement responses to domestic violence expanded to include police
mandatory arrest policies62 and no-drop prosecution policies in court.63
These approaches, however, were not without critique within the anti-
54. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 54-59 (1979); KATHLEEN
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 1-3 (1995).
55. See Bravo, supra note 7, at 223 (discussing how sex tourism also emerged as an issue in
the late 1970's and concerns about how international prostitution arose in the context of the fall of
the Soviet Union). For influential works on pornography in the dominance feminist tradition, see
ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 101-03 (1981); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 327, 328-29 (2007). For an in-depth discussion of
dominance feminism as an influencing force on the movement against domestic violence movement,
see LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 9-
15 (2013) (discussing dominance feminism as an influential force on the movement against domestic
violence).
56. Elizabeth Bernstein, From "Prostitution" to the "Traffic in Women": Political Implica-
tions of the (Re)emergence of a Discourse, WILSON CTR., Summer 2010, at 12, 12-13 (Middle East
Program & United States Studies Occasional Paper Series),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Rethinking%20Human%2OTrafficking.pdf
57. Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics
of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS 45, 52-58
(2010).
58. See GOODMARK, supra note 55, at 17.
59. 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582 (N.Y. 1979).
60. No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1976).
61. See Claire Houston, How Feminist Theory Became (Criminal) Law: Tracing the Path to
Mandatory Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 255-
60 (2014). See generally Pauline W. Gee, Ensuring Police Protection for Battered Women: The
Scott v. Hart Suit, 8 SIGNS 554, 554-67 (1983).
62. Houston, supra note 61, at 267.
63. Id at 265.
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domestic violence movement. Many advocates were concerned about
this reliance on law enforcement and the minimizing of survivor agency
survivors in these situations.6 Even so, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 included a critical victory for the move-
ment-the Violence Against Women Act, which developed key roles for
law enforcement and the criminal justice system with respect to the prob-
lem of domestic violence.65
2. The Anti-Trafficking Movement
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the first compre-
hensive federal anti-trafficking law in the United States, came to fruition
in association with the Violence Against Women Act of 2000.66 The
TVPA created a new crime known as "severe trafficking in persons,"67
increased the applicable sentences for trafficking-related crimes, crimi-
nalized additional trafficking-related acts,69 and established the right to
mandatory restitution for these crimes.70 The TVPA, like the UN Traf-
ficking Protocol, rationalized border and immigration control as part of a
law enforcement strategy to protect victims. 71 The TVPA also retained
the highly-gendered notions of trafficking and migration set forth in the
UN protocols, placing particular emphasis on the exploitation of women
and girls and the problem of sex trafficking.72 Senator Paul Wellstone,
who introduced the bill, specifically stated that the resolution was in-
tended to address trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploita-
64. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis & Carol E. Jordan, Encouraging Victims: Responding to a
Recent Study of Battered Women Who Commit Crimes, 15 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2014); Leigh Goodmark,
Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions
for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004).
65. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 2001, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796, 1910 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.). 42 U.S.C. § 13981,
which was part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, was subsequently declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
66. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of various titles of U.S.C.) (organizing the Victims
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 into divisions including the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 and the Violence Against Women Act of 2000).
67. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2000) (defining "severe forms of trafficking in persons"),
with U.N. 2000 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 36, at 43 (calling on the global community to crim-
inalize trafficking and related activities). Many legal scholars have noted the global practice of
criminalizing trafficking in persons. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1617-20; Chuang, supra
note 25, at 1725-26; Jonathan Todres, Widening Our Lens: Incorporating Essential Perspectives in
the Fight Against Human Trafficking, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 53, 58, 61-67 (2011) (noting the preva-
lent practice of adopting criminal laws as a means of combatting trafficking in persons).
68. 22 U.S.C. § 7109 (2000); 18 U.S.C § 1594 (2000).
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-1592 (2000).
70. Id. § 1593.
71. See Bemstein, supra note 25, at 251; Chuang, supra note 25, at 1697-1703.
72. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 § 102(b), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464, 1466-69 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012)).
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tion.73 A separate proposal, which made broad reference to labor exploi-
tation, did not pass.74
As with the Violence Against Women Act, victim advocates hailed
some provisions of the TVPA as a much-needed development. The
TVPA is noteworthy in that its passage and implementation galvanized a
wide range of supporters beyond victim advocates, including groups
across the political spectrum, from mainstream feminist organizations to
religious abolitionists.7 Aspects of the bill respond to critical needs of
trafficking survivors. For example, the TVPA explicitly addresses the
immigration status of survivors by creating a "T" visa that will allow
individuals who assist law enforcement to remain in the United States.
The TVPA also includes non-physical and psychological aspects in the
definition of "coercion," which supersedes the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the term.77 At the same time, this framework bears the mark of
the anti-prostitution movement, which became more perceptible under
the presidency of George W. Bush. President Bush also authorized the
73. 144 CONG. REC. S1702-04 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Wellstone),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/03/10/CREC-1998-03-10-ptl-PgS1702-2.pdf; see also S. Con.
Res. 82, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
74. See Comprehensive Antitrafficking in Persons Act of 1999, S. 1842, 106th Cong. (1999),
https://www.congress.gov/106/bills/sl842/BILLS-106sl842is.pdf.
75. See, e.g., Jacqueline Berman, The Left, the Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of US.
Antitrafficking in Persons Policy, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269, 283 (2006).
76. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(T) (2012). Nonimmigrant visas are available to individuals who
can prove: (1) they are victims of severe human trafficking; (2) present in the United States on
account of trafficking; (3) either comply with requests to cooperate with law enforcement in the
investigation of their trafficking case or are deemed exempted from doing so on the basis of their
youth or the trauma they have suffered; and (4) would suffer "extreme hardship involving unusual
and severe harm upon removal" from the United States to remain in the United States. Id. T visas are
valid for four years and carry the benefits of work authorization, derivative status for qualifying
family members, and the possibility of adjusting status if certain requirements are met. 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.11(l)(4), (o)-(p) (2016). Exceptions to the law enforcement requirement are available to indi-
viduals who are under fifteen years of age or who are unable to assist due to trauma. See id.
§ 214.11(a) (defining "reasonable request for assistance" with respect to eligibility criteria set forth
in § 214.11(b)(3)).
77. Compare United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952-53 (1988) (holding that for
purposes of criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1584, "the term 'involuntary servitude' neces-
sarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the
use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law
or the legal process"), superseded by statute, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, as recognized in United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2014),
with Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 § 103(2), 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2000) (defining coer-
cion to include "any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to
perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person").
78. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, The Link Between Prostitution and
Sex Trafficking (2004), https://2001 -2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/38790.htm (stating that trafficking is
both the cause and effect of prostitution). The research methods and data supporting this assertion
have since been contested by scholars. See, e.g., Sealing Cheng & Eunjung Kim, The Paradoxes of
Neoliberalism: Migrant Korean Sex Workers in the United States and "Sex Trafficking," 21 Soc.
POL. 355, 356-57 (2014); Chuang, supra note 25, at 1683-84 (examining the anti-prostitution legal
reforms scaffolded onto anti-trafficking laws following the passage of the TVPA); Rebecca L. Whar-
ton, Note, A New Paradigm for Human Trafficking: Shifting the Focus from Prostitution to Exploita-
tion in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 753, 771 (2010)
(discussing the appointment of John Miller, a prostitution abolitionist, as Chairman of the Office to
DENVER LAW RE VIEW
National Security Presidential Directive in February 2002, which framed
trafficking as a national security issue in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Hence, the anti-trafficking advocacy of the past two decades crystalized
century-old narratives featuring women forced into prostitution as traf-
ficking victims, and traffickers as threats to border security and public
safety.8 0
This framework also entrenched the criminalization approach to
trafficking, advocating for law enforcement as a means to rescue of vic-
tims and identify and punish traffickers. When the TVPA was reauthor-
ized in 2008, one of the amended provisions called for the promulgation
of Model State Criminal Provisions on pimping, pandering, and prostitu-
tion.81 These provisions, modeled on Chapter 27 of the Criminal Code of
the District of Columbia, were intended to supplement existing state
criminal frameworks with specific provisions involving commercial sex
exploitation of minors and compelled or coerced commercial sex acts.82
A subsequent amendment clarified (and lessened) the government's bur-
den when proving the age of the victim in commercial sex trafficking
prosecutions.83 Since Congress passed the TVPA, federal and local law
enforcement have also become increasingly involved in identifying un-
documented individuals and placing them in removal proceedings.84
Critics of the TVPA's criminalization provisions point out that the
emphasis on criminalization places trafficked individuals at the risk of
arrest, prosecution, and deportation. These aspects also make migration
itself more dangerous and contribute to the prevalence of trafficking.
This criminal framework also brings a greater number of individuals
under state scrutiny, particularly people of color.85 Criminal law aspects
of the TVPA have also facilitated aspects of restrictive immigration poli-
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and his anti-prostitution campaign, which further con-
flated prostitution and trafficking).
79. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Trafficking in Persons Nation-
al Security Presidential Directive (Feb. 25, 2003), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/trafpers.html.
80. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 382-85 (2006); see also Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1637-43.
81. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
§ 225(b), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5072 (2008).
82. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Model State Provisions on Pimping, Pandering, and Prostitu-
tion, Explanatory Notes, http://www.justice.gov/olp/model-state-provisions-pimping-pandering-and-
prostitution (last updated June 18, 2014).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2012) (amending the law such that the prosecution need not
prove that the defendant knew the victim was under the age of eighteen if the defendant had "a
reasonable opportunity to observe the [victim]").
84. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1290
(2010); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 88, 92 (2005); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion
That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal
Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1820-21 (2011).
85. See, e.g., Kamala Kempadoo, Victims and Agents of Crime: The New Crusade Against
Trafficking, in GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE, GENDER, AND THE PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 35,
38-42 (Julia Sudbury ed., 2005); see also discussion infra Sections II.A.-B., III.B.
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cy. These enforcement practices include greater involvement by federal
courts 86 and law enforcement, including agencies concerned with immi-
gration and border control. States' adoption of a law enforcement-
centered approach is comparable to domestic violence policy in that it
demonstrates a commitment to treating these violations as serious of-
fenses. However, many advocates argue that the need to prosecute of-
fenders must be balanced with protection for victims, just as the law has
done in the domestic violence context.87
II. RECASTING TRAFFICKING NARRATIVES
The phenomenon of human trafficking is enormous and complex,
and how it is understood depends heavily on the perspective by which
one views it. There is limited evidence available-some of which is
based on questionable research-from which to draw conclusions." Me-
dia has traditionally played a key role in the public's understanding of
the problem.89 Feature and documentary films, television shows, journal-
istic accounts, public awareness campaigns, and legislative statements
cast the problem of human trafficking in ways that resonate with the pub-
lic and capture the interest of audiences. These media portrayals, com-
plete with their dramatic narratives and stereotypical characters, become
important sources of information for the public about the realities of traf-
ficking in persons, regardless of the accuracy of facts or authenticity of
the narratives captured therein.90 In particular, images of criminality and
illegality inform attitudes about actual crimes and the people who com-
mit them, even when this information comes from media other than
news, such as entertainment or commercials.91 These popular narratives,
86. Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1611.
87. Id. at 1626-27.
88. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING COMMERCIAL
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MINORS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Ellen Wright
Clayton et al. eds., 2013) ("The committee's review of commercial sexual exploitation and sex
trafficking in minors in the United States was constrained by the extremely limited evidence base
related to these crimes, particularly in the areas of prevention and intervention strategies. In addition,
the committee found considerable variability in the quality of current research in these areas.");
Jonathan Todres, Human Trafficking and Film: How Popular Portrayals Influence Law and Public
Perception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 19 (2015).
89. See, e.g., Annie Isabel Fukushima & Julietta Hua, Calling the Consumer Activist, Con-
suming the Trafficking Subject: Call + Response and the Terms of Legibility, in DOCUMENTING
GENDERED VIOLENCE: REPRESENTATIONS, COLLABORATIONS, AND MOVEMENTS 45, 49 (Lisa M.
Cuklanz & Heather McIntosh eds., 2015) ("Because trafficking can happen anywhere to anyone, and
its exact form is uncertain, trafficking privileges visuality and the trope of revelation. Documentary
film, even as it presents a constructed vision, has an element of witness that alongside trafficking's
presumed need to be witnessed in order to be stopped."); see also Todres, supra note 88, at 24.
90. Edith Kinney, Victims, Villains, and Valiant Rescuers: Unpacking Sociolegal Construc-
tions of Human Trafficking and Crimmigration in Popular Culture, in THE ILLEGAL BUSINESS OF
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 87, 90 (Maria Joo Guia ed., 2015) (first citing Linda Heath & Kevin Gilbert,
Mass Media and Fear of Crime, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 379 (1996); then citing SHANTO IYENGAR &
DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION (updated ed.
2010)).
91. Id. at 88 ("Official sources explain the paucity of data regarding victims of trafficking in
the U.S. by stating: 'we are not finding victims in the United States because we are not looking for
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and the policies they inspire, carry baggage from historical debates about
the rights of women, racial minorities, and noncitizens. As these tropes
persist, so does the rationalization of a law-enforcement driven re-
sponse.92
These forms of public understanding have not only shaped the de-
velopment of the law, as alluded to previously, but also play a vital role
in how the law is applied and enforced. For example, in the context of
domestic violence law, clients tell their stories to judges, and elements of
those stories make their way into findings of fact and conclusions of
law.93 In immigration courts, images of "good" and "bad" immigrants
affect eligibility for immigration relief.94 In criminal trafficking arrests
and prosecutions, local and federal law enforcement are informed by
these stories as well.
Popular trafficking narratives tend to feature three stock characters,
which this Article will refer to as "the innocent victim," "the evil offend-
er," and "the good rescuer."95 Congressional debates leading up to the
passage of the TVPA featured repeated references to the figure of the
innocent victim-individuals lured or forced into trafficking situations,
particularly in the sex industry.96 Offenders in these cases included un-
derhanded recruiters, organized crime bosses, and brutal pimps.97 Popu-
lar portrayals of trafficking frame these acts in association with danger-
ous criminal enterprise, implying that law enforcement response is the
logical (and necessary) response. This prompts public pressure for the
state to intervene via the criminal justice system as rescuer.98
Critical feminist scholars have noted in these "victimization ac-
counts" the troubling racial and neocolonial themes of nafvet6, back-
wardness, and sexual deviancy as pertaining to women from the global
South, as well as the tendency of these stories to "rely on dichotomous
framings of 'good' and 'bad' human rights actors."99 Scholars have also
them.' This sets up a dynamic where awareness-raising reports by journalists and others in the 'res-
cue industry' emphasise [sic] the scope, scale, and suffering of trafficking victims to trigger and
justify law enforcement efforts to tackle 'the hidden crime' of trafficking.").
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 4, at 81.
94. See generally Keyes, supra note 4, 226-27.
95. Kinney, supra note 90, at 92.
96. 146 CONG. REc. 7293-94 (2000) (statement of Rep. Pitts); see also Trafficking of Women
and Children in the International Sex Trade. Hearing on HR. 1356 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Operations & Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. 56 (1999) [hereinafter
Trafficking of Women and Children in the International Sex Trade] (statement of Rep. Smith),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg63274/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg63274.pdf; id at 41
(statement of Gary A. Haugen, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Justice Mis-
sion); id. at 35 (statement of Anita Sharma Bhattari, trafficking survivor).
97. Trafficking of Women and Children in the International Sex Trade, supra note 96, at 35-
36.
98. Kinney, supra note 90, at 88.
99. Id. at 92 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that anti-
trafficking discourses reflect "particular conceptions of migration, female sexuality, and the sex
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noted the parallels with the white slavery moral panic, in which public
understanding of the dangers posed to white women fueled a campaign
that ultimately restricted freedom of movement for women worldwide.00
Even where individuals benefit from conforming to this idealized image
of the "perfect victim," they may do so in ways that deny the realities of
their lived experiences and their dignity before the law. Reinforcing the-
se images may also be detrimental to others who might seek relief in the
future if they cannot live up to the idealized role of a worthy victim. 0 1
These narratives are also troubling because for every victim, there
must be a perpetrator, and there is a narrative tendency to make victims
more pure or make perpetrators more evil to show contrast between
them.10 2 A "good victim" is likely to obtain benefits, such as social ser-
vices and immigration status, and escape prosecution, whereas a "bad
offender" is likely to be found guilty and sentenced under the criminal
law framework. Unfortunately, when a survivor is not "good" or "pure"
enough to be seen as a victim, he or she is likely to be deemed ineligible
for relief. Worse yet, he or she may be subject to prosecution for a crime
associated with the trafficking situation or removal from the United
States for an immigration violation. In this sense, victims may be seen as
perpetrators and may be portrayed in the worst possible light to justify
punishment under the fullest extent of the law. Particularly in the era of
immigration enforcement, these narratives carry tremendous power to
shape responses to trafficking. Law enforcement officers, expected to act
as rescuers, may rely on.narratives in ways that render individuals sus-
pect based on their gender, race, immigration status, or national origin.
A. The Victim Role
1. The "Innocent Victim"
The victim construct in the trafficking narrative emerged in the ear-
ly days of the white slavery campaign. Legal reformers used images of
innocent women, kidnapped and forced into prostitution, as justification
for criminal penalties. This quintessential victim was entirely passive in
order to show that she had no responsibility for her situation and was
industry, reflecting deeper fears and uncertainties, concerning national identity, women's increasing
desire for autonomy, foreigners [and] immigrants"); see also Julietta Hua & Holly Nigorizawa, US
Sex Trafficking, Women's Human Rights and the Politics of Representation, 12 INT'L FEMINIST J.
POL. 401, 409 (2010); Jo Doezema, Loose Women or Lost Women? The Re-Emergence of the Myth
of 'White Slavery' in Contemporary Discourses of 'Trafficking in Women,' 18 GENDER ISSUES 23,
34 (2000).
100. Doezema, supra note 99, at 41.
101. See, e.g., Rose Broad, 'A Vile and Violent Thing': Female Traffickers and the Criminal
Justice Response, 55 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1058, 1068-69 (2015) (describing the harsh sentencing
of female traffickers, even though their "relationships and previous victimization [were] significant
in their pathways into . .. offending").
102. See Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
915, 938 (2015).
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therefore completely deserving of public sympathy.10 3 The victim's inno-
cence was further reinforced by her appearance-specifically her youth,
virginity, and whiteness. 10 This image of the victim persists even in con-
temporary anti-trafficking discourse. The role of the victim in trafficking
narratives has not changed-she remains an icon for mobilizing reform
to combat "modern-day slavery." 05 She bears resemblance to the proto-
typical battered woman, an image that played a comparable role in the
criminalization of domestic violence 06 and rape.107
The iconic trafficking victim of the present day bears a striking re-
semblance to the "white slave"-she is female, trafficked for sex, and
blameless for her plight because of her youth or lack of education; she is
rescued by law enforcement instead of escaping on her own, is coopera-
tive in the investigation, and is flawlessly credible as a witness for the
prosecution. os Just as in the case of the virginal white slave, the rescue
of the modem-day trafficking victim "puts a 'soft glove' on the 'punish-
ing fist' of American immigration enforcement," rationalizing criminal
enforcement as the necessary means to protect the innocent, feminine
subject.10 Her passivity and blamelessness conceptually separate her
from the illegal immigrant or prostitute and render her worthy of legal
protection.
A particularly powerful example of the power of the trafficking vic-
tim icon is "Christina," a figure invoked in an anti-trafficking rally in the
early 2000s, as documented in the field notes of scholar Elizabeth Bern-
stein. The keynote speaker at an event described Christina as a young
woman lured by the promise of a babysitting job, who was ultimately
forced to work in a brothel. According to the speaker, Christina found
prostitution to be a "disgusting," "degrading," and "traumatic" experi-
ence, and tragically discovered that she was infertile once she managed
to escape.10 Bernstein notes that she heard this story retold a number of
times with only minor differences, "the only significant alteration being
103. Doezema, supra note 99, at 28.
104. Id
105. Kinney, supra note 90, at 91; see also Bernstein, supra note 25, at 239 (describing the
"victim subject" as the galvanizing figure of what he calls governance through crime, and arguing
that "the crime victim has supplanted the rights-bearing citizen as the idealized legal subject of our
time").
106. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 793 (2007);
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and Intersectional Theory on
Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 531, 543 (2013).
107. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 583, 589-90, 592-94 (2012).
108. See Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 187; see also Jennifer Musto, Domestic Minor Sex Traf-
ficking and the Detention-to-Protection Pipeline, 37 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 257, 266 (2013)
(illustrating that age, gender, and heteronormative behavior all play a role in convincing fact-finders
that victimization has actually occurred).
109. Kinney, supra note 90, at 94-95.
110. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 248.
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the victim's name."'11 She also found that the Department of Justice had
no record of any prosecuted cases with a victim matching Christina's
description.1 12 As with the iconic victims of the white slavery epidemic,
the facts of Christina's story were less important than her role in a narra-
tive to drive a particular brand of reform.1 3
It remains unclear whether Christina was a real person or a sympa-
thetic composite, but the use of victims as prototypes has troubling im-
plications. Individuals may be pressured, directly or indirectly, to con-
form to an idealized victim image. Jill Brenneman, a survivor of coerced
prostitution who at one point was involved with a sector of the anti-
trafficking movement, recalls that she was encouraged to change the
narrative of her experiences to conform more closely to a political mes-
sage.114 Other scholars have documented the ways in which the charged
language of victimhood changes the way in which exploited individuals
tell their stories. 115
This image also plays an influential role in identification of traffick-
ing victims.116 In discretionary matters of immigration law, for example,
categories of relief serve as "proxies for" deeper "questions of worthi-
ness,"ll7 and nowhere is that truth more starkly illustrated than in traf-
ficking cases. Immigrants, often times through advocacy by their attor-
neys, may also find themselves cast as victims to make themselves more
eligible for immigration relief, such as T and U visas that are available
for survivors of trafficking and labor exploitation.' These narratives,
however, are fragile and may pose risks to individuals within the justice
system. Although Christina has not been a subject of public interroga-
tion, other individuals subject to trafficking or exploitation who have
been placed on the "iconic victim" pedestal have later been discredited
111. Id.; see also Erin Denton, International News Coverage of Human Trafficking Arrests and
Prosecutions: A Content Analysis, 20 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 10, 20 (2010) ("Many such articles [in
the study analyzing global media accounts of human trafficking] told stories of young women forced
into sexual servitude but frequently failed to mention any specific details regarding a trafficking
offense and rarely used real names and locations. Although it is certainly possible that these editori-
al-style reports were based on actual cases of trafficking, little explanation can be provided for why
some articles were specifically related to a trafficking offense and others merely adopted what could
be perceived as a scare-tactic approach to addressing sex slavery.").
112. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 248-49.
113. See id. at 239; see also Kinney, supra note 90, at 91.
114. See Maggie McNeill, Mind-Witness Testimony: The Unreliability of First-Person Ac-
counts in Sex Trafficking Discourse, 7 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 56, 83-84 (2014) (quoting Jill Bren-
neman as saying that individuals encouraged her to "lie[], which they call 're-framing experiences',
to make their point. As difficult and extreme as my experiences were, they wanted me to re-frame
them, meaning add things that didn't happen to make it worse.").
115. Id. at 70-73.
116. Musto, supra note 108, at 266 (quoting a vice detective as saying, "The district attorney is
looking to find young trafficked victims chained to beds. It's hard to convince a jury that older
women can be victims [of trafficking]. So it's the young victims the DA is after and that's who we
look for. But most of our girls aren't perfect victims." (alteration in original)).
117. Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to "Worthiness"
Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law's Civil Rights Goals, 57 How. L.J. 899, 900 (2014).
118. See Keyes, supra note 4, at 226-3 1.
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for embellishing their stories.'19 The stakes are much higher for individu-
als in criminal or immigration proceedings. As narratives fall apart under
scrutiny, victims may be discredited as witnesses or deemed ineligible
for services, legal relief, or protection from prosecution.
2. Recasting the Victim
a. Age, Gender, Race, and Sexual Exploitation
Popular narratives overwhelmingly portray human trafficking as a
crime against women.120 This is due, in part, to the frequent reduction of
trafficking to only the crimes of forced prostitution and sexual exploita-
tion. Many of the victims featured in the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity's Blue Campaign to combat human traffickingl 2 1 and other public
anti-trafficking campaigns are young women, often Latina or Asian, with
overt or subtle references to sex trafficking.122 Scholars have criticized
the construct of the "human trafficking victim" as gendered, racialized,
and infantilized-imbued with stereotypes about "third world" wom-
en. 123 There are relatively few references to the context of labor traffick-
ing. These portrayal of victims also fail to acknowledge the research
findings that men and boys are also victims of trafficking, including sex
trafficking.124
119. One high-profile example is the story of Somaly Main, an anti-trafficking activist in
Cambodia, profiled in Nicholas Kristof's documentary Half the Sky and selected as one of Time
Magazine's "100 Most Influential People" list in 2009. See Angelina Jolie, The 2009 Time 100:
Somaly Main, TIME MAG. (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1894410_1894289_1894268,00.html.
Main resigned from the head of her foundation in 2014 following a Newsweek expos6 on inconsist-
encies in Mam's accounts of her victimization and the experiences of trafficking survivors in Cam-
bodia, many of which were found to have been fabricated. Simon Marks, Somaly Mam: The Holy
Saint (and Sinner) of Sex Trafficking, NEWSWEEK (May 21, 2014, 5:49 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/30/somaly-mam-holy-saint-and-sinner-sex-trafficking-
251642.html; Taylor Wofford, Somaly Mam Foundation Closes, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 20, 2014, 6:28
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/somaly-mam-foundation-closes-278657.
120. See, e.g., Todres, supra note 88, at 11 (analyzing portrayals of trafficking in three popular
films and noting, "If you watched these three films, you would think that young women and girls are
the only victims of human trafficking. No man or boy is shown as a victim in any of these films.").
121. See, e.g., Annie Isabel Fukushima, Mellon Postdoctoral Assoc., Rutgers Univ., Lecture at
the Transnational Feminisms Summer Institute: Caged, Bound, and Shackled: Diasporan Crossings
and the Tethering of Subjects to Anti-Violence Iconographies (July 7, 2014); Kasey Carmile Ragan,
Rhetoric Constructs Reality: Using Feminist Scholarship to Assess an Anti-Human Trafficking
Campaign 14-15, 90-91 (Dec. 2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Northern Arizona University).
122. See Erin O'Brien, Human Trafficking Heroes and Villains: Representing the Problem in
Anti-Trafficking Awareness Campaigns, 25 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 205, 208-09 (2016).
123. See, e.g., Doezema, supra note 99, at 37-38; Fukushima & Hua, supra note 89, at 53
(noting that the victims in the Call + Response campaign materials are largely identified as south or
southeast Asian); see also Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
"Native" Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1,
1-2 (2002); Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 35; Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 187. But see Butler, supra
note 5, at 1495-1500 (arguing that iconic victims are still white women and that individuals of color
are frequently overlooked as victims of trafficking).
124. See SARA ANN FRIEDMAN, ECPAT-USA, AND BOYS Too 5-6 (2013),
http://www.eepatusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/and-boys-to-report.pdf.
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Popular images of victims have traction with individuals directly
tasked with enforcing trafficking laws and identifying victims in need of
relief and assistance. There is an impression among some law enforce-
ment officials that most victims are U.S. citizen children, though studies
suggest otherwise.125 Scholar Jennifer Musto observes in her interviews
with law enforcement agents that
it was common for general discussions about human trafficking to
veer toward conversations about forced prostitution and invariably,
US-born underage girls forced into prostitution by trafficker pimps.
Most law enforcement officers agreed that they have come across ev-
er more US-born victims of domestic trafficking. Whether referenced
as runaways, throwaways, domestic trafficked minors, or the victims
of commercial sexual exploitation, there was a consistent emphasis
on the fact that that victims are young (varying from 10 to 17 years of
age) and that they keep getting younger.126
These perceptions are striking when compared with federal traffick-
ing prosecution patterns. According to the most recent U.S. Department
of Justice report, which analyzed 2,515 suspected trafficking cases
opened by federally-funded task forces between January 2008 and June
2011, around 82% of trafficking cases involved sex trafficking. 27 The
majority of the victims in these cases were women.128 Most of the sex
trafficking victims were U.S. citizens,129 and many of them were identi-
fied as white or black/African-American.130 Less than half of the cases
classified as sex trafficking involved prostitution or sexual exploitation
of minors,'31 though most cases involved victims age twenty-four or
younger.132 Numbers suggest, however, that there may be a growing law
enforcement focus on pursuing child prostitution and sexual exploitation
125. See, e.g., Denton, supra note 111, at 17-18.
126. Musto, supra note 108, at 265.
127. DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008-2010, at 3
(2011) (reporting that 82.1% of trafficking cases opened for investigation in January 2008 and June
2010 were sex trafficking cases, compared to 13.9% which were labor trafficking cases, 2.6% of
which were "other suspected trafficking," and 6.8% of which were unknown); see also Denton,
supra note 111, at 20 (arguing, based on an analysis of global media coverage of human trafficking,
that sex trafficking is over-reported).
128. BANKS & KYCKELHAIHN, supra note 127, at 6 (reporting that 432 out of 460 matters
classified as sex trafficking cases involved women, compared with 27 that involved men).
129. Id. (finding that 345 out of 460 victims in sex trafficking cases were U.S. citi-
zens/nationals, compared to 6 who were legal permanent residents, 64 who were undocumented
aliens, 0 who were temporary workers, and 41 whose status was unknown).
130. Id. (finding that 102 out of 460 victims in sex trafficking cases were identified as white
and 161 were identified as Black/African-American, compared to 95 who were identified as Hispan-
ic/Latino, 17 who were identified as Asian, 23 of which were identified as "other," and 61 whose
race was unknown).
131. Id. at 3 (reporting that 40% of matters classified as "sex trafficking" involved minors,
compared to 48% that involved adults).
132. Id. at 6 (reporting that 248 out of 460 individuals identified as victims in sex trafficking
cases were age 17 or younger, and 124 were ages 18-24, compared with 46 who were ages 25-34,
12 who were age 35 or older, and 12 whose ages were unknown).
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cases because the TVPA does not require proof of force, fraud, or coer-
cion when the victim is a minor.133 By 2013, prosecutions with a lead
charge of sex trafficking of minors had increased from 35 to 203-nearly
a five-fold increase.1 3 4 The number of prosecutions for the 2016 fiscal
year-to-date is 273 under this lead charge,1 35 compared to two prosecu-
tions with a lead charge of sale into involuntary servitude,1 36 two prose-
cutions with a lead charge of trafficking with respect to slavery,137 and
nine prosecutions with a lead charge of forced labor.'38
These prosecution demographics contrast sharply with the available
statistical data on labor trafficking. Internationally, labor trafficking rep-
resents a significant percentage of all trafficking cases.139 The most re-
cent U.S. statistics, however, indicate that a scarce 11% of trafficking
cases in the reporting period involved labor trafficking.14 0 Interestingly,
133. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2012) (explaining that sex trafficking occurs when the sexual
conduct in question is "induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age" (emphasis added)).
134. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FOURFOLD INCREASE IN
PROSECUTIONS OF CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING CRIMES SINCE 2008: PROSECUTIONS FOR 18 USC 1591
THROUGH JUNE 2013 (2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/328/.
135. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LEAD CHARGE: 18 USC 1591 - SEX
TRAFFICKING OF CHILDREN BY FORCE, FRAUD OR COERCION (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/cgi-
bin/product/interpreter.pl?tab=criminal&pseries=annual&pstat-fil&agenrevgrp=&distcode=&pro
ggrp=&progcat-&tracleadcharge=1 8+%3A00001591 &varlist-&varlistsubmit-&countlist-&mon
thcountlist-&statcount-133041 &statmonthcount= 10090&statcost-] &costlist-&month=sep&ye
ar-16&t=1482461899&_SERVICE=express9&_DEBUG=0&_PROGRAM=interp.annualreport.sas.
136. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LEAD CHARGE: 18 USC 1584 -
SALE INTO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/cgi-
bin/product/interpreter.pl?tab=criminal&pseries=annual&pstat-fil&agenrevgrp=&distcode=&pro
ggrp=&progcat--&trac_1eadcharge=18+%3A00001584&varlist-&varlistsubmit-&countlist-&mon
thcountlist-&stat-count- 133041 &stat-monthcount- I 0090&stat-cost- I &costlist-&month=sep&ye
ar-16&t-1482462061&_SERVICE=express9&_DEBUG=0&PROGRAM=interp.annualreport.sas.
137. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LEAD CHARGE: 18 USC 1590 -





138. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LEAD CHARGE: 18 USC 1589 -





139. See INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, ILO GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR: RESULTS &
METHODOLOGY 13 (2012),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_1
82004.pdf; see also JONATHAN MARTENS & JETTE CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., INT'L ORG. FOR
MIGRATION, COUNTER TRAFFICKING AND ASSISTANCE TO VULNERABLE MIGRANTS: ANNUAL
REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 2011, at 18 (2012), https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-
Do/docs/Annual Report_2011_Counter_Trafficking.pdf.
140. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 127, at 3 & tbl.2 (finding that 278 out of 2515 traf-
ficking cases in the reporting period, or 11 .1%, were identified as trafficking cases). It is also worth
noting that, for purposes of analysis, matters involving both labor and sex trafficking were classified
as sex trafficking cases. Id. at 3.
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the majority of victims in these cases were also female,141 which raises
questions about he extent to which law enforcement officers identify
men as trafficking victims. Individuals identified in labor trafficking cas-
es were predominately Hispanic/ Latino,142 and most victims were above
the age of twenty-five.143 These statistics suggest that individuals who do
not fit the traditional image of victims, such men or older adults, are less
likely to be identified as individuals who merit relief.1
Critiques of trafficking policy have focused heavily on the danger
stereotypes pose to victims who do not fit these images.145 In the exam-
ple above, because labor trafficking enterprises are also associated with
adult men,146 gender stereotypes about victims are likely interfere with
the successful identification of individuals subject to workplace exploita-
tion. Where an individual is not identified as a victim, it is more likely
that he or she will be subject to punishment, as in the case of an unau-
thorized worker or undocumented immigrant. To assign culpability, the
individual's transgressions are more likely to be attributed to choice ra-
ther than coercion in the course of a criminal prosecution or removal
proceeding.147
b. Agency
The innocent victim is an individual who does not wish to be in a
trafficking situation, but is incapable of leaving it. This image manifests
in law enforcement bias against individuals who self-report after leaving
their trafficking situations of their own accord; data suggests that offi-
cials are also more likely to believe the accounts of individuals they have
rescued through law enforcement operations.148 This stereotype of help-
141. Id. at 6 & tbl.5 (finding that 43 out of 63 matters classified as "labor trafficking" involved
a female victim, compared to 20 that involved a male victim).
142. Id. at 6 tbl.5 (finding that 34 out of 63 individuals identified as victims of labor trafficking
were Hispanic/Latino, compared to one who was white, 6 who were Black/African-American, 9 who
were Asian, II who were identified as "other," and 2 whose race were unknown).
143. Id. (finding that 22 out of 63 individuals identified as victims of labor trafficking were age
25-34 and 15 were age 35 or older, compared with 6 who were age 17 or younger and 17 who were
age 18-24).
144. Id.; see also Denton, supra note 111, at 21 (finding that in an analysis of recent news
stories on trafficking, 7% of men were identified as exploited and the remaining 93% were identified
as voluntarily smuggled and suggesting that "trafficked males are rarely given the victim-status
attention in the media that heir female and child counterparts receive").
145. See Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 158, 160-61, 170; see also Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not)
Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the
Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 347 (2007).
146. See Susan Carroll, Traffickers Force More Men into Servitude, HOUS. CHRON. (July 6,
2009, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Traffickers-force-more-men-
into-servitude-1730660.php (quoting a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services spokesper-
son who attributed the increase in the number of male victims to an increase in labor trafficking
cases).
147. Jennifer Lynne Musto, What's in a Name?: Conflations and Contradictions in Contempo-
rary U.S. Discourses ofHuman Trafficking, 32 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 281, 283 (2009).
148. Dina Haynes, Conceptual, Legal and Implementation Gaps in the Protection of Trafficked
Persons in the United States, WILSON CTR., Summer 2010, at 16, 17-18 (Middle East Program &
United States Studies Occasional Paper Series),
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lessness inhibits effective identification of trafficked people, particularly
where they are disinclined to self-identify as "trafficking victims."1 49
Where individuals exercise independent capacity for decision-making,
their status as victims becomes legally debatable. The law attempts to
parse questions of agency in decisions to migrate and undertake risky
work arrangements. The Trafficking Protocol and Smuggling Protocol
attempt to clearly distinguish the two phenomena, where in fact many
migration cases occupy a gray area between them.150
The existing legal approach is in tension with migration theory,
which posits that the migration process is best understood as a process of
free will. 15 As Saskia Sassen observes, migration is a matter of initiative
rather than passive osmosis: "only certain people leave, and they travel
on highly structured routes to their destinations, rather than gravitate
blindly toward any rich country they can enter." 52 The agency of female
migrants in particular troubles the dominant narratives about labor mi-
gration. Recent studies in migration theory, however, specifically cast the
"new migrant" as a female looking to break from social roles and con-
straints including familial expectations, such as the expectation to care
for elderly relatives, to marry, to carry out gender roles determined by
society, or to turn over paychecks to male relatives.153 From this perspec-
tive, migrations are matters of choice but never completely voluntary-
each decision is influenced by "push" and "pull" factors.154 Economic,
political, and social circumstances contribute to an individual's desire to
migrate,'5 5 blurring the distinction between agency and coercion. In the
words of Professor Dina Haynes, "[t]he legal fiction is that one can either
be a victim or a capable person of free will, but not both." 56
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Rethinking%20Human%2OTrafficking.pdf; see also
Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 183 ("[T]he regulations ... grant preference to victims who are rescued
by law enforcement over those who escape from trafficking, a preference that appears nowhere in
the statute. Victims whose cases come to light because they escaped from traffickers not only must
convince law enforcement to issue an LEA, but also must convince DHS that they could not have
left the country after escaping their traffickers.").
149. See, e.g., Cheng & Kim, supra note 78, at 363-64.
150. See supra Section I.C.
151. Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Legal Lines Between
Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 7-
8 (2009).
152. SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS 2 (1999).
153. See id. at 19-20; see also Shelley Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way
Feminist Account of Trafficking for Sex Work, 86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1442 (2011) (describing the need
for a more nuanced view of coercion that takes into account the marginalizing experiences of wom-
en).
154. See Carolyn Hoyle, Mary Bosworth & Michelle Dempsey, Labelling the Victims of Sex
Trafficking: Exploring the Borderland Between Rhetoric and Reality, 20 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 313,
322 (2011).
155. See, e.g., Nicole Constable, Migrant Workers, Cross-Border Marriages, and Trafficking,
WILSON CTR., Summer 2010, at 26, 26 (Middle East Program & United States Studies Occasional
Paper Series),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Rethinking%20Human%2Trafficking.pdf
156. Haynes, supra note 151, at 7.
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The narrow conception of a victim permits the state to re-categorize
a small number of individuals, particularly (young) women associated
with sex work, as victims of abuse rather than as laborers.'5 7 When traf-
ficking victims are migrants with agency, their lived experience blurs
this convenient distinction between "trafficking" and "smuggling for
purposes of economic migration," perhaps tipping the scale in favor of
designation as an offender rather than a victim.1 5 8 Irregular migration
often becomes the only option for people-men and women-to exercise
a modicum of choice, increasing the likelihood that people will continue
to take risks when accepting employment.159 For this very reason, schol-
ars argue that the existing anti-trafficking framework, with its emphasis
on border control, actually makes it more likely that global migrants will
become involved in trafficking.160
c. Consent and Coercion
To be identified as a trafficking victim, an individual must be seen
as someone who was forced, defrauded, or coerced into labor exploita-
tion.161 In determining whether an individual has been coerced, one must
consider the role of a worker's consent.162 Those who seek protection as
legally-designated trafficking victims must therefore demonstrate their
lack of capacity for consent or argue that they were forced, coerced, or
deceived into the work arrangement.163
Consent in the trafficking context, however, is frequently compli-
cated by a number of factors. Immigration status,'1 youth,16 5 gendered
oppression,1 66 education and experience,167 and poverty may all play a
role in an individual's decision-making.16 8 Research on global migration
157. Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 194, 197.
158. See id. at 197.
159. LEE, supra note 7, at 30.
160. See id. at 31; see also Constable, supra note 155, at 26 ("In reality, although economic
factors are primary, motivations are often more complex. Women work in Hong Kong for many
reasons besides economic need, including escaping marital problems or familial conflicts, or a desire
for travel and adventure. Filipina DWs are well educated and do not come from the poorest sector of
the Philippine population. If they were, they would not be able to afford the required fees associated
with working overseas. Many were under-employed or dissatisfied with opportunities in the Philip-
pines, and their incomes may be higher as DWs in Hong Kong. Many described their decisions as
the most desirable 'choice' among the available options.").
161. See generally Haynes, supra note 151, at 7.
162. Id.; see also Constable, supra note 155, at 26.
163. Constable, supra note 155, at 26; Haynes, supra note 151, at 7.
164. See Haynes, supra note 151, at 7.
165. See Cheryl Nelson Butler, Kids for Sale: Does America Recognize Its Own Sexually
Exploited Minors as Victims ofHuman Trafficking?, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 833, 835 (2014).
166. See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 29 (2009).
167. See Diana Tietjens Meyers, Feminism and Sex Trafficking: Rethinking Some Aspects of
Autonomy and Paternalism, 17 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 427, 433-34 (2014).
168. See Kay B. Warren, Troubling the Victim/Trafficker Dichotomy in Efforts to Combat
Human Trafficking: The Unintended Consequences of Moralizing Labor Migration, 19 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 110 (2012).
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shows countless exercises of consent and agency, but at the same time
workers regularly assume risks in their employment arrangements.169
Many workers who decide to migrate understand that work options on
the whole are undesirable-whether in the home country or destination
country-but work in the destination country is better compensated.170
There is also a question of type and degree when it comes to the undesir-
ability of an employment opportunity. For migrant workers in the sex
industry, some may know beforehand that their job involves a sexual
component, but as Laura Maria Agustin points out, "knowing beforehand
is a poor measure of exploitation and unhappiness, since no one can
know what working conditions will feel like in any future occupation.,
171
Critical to this discussion is the reality that sex work is like any other
form of labor, particularly in the informal sector-work that one can
consent to, where conditions of exploitation may independently exist, but
which is not in itself inherently abusive.172
Though human trafficking includes a number of situations of abuse
and exploitation, there is tension between the threat of violence within
the process and conditions of migration itself and the structural inequali-
ty imposed by immigration, labor, and criminal law enforcement frame-
works.173 This makes for a highly individualized, nuanced, and at times
ambiguous framework for consent-one that is difficult for the state to
standardize and embrace. Aspects of this understanding of consent may
also conflict with individual law enforcement officers' beliefs and as-
sumptions about coercion, exploitation, and sex work. For example, in
Jennifer Musto's field research, a vice detective interview subject ex-
pressed the opinion that
prostitution is never voluntary. Even if a person says it is, they're
not.... And whether it be the economics or whatever of the situa-
tion, that's coercing them to do it. It's not something they want to do.
If they could make money doing something else they
169. Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 37-38 ("[Workers] often do not know, or sometimes tacitly
accept, . . . the dangers of underground routes they have to take to cross a border; the financial costs;
the type of activities; the working and living conditions upon arrival; the high level of dependence
on a particular set of recruiters, agents, or employers; the health risks; the duration of the job; their
criminalized status once in an overseas location; the enforcement violence; and/or periods of deten-
tion or incarceration they may face.").
170. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 168, at 110, 112 ("[Many migrant women] see themselves as
people who made unfortunate job decisions that resulted in their having to work in exploitative and
dangerous conditions with poor pay, both chronic issues in their work lives as a whole whether or
not they leave their home communities.").
171. LAURA MARIA AGUSTIN, SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION, LABOUR MARKETS AND
THE RESCUE INDUSTRY 30 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kempadoo, supra
note 85, at 38 ("Most trafficked persons ... express some personal desire to migrate, and about half
of women in the global sex trade appear to be conscious of the fact that they will be involved in
some form of sex work prior to migration.").
172. See Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 37.
173. Id. at 37-38.
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would.. .. [I]t's very degrading and there's no way a person would
do what they would do for money.174
Musto specifically notes that this vice detective was speaking in the
context of young girls who lacked the age and life experience to fully
consent, but in the course of the agent's narrative, these young girls
"come to stand in for the entire population of adult female, male, and
transgender sex workers."7 5
These distinctions are critical because eliminating the possibility of
consent also eliminates meaningful exercise of agency and autonomy.
Work, including sex work, may involve aspects of consent and choice,
regardless of economic push and pull factors. 176 As Meyers explains,
even though these workers may be subject to the constraints of jobless
economies, research does not reinforce the notion of "women as passive
pawns of economic pressures and criminal gangs," but rather as individ-
uals who are known to "rebuff sex traffickers" and "manipulate the traf-
ficking system to their own advantage."l77 This does not discount the fact
that abuse can and does certainly occur under these circumstances, and
serious harm may result.'7 8 Individual experiences of marginalization and
desperation may contribute to decisions made around consent.17 9 Kamala
Kempadoo posits that individuals may use their agency in ways that gen-
erate income and permit survival, but the circumstances of travel and
work, particularly in informal and underground sectors, may facilitate
exploitation.!80 She points out that "[s]ituations in which women are ab-
ducted or kidnapped, chained to beds in brothels, and held as sex or other
types of slaves are rarely documented," and that labor exploitation and
migratory processes are much more common sites of trafficking and oth-
er forms of exploitation.181 The question is, to what extent the state will
consider any of these individual factors, including whether individuals
who demonstrate agency in the form of consent are eligible for assis-
tance.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has acknowledged
the challenges inherent in assessment of consent and coercion in the law
enforcement context, which can create challenges in identifying both
174. Musto, supra note 108, at 265.
175. Id.
176. Meyers, supra note 167, at 432.
177. Id.
178. Musto, supra note 108, at 265.
179. See Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 37 ("[W]omen are not simply located as victims of
terrifying or paralyzing male power or as a homogeneous group. Rather, they are co-located in this
perspective as agentic, self-determining, differentially positioned subjects who are capable of nego-
tiating, complying with, as well as consciously opposing and transforming relations of power,






victims and offenders.'82 While a prosecutorial approach under the
TVPA would favor a clear case of coercion, deception, or fraud to recruit
and retain trafficked workers, the issues of false promises and force are
quite complicated and speak to a range of different experiences.183 Expe-
riences of force, coercion, and deception are equally subjective.1 84 In-
deed, many scholars view autonomy as episodic and as a matter of de-
gree. The judicial history of coercion in forced labor cases is far from
clearly resolved.186 The TVPA sought to broaden the definition of "psy-
chological coercion" beyond the narrow definition in United States v.
Kozminski.187 Unfortunately, the TVPA's non-specific language around
coercion, while intended to permit inclusion of psychological and other
forms of non-physical coercion, forces a clear designation.'88 This cre-
ates space for unfavorable discretion by law enforcement. Where traf-
ficked individuals demonstrate agency and deviate from the image of the
passive victim, they do not have defenses or mitigating factors for crimi-
nal offenses, such as prostitution, drug use or distribution, unlawful en-
try, or possession of fraudulent documents.189
d. Fallibility
The flip side of agency and consent is that victims cannot always be
considered "innocent" of unlawful conduct. Certain individuals are less
likely to be "rescued" by law enforcement than to be arrested for having
committed another crime.190 From 2000 to 2007, a total of 298 traffick-
182. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ISSUE PAPER: THE ROLE OF 'CONSENT' IN THE
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS PROTOCOL 15 (2014), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/2014/UNODC_2014_Issue Paper Consent.pdf.
183. See, e.g., Julia O'Connell Davidson, Gender, Migration, 'Trafficking' and the Trouble-
some Relationship Between Agency and Force, U. OXFORD FAC. L.: BORDER CRIMINOLOGIES (June
19, 2015), http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/gender-migration-trafficking/ (attributing the
emphasis on voluntariness to the dominant liberal paradigm present throughout the antitrafficking
legal framework); see also AGUSTiN, supra note 171, at 31-32 ("Some intermediaries deceive mi-
grants egregiously, as when the package includes signing a contract whose language and foreign
currencies they cannot comprehend. Some overeager travellers [sic] do not investigate what they are
promised, and some permit false documents to be prepared which render them vulnerable in ways
they cannot imagine.").
184. AGUSTIN, supra note 171, at 32.
185. See Meyers, supra note 167, at 432.
186. See Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day Involuntary
Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U. TOL. L.
REV. 941, 943-44 (2007).
187. 487 U.S. 931 (1988), superseded by statute, Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, as recognized in United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d 900 (8th Cir.
2014); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13) (2012).
188. See Kim, supra note 186, at 966-68.
189. See Musto, supra note 147, at 283.
190. Haynes, supra note 148, at 17; see also Musto, supra note 108, at 266 ("[S]ome law
enforcement conceded that it is much harder to convince people-and especially prosecutors, judges,
and juries-that adults are also victimized, since many assume they are complicit in their own vic-
timization or addicted to 'the life' of prostitution").
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ing cases were filed in U.S. Federal Appellate and District courts.'99
Most of these cases involved female victims in sex trafficking situa-
tions. 192 From the outset, it is clear that these numbers reflect a relatively
small percentage of the individuals in trafficking situations in the United
States, and that these numbers disproportionately exclude forced labor
cases. Prosecutors report a number of challenges to bringing successful
cases under these laws including determining who is a victim, obtaining
"truthful" testimony from victims in light of fear of traffickers, and en-
suring the safety of the victim's family abroad.193 Ultimately, very few
victims testify in trafficking prosecutions.1 94 In addition to the ordinary
considerations of whether witnesses are willing and able to testify, pros-
ecutors face the challenge of producing "good" victims.' 95 As witnesses,
trafficking victims may refer to choices such as travelling abroad, know-
ingly accepting sex work, keeping false passports, and deciding to make
money, all of which might undermine their credibility in court.196 Prose-
cutors might also anticipate that judges and juries might have stereotypes
about who is a victim and may be hesitant to call witnesses who do not
conform to this image.'97 The distinction between traffickers and victims
may therefore become a matter of selectively-presented evidence where
the reality is much more complex.198
Lawmakers have attempted to better protect rafficked persons from
prosecution. For example, for individuals who have received T visas on
account of trafficking, the TVPA makes certain exceptions to the "good
moral character" requirement for legal permanent residence.199 Ordinari-
191. HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT'L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES:
LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 12 (2008),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/223972.pdf.
192. Id. at v (finding that out of the sample of federal cases prosecuted under the TVPA, 71%
of cases involved sex trafficking and 94% involved female victims, whereas 29% involved non-sex-
related labor trafficking).
193. See id. at vi-vii.
194. Id. at vi (finding that out of the sample of federal cases prosecuted under the TVPA,
victims testified at the grand jury hearing in 49% of cases, 40% included victim testimony at trial,
and 11% involved testimony at the disposition; 89% of cases did not involve victim testimony at the
disposition); see also Christine Guida, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office,
Remarks at the Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender Symposium: Sex Work and the Law: Felony,
Fetish, or Free Market? (Nov. 5, 2014), in 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 499, 513 (2015) ("Some
[trafficking] cases, many cases, that I do pursue, where the victim is not cooperative with the prose-
cution, where we either can prove the case evidence-based, photographs, 911 calls, other evidence,
eyewitnesses, or we try to go forward and we try to get them services, and we do whatever we can to
assist the victim of trafficking, we get them enrolled in a program, we give them a referral, we find
them shelter, they get free legal services, job services, whatever we can possibly give them, trauma-
based counseling, whatever the programs can give, and we see I [sic] something changes, and it is
difficult to pursue a case without a cooperative victim on these cases.").
195. Warren, supra note 168, at 118 (citations omitted) (highlighting difficulties in the prose-
cution of human trafficking cases in the Columbian court system).
196. Id.
197. Cf Haynes, supra note 151, at 44-45 (distinguishing victims of human trafficking for sex
purposes and labor purposes).
198. See Warren, supra note 168, at 113.
199. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(2)(B) (2012).
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ly, the good moral character equirement will disqualify individuals who
have committed even a single crime of moral turpitude. Without the
waiver exception, individuals with convictions for prostitution, drug of-
fenses, or immigration fraud associated with their trafficking situations
would be potentially unable to obtain green cards.200 Another example of
shielding trafficked individuals from prosecution is the series of state
"Safe Harbor" laws, which grant minors subject to sex exploitation im-
munity from prosecution.201 But these legal exceptions are double-edged
swords. While these provisions keep avenues of relief open to individu-
als who may have engaged in unlawful conduct, they also tend to rein-
force the divide between the "guilty" and the "innocent." A claim for an
exception will likely downplay individual agency in favor of the argu-
ment that the individual was coerced or deceived into the illegal activity.
As Jayashri Srikantiah explains, the stereotypical victim who enters the
United States under complete control of a trafficker is an "effective pros-
ecutorial story" in that she "allows prosecutors to describe the trafficker
as maximally culpable."20 2 In addition, "perfect victims" make good wit-
nesses, and individuals may need to conform to this passive stereotype in
order to be eligible for relief.203 "Safe Harbor" prosecutions also retain a
focus on victimization of minors, whose testimony is generally not re-
quired in trafficking cases because there is no need to prove consent.204
B. The Offender Role
1. The "Evil Offender"
Critical scholarship has engaged the troubling stereotypes about
trafficking victims, but the other side of the narrative coin is the equally
problematic concept of the evil offender.205 In the cast of characters, this
offender is usually the trafficker. Kay Warren notes that this traffick-
er/victim dichotomy is essential to the trafficking narrative "to harness
the power of moralizing, that is both gendered and generational, to pro-
duce innocent victims for wider publics, human rights activism, service
providers, and the state."206 As the previous discussion of victims sug-
gests, the complex nature of trafficking and the nature of anti-trafficking
laws can make it difficult to distinguish between victims and offenders.
The current legal framework, with its emphasis on criminalization, is
200. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(f)(3) (2012).




202. Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 160-6 1.
203. Id. at 179 (describing the simultaneous evaluation of the viability of witnesses' testimony
alongside individuals' eligibility for immigration relief); see also Kinney, supra note 90, at 95.
204. See BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 127, at 8.
205. See Doezema, supra note 99, at 24, 28, 47.
206. See Warren, supra note 168, at 116.
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also more likely to attribute wrongdoing to individuals rather than to
systemic factors that motivate and facilitate trafficking.
2. Recasting the Offender
a. Troubling the Victim/Offender Dichotomy
Within a narrative, clear distinction between the entirely
good/passive conduct of the victim and the thoroughly bad/active con-
duct of the offender allows for complete assignment of blame and crimi-
nal liability. These roles exist in opposition to one another. Nils Christie
describes victims and offenders as relative; whereas a victim is "weak[,]
[s]ick, old or very young" and "carrying out a respectable project," the
offender is "big and bad" and has no personal relationship to the vic-
tim.207
In reality, however, the distinction between victims and offenders
may not be so stark as popular images of trafficking might suggest. In the
context of sex work exploitation, for example, supervisors may be hard
to distinguish from workers, and individuals in management could easily
be considered both complicit and victimized in a trafficking scheme.
Traffickers and victims often have similar economic backgrounds, histo-
ries of family abuse and drug abuse, and experiences of physical or sexu-
208al abuse or family prostitution. Contrast between victims and offenders
can be merely a matter of framing; in some cases, individuals have even
been charged as co-conspirators in their own trafficking cases.209
Personal relationships between offenders and victims are also ex-
tremely common. Victims and their traffickers are seldom strangers to
each other; many have familial, pseudo-familial, or romantic connec-
tions.210 These relationships that may be characterized by power dynam-
ics, as in the case of individuals who are recruited or supervised by older
211family members. In some trafficking networks, kinship models are
encouraged, including domestic partnerships, mother-daughter dyads,
and extended families. 2 12 Some female traffickers use their friendship
and acquaintance networks for recruitment, often at the urging of male
207. See Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY:
REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17, 18-19 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986).
208. INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 88, at 108-09.
209. See, e.g., Guida, supra note 194, at 513, 517 ("[W]e saw one case within our city in the
EHTICs, where someone's trafficker had put them down on the lease of the place that they were
using as a brother [sic] and I believe she was convicted for trafficking as well.").
210. See, e.g., AGUSTiN, supra note 171, at 1.
211. See id
212. Warren, supra note 168, at 114-15, 117-18 (recognizing that "images of trafficking
networks as family businesses complicate the vision of solo traffickers and victims in favor of the
family basis common to other kinds of organized crime," and the fact that women also work as labor




counterparts with whom they are intimately involved.2 13 Though most
trafficking narratives emphasize the fear and psychological manipulation
that connects victims and offenders, there is a wide range of experiences
among trafficked individuals, and the reality is that some individuals
may feel emotional connection, familial obligation, and other complex-
and potentially competing-emotions to those implicated in their traf-
ficking situations.
b. State Perceptions of Traffickers
Traffickers are almost always portrayed as male, nonwhite, and
214noncitizens2. These portrayals are not without historical precedent. Dur-
ing the moral panic of the early twentieth century, anti-trafficking re-
formers frequently depicted offenders as foreigners and immigrants.215
Jonathan Todres observes that these representations are intentional,
drawing on the theme that trafficking is a problem "rooted in other cul-
tures" that are "exploitative by nature."216 This image of men of color as
traffickers persists in current anti-trafficking law enforcement. Jennifer
Chac6n observes, for example, that public statements by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice generally involve cases with noncitizen or minority
defendants.217
The demographics of those apprehended and tried for trafficking of-
fenses underscore the disproportionate effects of anti-trafficking law
enforcement on communities of color. The U.S. Department of Justice
estimates that, between 2008 and 2010, more than 75% of suspects iden-
tified in trafficking cases were male.2 18 Overwhelmingly, suspects were
people of color, predominantly black or African-American.21 Critics
argue criminal anti-trafficking laws contribute to gendered and racialized
213. See Broad, supra note 101, at 1061.
214. Kinney, supra note 90, at 91; see also Fukushima & Hua, supra note 89, at 53 ("[T]he
criminal element is visualized as a Southeast Asian man who enables the transaction of women and
children. The man is racialized as similar to the women and children he traffics over and against his
presumed difference to the male voice behind the camera (a difference emphasized through the
Southeast Asian man's broken and accented English), making the crime seem like a cultural problem
of immoral global 'others."'). But cf U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 10 (2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/GlobalReport on TIP.pdf
(finding that in a study of trafficking in forty-six countries, women also make up a significant per-
centage of perpetrators).
215. See Doezema, supra note 99, at 30, 39-41.
216. See Todres, supra note 88, at 52-53.
217. Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1628 (underscoring patterns throughout the Department's
annual reports to Congress).
218. See BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 127, at 1, 6 (finding that 368 of the 488 suspects
in trafficking cases during the reporting period were male, compared to 88 who were female and 32
whose sex was unknown). The arrest and prosecution of male suspects, however, does not necessari-
ly mean that most trafficking cases are in fact committed by men. See, e.g., Denton, supra note 111,
at 21 (opposing the characterization of "sexual exploitation of trafficked individuals as a male-
dominated and male perpetrator-only crime").
219. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 127, at 6 (reporting that 224 out of 488 suspects were
Black/African American, 119 were Latino or Hispanic, and 28 were Asian, compared with 24 who
were white, 20 whose race was identified as "other," and 73 whose race was unknown).
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perceptions of offenders, "creat[ing] a new 'demon' akin to the black
drug dealer or Arab terrorist who not only is depicted as completely dis-
respectful of women but also is used to justify drastic punitive measures
against populations of color." 2 20
These racialized images of offenders have larger community effects
in the enforcement of anti-trafficking laws, particularly state and local
ordinances with low thresholds for police stops. Kate Mogulescu, found-
er of the New York Legal Aid Society's Trafficking Victims Advocacy
Project, has pointed out this problem with respect to New York's anti-
prostitution loitering law.221 Because law enforcement must only have
"perceived intention" to make stops for loitering, stops tend to target
particular neighborhoods and individuals ("[t]he same people who face
arrest for every sort of quality of life offense in New York City") who
222are then more likely to be prosecuted for trafficking offenses. Mo-
gulescu also cites the New York Police Department's (NYPD) Operation
Losing Proposition, a multi-year effort targeting johns, as an example of
a street-based operation that results overwhelmingly in the arrest of un-
documented men of color.223 The public's consumption of trafficking
narratives takes on new significance in a widely-advertised tool to com-
bat trafficking: the Department of Homeland Security's Investigation Tip
22Line.224 Official government statements about trafficking cases tend to be
those that involve noncitizen defendants and sex trafficking. In doing so,
argues Jennifer Chac6n, law enforcement "primes the public to look
for-and report-a certain kind of trafficker." 225
When law enforcement uses anti-trafficking policy as justification
to establish a presence in select communities, it facilitates police harass-
ment in the name of protecting victims. Law enforcement sweeps have
particularly detrimental effects on individuals in the shadow economy; in
the case of the sex industry, for example, suspected sex workers, clients,
and pimps all face the possibility of police detainment, arrest, and prose-
226cution. Practices intended to identify offenders disproportionately tar-
get immigrants and communities of color by placing them "under extra
scrutiny" and "expos[ing] them to the dangers of being apprehended,
220. Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 43.
221. See Kate Mogulescu, Pub. Def., Legal Aid Soc'y Trafficking Victim's Advocacy Pro-
gram, Remarks at the Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender Symposium: Sex Work and the Law:
Felony, Fetish, or Free Market? (Nov. 5, 2014), in 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 499, 500-01, 510
(2015) (discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 2016)).
222. Id. at 510.
223. Id. at 524; see also NYPD Legal Bureau: Civil Enforcement Unit, NYC,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/legal matters/dclm civil enforcement unit.shtml (last visited
Nov. 5, 2016) ("'Operation Losing Proposition,' focuses on the seizure and forfeiture of the cars of
'johns', [sic] the prostitutes' customers, thereby deterring street prostitution.").
224. See Investigating Illegal Movement of People and Goods, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/tipline#wcm-survey-target-id (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
225. Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1629.
226. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 253.
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harassed, detained, deported, and recycled back into underground, crimi-
nalized activities."227 This phenomenon heightens the perception of im-
migrants as criminals and fuels immigration enforcement efforts, ironi-
cally making trafficking more clandestine and giving abusive employers
more leverage in their threats to deport workers who come forward to
report trafficking to law enforcement.228
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime acknowledges in its
issue papers that the criminalization framework it endorses will subject
offenders "to a different and typically harsher legal regime than would be
applicable if that identification had not occurred."22 9 In the United States,
anti-trafficking reforms contribute to the trend of incarcerating people of
color, particularly men, with prescription of heavier sentences. Ironically,
scholar Elizabeth Bernstein points out, "young men of color [are] being
given 99-year or even life sentences as 'domestic traffickers'-more than
they would get if they had killed the woman in question, rather than
simply profiting from their labor."230 Although men are prosecuted at a
higher rate than women for trafficking, researcher Rose Broad finds that
female offenders are also likely to suffer from gendered portrayals of
trafficking. According to her research, female traffickers frequently re-
ceived harsher penalties than their male counterparts and attributes this to
the "doubl[y] devian[t]" nature of female offenders in that they both
transgress gender norms and commit crimes "that only the most brutal of
men would contemplate."231
In the state response to human trafficking through, individual crimi-
nal liability ignores the responsibility of other social actors that create the
demand for exploited labor. Media coverage and law enforcement train-
ing focus on the conduct of "bad actors" rather than culpability for the
individuals who demand this labor and consume its results.232 The de-
mand for cheap labor in the agricultural, manufacturing, and domestic
and commercial service industries far exceeds the demand for under-
ground sex work, which suggests that enforcement action against actors
in the formal economy might be more effective in curtailing practices of
trafficking and exploitation than a street-based ragnet approach.233
227. Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 47.
228. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1632-33.
229. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 182, at 15.
230. Bernstein, supra note 56, at 13.
231. Broad, supra note 101, at 11-12.
232. Id.
233. See Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 43.
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C. The Rescuer Role
1. The "Good Rescuer"
As the trafficking narrative goes, the plight of the innocent victim at
the hands of the evil offender must be resolved by a third party-the
good rescuer.234 The rescuer in popular trafficking narratives is frequent-
ly American, in contrast to the traffickers who are foreign nationals.235
The state and its laws occupy the rescuer role, with law enforcement
officers as proxy.
The youth, naivet6, weakness, and limited capacity of victims, as
well as the danger posed by offenders, apparently justifies rescue by the
state. The rationale for intervention, as summarized by Jennifer Chac6n,
is "that trafficking is perpetrated by foreign criminal organizations and is
best solved through aggressive policing at the border."23 6 The legal anti-
trafficking framework, at both a national and international level, reflects
and reinforces this need for intervention by law enforcement. But this
approach does not always benefit victims. Nor does it always result in
the successful identification, arrest, and prosecution of offenders. In
Melissa Ditmore's research for the Sex Worker Project, she interviewed
a law enforcement agent who at one point thought "victims would be
grateful for the rescue," but then realized "that this is not true. It is more
complicated."237
2. Recasting the Rescuer: Rescue as Harm
a. "Rescue" as Carceral Protectionism
Anti-trafficking reformers frequently point to law enforcement in-
tervention as a means to keep victims safe. As an example of the pater-
nalism of the state's role as rescuer, Jennifer Musto quotes an NGO ad-
vocate as saying that the arrest of a 16-year-old sex worker is justifiable
because "it's the only way we can help her."238 In her research, law en-
forcement officials repeatedly stated that hey felt arresting young people
in the sex industry is critical to victims' safety.239 Musto compares these
234. Todres, supra note 88, at 15.
235. Id.
236. Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1630-31.
237. MELISSA DITMORE, SEX WORKERS PROJECT, THE USE OF RAIDS TO FIGHT TRAFFICKING
IN PERSONS 38 (2009), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/swp-2009-raids-and-trafficking-
report.pdf; AMY FARRELL ET AL., NE. U. INST. ON RACE & JUST., UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FINAL REPORT 38 (2008),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/222752.pdf.
238. Musto, supra note 108, at 257.
239. Id. at 267 (quoting a law enforcement interviewee who stated, "We have to focus on
arresting victims as an option because right now we don't have other options. I don't necessarily like
putting victims in jail. I recognize that's what we're doing. I'm incarcerating a victim. But I'm doing
it for their best interest.... Law enforcement as a whole-we don't necessarily want to incarcerate
the victim, but we have to work with the tools we have."); see also id. at 268 (noting where a law
enforcement officer referred to the criminal justice and juvenile justice system as "safety net[s]").
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arrests to the history of institutionalizing young women for their protec-
tion; in both cases, she argues, these young women were likely to be
victimized while in custody.240 She concludes that the law enforcement
approach, particularly in the context of both voluntary and involuntary
sex work, embodies a combination of incarceration and paternalism-a
"largely uninterrogated combination of law enforcement punishment
combined with psychosocial efforts to rehabilitate them"-which she
calls "carceral protectionism."24'
It is not coincidental that raids typically focus on prostitution opera-
tions and the practice of arrest as a form of protection for women in par-
ticular. The invocation of women's bodies as sites of violence rationaliz-
es state intervention "for their protection" and presumes the state knows
what is best for these individuals, even if it means arresting and detaining
them. For individuals who consider themselves "workers" as opposed to
"victims of trafficking," "rescue" is tantamount to "capture," and the
state can appear "not as a savior, but oppressor."242 Rather than expand-
ing rights for women, migrants, and workers-categories which overlap
in meaningful ways-the rescuer may actually constrain their movement
and endanger their lives and livelihoods.24 3 This phenomenon, ironically,
replicates the dynamics of control and coercion within a trafficking situa-
tion.
Many law enforcement officials and anti-trafficking advocates be-
lieve that rescue is necessary, even when it is unwelcome, because it
allows the state to connect vulnerable individuals with important services
and benefits. Anti-trafficking reforms have included a number of critical
victim services, which are certainly available via law enforcement refer-
rals and certifications. However, state interventions are not always effec-
tive in connecting individuals identified as trafficked with the assistance
they might need. It is not a regular priority for law enforcement to con-
nect trafficked individuals with benefits and services. There are no over-
arching due process guidelines to guarantee prompt access to legal assis-
tance or supportive services in association with law enforcement ar-
244rests. Service providers have recalled cases where trafficking survivors
were denied access to immigration counsel and were deported or interro-
245
gated before obtaining access to counsel. This may not happen in eve-
240. Id. (citations omitted).
241. See id at 263. In their article about human trafficking intervention courts, Aya Gruber,
Amy Cohen, and Kate Mogulescu introduce the similar concept of "penal welfare," which they
define as "states' growing practice of provisioning social benefits through criminal court." See Aya
Gruber, Amy J. Cohen & Kate Mogulescu, An Experiment in Penal Welfare: The New Human Traf-
ficking Intervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
242. Kempadoo, supra note 85, at 41.
243. See Kapur, supra note 123, at 6.
244. See DITMORE, supra note 237, at 40-41.
245. Melissa Ditmore & Juhu Thukral, Accountability and the Use ofRaids to Fight Traffick-
ing, I ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 134, 144-45 (2012).
34 [Vol. 94:1
TRAFFICKING IN NARRATIVES
ry case; service providers acknowledge positive experiences of collabo-
rating with agents, but also indicated that experiences with law enforce-
ment are "hit or miss," and that well-meaning agents at times found their
hands tied by systemic constraints.246 The policy of arresting individuals
in the interest of their own welfare also suggests that benefits cannot be
given outside the criminal justice system, although there are a number of
programs that seek to deliver their services independently of criminal
justice proceedings.2 47
b. Rescue as Community Harm
There is widespread concern about the collateral damage from law
enforcement intervention, particularly rescue of victims through law en-
forcement raids. Although raids and rescues differ in terms of their pur-
poses and targets, the terms are frequently used interchangeably in the
law enforcement context, and individuals who are rescued often receive
248similar treatment to those arrested in raids. In a Sex Worker Project
study on law enforcement raids, nine of the fifteen sex workers inter-
viewed were previously arrested by local police at least once (often on
multiple occasions), and were never identified as trafficking victims
while in law enforcement custody.249 This does not appear to be an iso-
lated phenomenon. A prominent public example of this phenomenon was
the extensive Operation Gilded Cage, a raid of eleven massage parlors
owned and staffed by Koreans in the San Francisco Bay area.250 Law
enforcement arrested forty-five people and brought 150 workers into
police custody as witnesses.2 51 Federal officials did not call in trained
service providers for twenty-four hours, during which time the women
were interrogated.252 The operation was heralded as the largest traffick-
ing bust since the passage of the TVPA, and yet none of witnesses were
deemed eligible for immigration relief as trafficking victims. 25 3 "By the
time advocates arrived, federal officials had already decided that the ma-
jority of women were not legal victims of trafficking, and placed them in
immigration detention."254
246. DITMORE, supra note 237, at 40.
247. See id. at 40-41.
248. Id. at 20.
249. Id. at 8.
250. See David Rosenzweig & K. Connie Kang, Raids on Brothel Rings Net 45 Arrests, L.A.
TIMES (July 2, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/02/local/me-smuggling2.
251. Id. The FBI's website notes that the operation "has resulted in the arrest/detention of
approximately 100 illegal/legal aliens, [and] 26 federal convictions," suggesting that some of the
individuals detained as witnesses were later classified as immigration enforcement targets. See
Today's FBI: Investigative Programs, FBI.GOV,
https://www2.fbi.gov/facts and figures/investigativejprograms.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
252. Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking:





While rescues are intended to reach victims, there is an additional
danger that individuals will be identified as offenders who have run afoul
of anti-prostitution, labor, or immigration law. In Operation Gilded Cage,
for example, more than half of the workers were ultimately deported
after law enforcement officials concluded they had not been coerced and,
therefore, had not been subject to trafficking.255 Another example is Op-
eration Bad Neighbor, another brothel sting in the Bay Area, in which
"104 women were arrested [but] only twelve were certified as vic-
tims."256 Sienna Baskin, an attorney for the Sex Workers Project at the
Urban Justice Center in New York, recently observed that an attempt to
"crack down" on trafficking during the 2014 Super Bowl resulted in ar-
rests of numerous sex workers.257
In addition to harming workers in marginalized labor sectors, in-
cluding underground sex work, law enforcement rescue tactics may dis-
proportionately target marginalized communities. In October 2014, the
Red Umbrella Project released its Human Trafficking Intervention Court
report-an eight-month study of human trafficking intervention courts in
eleven jurisdictions within New York City. 25 8 Ariel Wolf, a Red Umbrel-
la member and court observer for the project, described "racially moti-
vated tactics by the NYPD, especially in charges like loitering for the
purpose of prostitution."259 She observes, for example, that 94% of the
arrested individuals in Brooklyn were black, and that there was a high
rate of arrest of trans women in Jackson Heights.260 In addition, there
were "frequent re-arrests also happening in places where it was a known
area for prostitution charges," resulting in repeat victimization by law
enforcement.261
Not only are anti-trafficking raids harmful to victims and non-
trafficked persons working in certain marginalized industries, but the
beneficial effects of these raids are often overstated. Arrests often do not
result in successful identification of trafficked individuals or help with
262referring them to victim services2. Law enforcement officials and advo-
cates also agree that individuals arrested in raids often do not make good
witnesses in trafficking prosecution. Although state officials maintain the
255. Id. at 333-34.
256. Bernstein, supra note 56, at 14.
257. Sienna Baskin, Co-Dir., Sex Workers Project, Urban Justice Ctr., Remarks at the Univer-
sity of Miami Race and Social Justice Law Review Symposium: Converge! Reimagining the Move-
ment to End Gender Violence: Panel on Sex Trafficking (2014), in 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST.
L. REV. 445, 451 (2015).
258. See generally AUDACIA RAY & EMMA CATERINE, RED UMBRELLA PROJECT, CRIMINAL,
VICTIM, OR WORKER? (2014), http://www.redumbrellaproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/RedUP-NYHTIC-FINALweb.pdf.
259. Ariel Wolf, Artist, Sex Worker & Organizer, Red Umbrella Project, Remarks at the
Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender Symposium: Sex Work and the Law: Felony, Fetish, or Free
Market? (Nov. 5, 2014), in 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 499, 500, 503 (2015).
260. Id. at 503.
261. Id at 504.
262. DITMORE, supra note 237, at 9.
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belief that trafficking is a problem, there are relatively few prosecu-
263tions. Most prosecutions are in sex trafficking cases, typically cases
involving minors, where proving consent is not an issue.264 Sienna
Baskin observes that these raids can in fact be more traumatizing than the
trafficking or exploitation experiences themselves.265 For these reasons,
the federal government has also expressed concerns about raids practic-
es,266 but the continued pursuit of law enforcement objectives continues
267
to place trafficked people at risk.
III. RECONSIDERING TRAFFICKING NARRATIVES AND THE STATE'S
CARCERAL RESPONSE
A. Anti-Trafficking Law as Crime Control
In 2010 Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador-at-Large for the Office to Mon-
itor Combat in Trafficking in Persons at the U.S. Department of State,
made the following remarks at a WWICS conference on human traffick-
ing:
[H]uman trafficking around the world is not something we can ad-
dress only by ridding the world of sexism and racism, of poverty,
conflict, corruption or human rights abuses. Nor is it a cultural phe-
nomenon that can only be tackled with education and awareness
building. To put it bluntly, trafficking in persons is a crime. It is a
crime akin to murder and rape and kidnapping. We have to confront
it not just by addressing root causes that are so far away from the re-
alities of the trafficker and those they enslave, but by using all of our
tools. And so the UN Protocol mandates criminalization of traffick-
ing in persons, and the U.S. laws are very focused on law enforce-
ment, because a policy solution to a heinous crime problem must in-
volve freeing the victims and punishing their tormentors.268
For individuals who entered the United States unlawfully, interac-
tion with the judicial system also means potentially facing criminal
charges, including misdemeanors for entry without inspection or felony
charges for illegal reentry or document fraud. 26 9 The Global Alliance
Against the Trafficking of Women (GAATW) has indicated that, despite
extensive financial investment in addressing trafficking in persons (the
263. Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1630.
264. See id
265. Baskin, supra note 257, at 451.
266. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 31 (10th ed. 2010),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/142979.pdf (explaining that wholesale raids are one of
ten troubling governmental practices).
267. Id. at 40.
268. Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador-at-Large, Office to Monitor & Combat Trafficking in Per-
sons, Remarks at the John F. Kennedy, Jr. Forum, Harvard University's Institute of Politics: From
Bondage to Freedom: The Fight to Abolish Modem Slavery (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/rmi/2010/136918.htm.
269. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 142, 144 (2009).
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United States being the largest investor), there is "substantial evidence to
suggest that anti-trafficking measures have had unacceptably negative
consequences for marginalized categories of people, such as migrants
and refugees and that these measures have been counter-productive for
some of the very people they are supposed to benefit most directly." 270
As previously discussed, law enforcement regularly arrest marginalized
individuals, such as African-American men and transgendered sex work-
ers that are routinely targeted and as part of local anti-trafficking initia-
tives. Even where community members are not arrested, neighborhoods
271
may be subject to greater police presence and scrutiny.
Anti-trafficking activism should therefore consider an approach that
resists the trend towards criminalization. Dr. Annalee Lepp argues for
what she calls a "do no harm" framework as an approach to traffick-
* 27
ing.272 This framework would require the government and all parties in-
volved in anti-trafficking initiatives to consider the possible harmful ef-
fects of these strategies, including consequences for the rights and safety
of victims.273 The associated "do no harm" principles includes judicial
limitations on rescue and post-rescue activities; protections for a rescued
person's human rights and prevention of further violations; adequate care
to the person during and after the rescue; and application of "the best
interest of the victim/rescued person" principle to guide all actions and
274decisions in the case.
The role of law enforcement may be reconsidered as part of this "do
no harm" framework. Under current anti-trafficking policy, law en-
forcement intervention is intended to direct trafficked and exploited indi-
viduals towards the criminal justice system, but it is worth considering
the effectiveness of minimal contact with police.275 Eisha Jain has sug-
gested that because arrests carry consequences, the law should create
mechanisms to expunge arrests from individual records in a similar man-
ner to convictions.27 6 Where individuals are arrested in association with
trafficking situations and do not wish to be involved in a prosecution, an
expungement would help these individuals avoid the law enforcement
270. ANNALEE LEPP, LEARNING NETWORK, CTR. FOR RESEARCH & EDUC. ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN & CHILDREN, Do NOT HARM: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO ANTI-
TRAFFICKING POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS IN CANADA (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.learningtoendabuse.ca/sites/default/files/AnnaLeeLeppHumanTrafficking.pdf; see
also Bernstein, supra note 57, at 57.
271. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820 (2015).
272. LEPP, supra note 270, at 4.
273. Id. at 4-5.
274. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME & Gov'T OF INDIA, PROTOCOL ON INTER STATE
RESCUE AND POST RESCUE ACTIVITIES: RELATING TO PERSONS TRAFFICKED FOR COMMERCIAL
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 7 (2007), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
traffick-
ing/India Trainingmaterial/Protocol onInterStateRescue andPostRescueActivities.pdf
275. See infra Section III.B.
276. Jain, supra note 271, at 862-63.
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scrutiny that may jeopardize their safety and subsistence and help facili-
tate voluntary interactions with law enforcement in the future.
B. Anti-Trafficking Law as Immigration Control
National and international debates over human trafficking reflect
anxieties about he mobility of populations and the phenomenon of mi-
gration. The international community took great pains to distinguish traf-
ficking from human smuggling, but remains concerned with the irregular
277
migration aspects of trafficking. In the United States, debates over the
TVPA took great pains to distinguish trafficking from smuggling and
economic migration.278 Trafficking is still associated with border security
279and immigration control. Criminal penalties associated with unlawful
migration and presence in the United States have expanded since the
1980s, including federal charges related to unauthorized reentry to the
United States and document fraud to facilitate unauthorized work.280
States and localities have also passed laws and ordinances targeting indi-
viduals who may be in the country unlawfully.281 These laws increase the
likelihood that individuals profiled as undocumented immigrants will
come into contact with law enforcement.
Many advocates for immigrant women's rights have supported the
involvement of law enforcement in trafficking cases as a way of connect-
ing exploited workers to much needed services, including certification
28for T or U visas.282 However, there are other angles of this problem that
also have implications for immigrant rights. As Michael Kagan recently
pointed out in his analysis of the U visa program, it is "the knife's edge
that separates good/deserving immigrants from bad/undeserving ones. By
distinguishing between deserving and undeserving immigrants, different
visa programs often perpetuate preconceived images or narratives of the
ideal beneficiary."28 3 Employing these narratives on behalf of some cli-
ents seeking trafficking relief may ultimately undermine opportunities
for others to seek relief.
Jennifer Chac6n has also pointed out that parsing the distinction be-
tween trafficking victims and abused immigrant workers is part of a larg-
er strategy of immigration control.284 She pointedly observes that "[t]he
invocation of trafficking .. . puts a human rights gloss on a border-
277. See Galma Jahic & James 0. Finckenauer, Representations and Misrepresentations of
Human Trafficking, TRENDS ORGANIZED CRIME, Mar. 2005, at 24, 28-30.
278. See Srikantiah, supra note 4, at 191-92.
279. See Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1637.
280. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1)-(8) (2012).
281. See Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1643-45; Eagly, supra note 84, at 1346.
282. See, e.g., Salima Khakoo, Karl Krooth, & Gail Pendleton, Advanced Issues in T and U
Visas 2 (unpublished manuscript),
https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/1.advanced-issues-for-ts-and-us.pendleton_1.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2016).
283. Kagan, supra note 102, at 930.
284. See Chac6n, supra note 52, at 1649.
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enforcement model that, in fact, raises a number of serious human rights
concerns."285 Local anti-trafficking laws, adopted in the name of victim
protection, have in fact given law enforcement enhanced abilities to iden-
tify and arrest undocumented immigrants or immigrants with criminal
records.286
Advocates should also consider the effects of these narratives on
other movements for workers' rights. Advocates on behalf of sex work-
ers and other marginalized laborers are concerned that immigration con-
trol enforcement may serve as auspices to crack down on marginalized
287labor operations. According to one law enforcement agent interviewed
for the Sex Worker Project study, "[the U.S. Department of Justice and
other law enforcement agencies] have to have probable cause for a crim-
inal case, but ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] can raid
whatever they want, if they think there are illegal immigrants."288 The
preamble to the TVPA presents labor trafficking related primarily as an
economic threat rather than a practice that is damaging to exploited
workers.289 This suggests that individuals subjected to labor trafficking
are "second class victims" 290 less worthy of relief and legal protection.
This framing also eclipses the larger realities of abuse of workers in both
formal and informal sectors of the economy.
Victim-centered approaches, like those highlighted in both the 2015
Trafficking in Persons Report291 and the current strategic plan for the
Office of Victim Services,292 are fundamentally incompatible with cur-
rent immigration law enforcement practices. So long as individuals are
recognized as immigration law offenders rather than as victims of ex-
ploited labor, the prevention of trafficking and protection of victims will
remain subordinate to border control objectives. Conversely, comprehen-
sive immigration reform that offers more individuals the opportunity to
migrate would decrease the reliance of low-income migrants on exploita-
293tive employers to obtain passage to the United States.
285. Id. at 1642.
286. See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immi-
gration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1594-95 (2008) (describing the efforts of state governments and
municipalities to localize immigration control through the use of criminal law, particularly since
September 11, 2001); see also Jennifer M. Chac6n, Human Trafficking, Immigration Regulation and
Sub-Federal Criminalization, NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2791792.
287. See, e.g., DITMORE, supra note 237.
288. Id. at 37.
289. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(12) (2012) (referring to the "impact [trafficking has] on the
nationwide employment network and labor market").
290. LEPP, supra note 270, at 7.
291. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 266, at 26.
292. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., COORDINATION, COLLABORATION, CAPACITY: FEDERAL
STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON SERVICES FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED
STATES 2013-2017, at 10 (2014),
https://www.ovc.gov/pubs/FederalHumanTraffickingStrategicPlan.pdf




Dominant anti-trafficking discourse, from its historic roots in the
United States to its present-day globalized incarnation, relies on images
of trafficking victims, offenders, and rescuers to promote and reinforce
the need for state intervention through law enforcement. These traffick-
ing narratives and the characters within them are imbued with racialized
and gendered assumptions, presenting barriers to effective assistance to
exploited workers and evolution of policy to prevent trafficking and en-
hance community safety. Misguided law enforcement policy intended to
rescue victims may replicate the dynamics of coercive control within a
trafficking situation, expose real and perceived victims to danger, and
justify arrests and higher sentences for populations already dispropor-
tionately targeted by the justice system. Moving forward, the anti-
trafficking movement-especially advocates who are concerned with
larger questions of rights for undocumented and exploited workers-
should reconsider the value of the carceral approach to human trafficking
based on concern for victims, but also based on the concern for overarch-




COUNTING ON QUALITY: THE EFFECTS OF MERITS BRIEF
QUALITY ON SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ADAM FELDMANt
ABSTRACT
Many legal scholars, academics, and practitioners contend that the
quality of merits briefs matters little in the United States Supreme Court.
According to this logic, by the time a case has reached the Supreme
Court the facts are already clear from the record and experts have me-
ticulously prepared briefs particularly tailored to meet the Justices' in-
formational needs. This Article sets forth a different thesis; specifically
that merits brief quality matters even at the upper-echelon of the U.S.
Courts. The results of this Article show that merits brief quality affects
both case outcomes and the amount of language Supreme Court's opin-
ions share with merits briefs even after controlling for Supreme Court
litigation expertise. Due to the lack of existing empirical scholarship on
the effects of brief quality, this Article has two objectives. First, it devel-
ops a conceptualization of brief quality that can be reliably measured.
Second, it tests whether the quality of merits briefs matters by looking at
both how this affects case outcomes and the Justices and clerks' likeli-
hood of adopting language from merits briefs in the Court's opinions. To
do this, the Article develops a new measure to gauge brief quality and to
make comparisons between briefs. The dataset created for this Article
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"I'll read good briefs, and I'll understand, that's a good brief. And
you'll try to think back at exactly what it was that made it a good brief,
and the sentence structure, and how it flowed together. And to a certain
extent, your mind internalizes that."'
Chief Justice John Roberts
INTRODUCTION
Beginning day-one in law school, aspiring lawyers are taught that
success in their future careers is dependent upon becoming good legal
writers. This maxim often becomes a reality as attorneys, especially at
the appellate level, spend the bulk of their time preparing written docu-
ments such as briefs and motions. As mastery of the written word is an
essential attribute of a talented attorney, one might expect little variation
in the quality of written briefs at the Supreme Court level-the venue of
practice for the most talented and experienced legal practitioners. The
question of whether the quality of legal briefs affects the Justices' deci-
sions, however, is unexplored scholarly terrain. This is the first article to
combine qualitative and quantitative methods to measure brief quality
and test its effects on both Supreme Court case outcomes and on opinion
content. The dataset consists of nearly 9,500 merits briefs from 1946
through 2013 Supreme Court Terms.
One reason the quality of writing may affect Supreme Court opinion
content is that it can affect the Justices and clerks' perceptions of the
strength of a party's case. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges percepti-
ble gradations in the quality of Supreme Court briefs: "The quality of
briefs varies greatly. We get some excellent briefs; we get a lot of very,
very good briefs. And there are some where the first thing you can tell in
many of them is that the lawyer really hasn't spent a lot of time on it." 2
According to the Chief Justice's words, attorneys that wish to gain the
Court's attention from the outset of a case must begin by taking the qual-
ity of the brief into account.
Justice Alito echoes Justice Robert's exhortations about the conse-
quential nature of briefs' quality: "Certainly, I appreciate good writing. It
makes my job so much easier. I've seen briefs that are extremely well
written and some that are abysmally written." 3 Justice Scalia makes this
1. Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices, 13 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 1, 39 (2010) (interviewing Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
2. Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (interviewing Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
3. Id. at 170 (interviewing Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
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point as well: "When you write well, you capture the attention of your
audience much better than when you write poorly."A
One reason the question of whether brief quality matters remains
unanswered is the ambiguity surrounding our conception of "quality."
Across disciplines, writing quality is understood as ranging from spelling
and word choice to punctuation and ease of readability.5
A second reason may have to do with differing views within the le-
gal community about what constitutes a high-quality brief. While judges
continuously emphasize the importance of specific aspects of briefs, such
as clarity and organization, surveys of lawyers show that they do not
accord the same significance to the written argument.6 This may explain
some of the disjuncture about the importance of brief quality within the
legal community. Notwithstanding the lack of a clear conceptualization
of quality, judges do not dispute that the quality of briefs affects their
perceptions of attorneys' cases.
But still we are left with the question of how we measure a concept
that has so many potential defining features; a concept that is difficult to
measure with any objectivity due to often subjectively defined features
such as style. I tackle this question by examining multiple dimensions of
briefs to assess a spectrum of features related to the concept of brief
quality including sentence length, passivity of writing, use of engaging
language, and an overall positive tone. Some of these aspects are particu-
lar to legal writing while others are central to writing quality generally.
This Article uses corpus-based techniques to generate an under-
standing of brief quality. I apply linguistic dictionaries to the texts to
measure features of the writing such as passivity. I also measure the sen-
timent of each brief to analyze the tone of the document.
4. Id. at 53 (interviewing Justice Antonin Scalia).
5. See, e.g., Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Measuring Readability in Financial Disclo-
sures, 69 J. FIN. 1643, 1643 (2014) ("We propose defining readability as the effective communica-
tion of valuation-relevant information."); K. Sand, N. L. Eik-Nes & J. H. Loge, Readability of In-
formed Consent Documents (1987-2007) for Clinical Trials: A Linguistic Analysis, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
RES. ON HuM. RES. ETHICs 67, 74-75 (2012) (examining how the organization of themes in consent
agreements impacts readers' comprehension); Yvonne Tsai, Text Analysis of Patent Abstracts, J.
SPECIALISED TRANSLATION, Jan. 2010, at 61, 78 (explaining that punctuation and word choice affect
the readability of patent abstracts).
6. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Repre-
sentation, 63 STAN. L. REv. 317, 340 (2011) ("Overall, the judges' relative emphasis on written
argument contrasts with surveys of practicing lawyers, who see legal writing to be of minor im-
portance."); see also Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think
About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 LEGAL WRITING 257, 261, 284 (2002) (surveying 355 federal
judges' views about the quality of lawyers' writing and finding that those judges were often unim-
pressed with the quality of legal briefs).
7. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 6, at 269 (listing nine varied writing flaws that surveyed
judges identified in lawyers' legal writing).
8. Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of
Plaintiffs' Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59, 80-
81 (2013) (documenting and demonstrating flaws in the legal writing of a sample of 102 briefs).
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With these measurement ools I examine two outcomes. The first
model examines decision outcomes to verify that winning parties tend to
have higher-quality briefs than the losing parties. The second model ex-
amines the language in each of the Court's opinions. The outcome varia-
ble in that model is the percentage of the language in the opinion that is
generated from overlapping language with the brief (referred to as the
brief's "overlap score" or "value"). This Article proceeds as follows: in
the next Part, I examine existing conceptualizations of brief quality, then
I describe the indicators developed to measure brief quality. In the fol-
lowing Part, I test the measures of brief quality on the set of Supreme
Court briefs. I conclude by discussing the relevance of the findings and
the implications for future inquiry.
I. UNDERSTANDING QUALITY
How do we know that the quality of merits briefs makes a differ-
ence? For one thing, Supreme Court opinions tell us just that. For exam-
ple, in the case Zablocki v. Redhail,9 Justice Thurgood Marshall writing
for the majority stated, "With regard to safeguarding the welfare of the
out-of-custody children, appellant's brief does not make clear the con-
nection between the State's interest and the statute's requirements."10
This case concerned a Wisconsin statute that places specific require-
ments on parents with previous child support obligations that wish to
marry." Here, the Court did not give credence to the State's position
because the State did not present a sufficient nexus between points in its
brief. 12
Lack of clarity in a brief can also confuse the Justices regarding a
party's argument. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,13 Justice Souter writ-
ing for the majority stated, "[I]t is unclear from Atwater's briefs whether
the rule she proposes would bar custodial arrests for fine-only offenses
even when made pursuant to a warrant. ... ,,14 In Atwater, the Court did
not fully comprehend the petitioner's argument from the brief,15 which
may have ultimately affected the Court's response to the petitioner's
pleas and led the Court to question the strength of the petitioner's case.
Finally, when both petitioner and respondent's merits briefs in a
case may lack the quality that clearly informs the Justices of the case
features, the Justices may not feel properly able to adjudicate claims,
especially in cases with far-reaching implications. Justice Blackmun's
9. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
10. Id. at 389.
11. See id at 375.
12. See id. at 389-90.
13. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).




dissent in New York Times Co. v. United States16 makes such a point.17 In
his dissent Justice Blackmun wrote,
I therefore would remand these cases to be developed expeditiously,
of course, but on a schedule permitting the orderly presentation of ev-
idence from both sides, with the use of discovery, if necessary, as au-
thorized by the rules, and with the preparation of briefs, oral argu-
ment, and court opinions of a quality better than has been seen to this
point. 18
Justice Blackmun sought higher-quality briefing in that instance to
make a more informed decision in a case with vast First Amendment
implications. 19
From these examples it is apparent that the Justices are concerned
with the quality of merits briefs. The Justices and their clerks also prefer
merits briefs that clearly lay out all of the party's points and arguments,
and these examples present evidence that the Justices may not rule favor-
ably on a party's contentions without such clarity.20 But what exactly
does quality mean in such cases? To gain leverage on the concept of
brief quality, I look at statements from legal scholars and from judges.
Based on these statements, I develop testable hypotheses that examine
whether the features of brief quality that Justices and judges discuss are
actually associated with more successful briefs.
Attorney experience is often anecdotally associated with brief quali-
ty. It is possible, for instance, that attorneys make marginal improve-
ments in their brief writing with each successive brief they write for the
Supreme Court. Justice Thomas relayed this notion in his statement,
I think you learn over time. You gain kind of a comfort with it. It's
like a jazz musician or something. You get a feel for it. You don't
just know the law, but you have a feel for it. You have a feel for what
the judges are trying to do. And then you know where you can give a
little ground without giving up your case.21
Similarly, Judge Robert Baldock from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals underscored the importance of multiple drafts of briefs stating,
16. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
17. See id. at 759-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 761-62.
19. See id at 760-62.
20. Although infrequent, there are occasionally opportunities for the parties to clarify state-
ments from their briefs in oral argument. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2004), for example,
Justice Ginsburg gave the respondent's attorney a chance to clarify a statement from the brief when
she began the question, "There was something you said in . .. your brief hat [sic] I thought was
unclear. So may I ask you-" Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2004) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 2663949, at *37.
21. Garner, supra note 1, at 109 (interviewing Justice Clarence Thomas).
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Now those who have an appellate practice, who appear before us a
lot, their briefs are usually very well done. But with the lawyer who
only comes once in a great while, often the product is not good and
it's no help. That really irritates me when I haven't been helped at all
by a brief and it has wasted my time.22
Experience may also help develop an attorney's credibility. Experi-
enced Supreme Court litigators tend to be highly successful on the mer-
its.23 The credibility of Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) attorneys
that is developed with repeat appearances before the Supreme Court, for
example, is often cited as a reason for the Justices' trust in them.24 This
credibility may generate a presumption of high-quality briefs that in turn
benefits the OSG's likelihood of success.
As this is still a "presumption" of credibility often based on an at-
torney's experience, it may be rebutted by evidence that trust is unwar-
ranted. Attorneys that present inaccurate information in their briefs or
that attempt to deceive judges with skewed portrayals of the facts may
lose this credibility and develop notoriety for their lack of candor.25 Ac-
cordingly, for Justice Stevens, honesty is the most important quality of a
brief.26 Judges on federal benches at all levels consistently highlight the
necessity of honesty in briefs and how deception can lead to the loss of a
judge's trust, which may consequently injure the attorney's reputation.
27
22. Robert R. Baldock, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Carlos F. Lucero,
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit & Vicki Mandell-King, Chief, Appellate Div.,
Fed. Pub. Defs. Office, Denver, Colo., What Appellate Advocates Seek from Appellate Judges and
What Appellate Judges Seek from Appellate Advocates, Panel Two at the Tenth Circuit Judicial
Conference (June 29-July 1, 2000), in 31 N.M. L. REV. 265, 274 (2001).
23. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court. Transform-
ing the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1539-49 (2008) (describing a trend of
favorable Supreme Court outcomes for a group of the most experienced litigators over the past
several decades).
24. Id. at 1545-47; see also RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL
DECISIONS 6-7 (2012); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
RULE OF LAW 4-7 (1987); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW & POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION 22-
23 (2003); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 2-3 (1992);
Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505,
506-07 (1998); Matthew Lee Sundquist, Learned in Litigation: Former Solicitors General in the
Supreme Court Bar, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 59, 81-83 (2010); David C. Thompson & Melanie
Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for
Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 270-71
(2009).
25. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 35 (1978); Steven Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1389, 1392 (1984).
26. Garner, supra note 1, at 46 (interviewing Justice John P. Stevens).
27. E.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENT 291 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge Emeritus, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).
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Attorneys may also lose credibility through attacks on other parties
or entities involved in the case.28 Since the attorney's goal is to persuade
the court, even if the facts are not in the party's favor, attorneys need to
tread lightly when trying to portray facts in the most favorable light to
their clients while providing accurate statements that do not belittle other
actors involved in the litigation.29
One feature of a brief that judges repeatedly say can win or lose a
case is its clarity.30 When lawyers do not lay out all of their points clear-
ly, judges may miss important aspects of the party's position. In one in-
stance when Chief Justice Roberts was asked if a bad brief can lose a
case, he replied,
It sure can-because [the Justices] may not see [sic] your strong case.
It's not like judges know what the answer is. I mean, we've got to
find it out. And so when you say can bad writing lose a strong case, if
it's bad writing, we may not see that you've got a strong case.31
Answering the same question Justice Alito conveyed, "It can be-
cause you may totally fail to convey the point that you want to make to
the court. The court just might miss your point. There have been times
when I've read a brief, and reread a brief, and I just didn't see what it
was saying."32 The relative clarity of the party's brief may impact the
judge's view of the case. Judge Diane Wood from the Seventh Circuit of
Appeals explained, "[I]f one side has presented a beautifully organized
and written brief, and the other leaves me trying to decide if they've hit
the side of the barn or not . .. there's an inherent advantage to the side
that's done it well." 33
The necessity of brief clarity is also one of few factors that has re-
mained of central importance in judges' analyses of advocacy over the
last hundred years, and judges describe that the best briefs they read are
often the clearest.34 Along these lines, when writing about judges' expec-
28. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 64 (1992) ("[A] top quality brief scratches 'put downs' and indig-
nant remarks about one's adversary, the trial judge or the agency. These are sometimes irresistible in
first drafts, but attacks on the competency or integrity of a trial court, agency, or adversary, if left in
the finished product, will more likely annoy than make points with the bench.").
29. See id. at 63; cf Carter G. Phillips, Partner, Sidley Austin LLP, Advocacy Before the
United States Supreme Court, Address at the Krinock Lecture Series (1998), in 15 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 177, 181-84 (1998).
30. See generally Garner, supra note 1.
31. Id. at 22 (interviewing Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
32. Id. at 177 (interviewing Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
33. Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Court of Appeals Judges, 15 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 1, 103 (2013) (second alteration in original) (interviewing Chief Judge Diane P.
Wood).
34. See Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing
Advice, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 4 (2010) (describing the evolving expectations for the con-
tents and quality of legal briefs in American courts); see also Robbins, supra note 6, at 282 ("Many
judges also indicated that ... the worst briefs 'read like a Joycean stream-of-consciousness and seem
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tations for briefs, Judge Roger Miner unsurprisingly described, "We ...
expect clarity, well-organized argument, and understandable sentence
structure. All too often, we find rambling narratives, repetitive discus-
sions, non sequiturs, and conclusions unsupported by law or logic."3 5
Veteran attorneys tend to be keenly aware of the need to set their
points out clearly on the page.36 Supreme Court advocate Robert Stem
described that one of the most common faults from inexperienced brief
writers is they do not make their arguments sufficiently coherent for
judges to understand. According to this logic, when lawyers' writings
are muddled in lengthy, inconsequential prose, judges may lose track of
the main point of the argument.
While briefs are argumentative in nature, the tone of the brief is still
an element that may affect the chances of the brief's success.38 Accord-
ingly, surveyed judges requested an "appropriate adversarial tone" from
brief writers.3 9 This can be a fine line for attorneys to follow, especially
when confronting contentious issues. There are several factors that judg-
es point to, however, that may contribute to an overly negative tone.
One clear admonishment concerns written attacks directed towards
other attorneys or officers of the court. Judge Harry Edwards and Judge
Robert Martineau, for instance, both note that such attacks may immedi-
ately detract from a judge's focus on a brief's main points.40 These are
not the only judges to acknowledge the toll a negative tone can have on a
brief. Judge Harry Pregerson refers to a "shrill tone in a brief' as "inef-
fective" and "counterproductive"4' and Judge Miner explains that per-
sonal attacks tend only to "weaken the brief." 42
Taken together, these judges' remarks convey that briefs which in-
clude attacks and a negative tone are detrimental to their persuasive
powers. Regular use of intensifiers may also be viewed as "loser lan-
guage" that can attach to the judge's view of a party's position.43 While
to have no theme or clear purpose,' 'are anything but' clear, 'muddy up the water,' 'cloud the main
issues with trivia,' or contain 'fuzzy, imprecise thinking and writing, leaving the reader to guess or
assume as to the meaning."').
35. Roger J. Miner, Twenty-Five "Dos" for Appellate Brief Writers, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 19,23 (1992).
36. See, e.g., ToM GOLDSTEIN & JETHRO K. LIBERMAN, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO WRITING
WELL 6 (3d ed. 2016) ("Good lawyers revere English - and edit their work one more time to ensure
they have expressed their thoughts with the clarity and felicity that they owe to their clients, to the
public, and to themselves.").
37. See ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 234-35 (1981).
38. Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins ofAppellate Brief Writing and Other Transgressions, 34
UCLA L. REv. 431, 436 (1986).
39. See Robbins, supra note 6, at 264.
40. ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY 129
(1985); Edwards, supra note 28, at 64.
41. Pregerson, supra note 38, at 436.
42. Miner, supra note 35, at 24.
43. Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) Attack: The
Theory ofArgumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REv. 933, 944 (2013) (describing
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such language may diminish the effectiveness of the brief, an adversarial
tone is still expected. Based on this assessment, judges are looking for a
balance between argumentation and overly negative and conflictual
statements.
The last two points of brief quality relate to the judge's focus. The
first of these factors is brevity. While briefs that lack complete arguments
and treatments of the facts will not serve attorneys' purposes, judges do
not expect or wish attorneys to expound lengthy prose to make their
points. Justice Ginsburg points this out as a flaw in many attorneys' cas-
es: "Lawyers somehow can't give up the extra space, so they fill the brief
unnecessarily, not realizing that eye-fatigue and even annoyance will be
the response they get for writing an overlong brief."" In response to
what he finds to be the biggest shortcoming in briefs, Justice Scalia re-
sponds, "Prolixity, probably.... You don't have to use the 40 pages if
that's what you're allotted. Use as much as is necessary to make your
point."4 5 The Justices clearly demand succinct briefs that only deal with
aspects of the case relevant to the Court's inquiry.
The Supreme Court docket has substantially shrunk over the last
several decades, and as a consequence the Justices and their clerks may
46have more time to focus on individual cases. The question on certiorari
should be the focus of the brief and straying from this might show the
Justices that the attorney is not concerned with issues relevant to the
case. Justice Scalia is clear on this point: "The framing of the question is
crucial. . . . I have seen that happen: not included within the question
presented. So you make that argument and, you know, too bad."47 justice
Breyer underscored this directive stating, "[W]e've taken the case to
decide an issue -- one issue usually, maybe two -- and we are not looking
so much at the whole case."4 8 Along with a shrinking docket, there has
been a substantial growth in the number of amicus briefs filed over re-
cent years.49 Moreover, there has been stable growth in the rate of peti-
tions for certiorari filed with some notable spikes in filings.5 0 The Justic-
this language as "a defensive emotional response to an expected . .. adverse result in an appellate
case").
44. Garner, supra note 1, at 137 (interviewing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
45. Id. at 53 (interviewing Justice Antonin Scalia).
46. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Dock-
et, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1225-27, 1263 (2012) (providing evidence of the shrinking
docket as well as explanations, including most prominently ideological cohesion among the Justic-
es).
47. Gamer, supra note 1, at 72-73 (emphasis omitted) (interviewing Justice Antonin Scalia).
48. Id. at 161 (interviewing Justice Stephen G. Breyer).
49. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Justices Are Paying More Attention to Amicus




50. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CASELOAD, 1878-2014,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloadsSup Ct totals (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
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es and their clerks need to process this additional information, which
counterbalances their lighter caseload.
The Justices and their clerks are not only concerned with the length
of briefs. They also prefer interesting over dull writing.5 I Engaging writ-
ing may gain the Justices' attention and focus Justices on the statements
made in the brief. This further highlights the importance of a coherent
rather than a verbose brief.52 Scholars allude to the paramount signifi-
cance of good general writing skills that make central points in the brief
easy for judges to comprehend.53
The Justices generally agree that well-written briefs gain their atten-
tion. For Justice Scalia, this ability to focus the Justice's attention is the
main advantage to good writing as he explained with the example: "My
attention was fixed on that brief. I'd been reading a lot of other briefs,
and they did not grab me the way this one did. That's the payoff. That's
the payoff. It is clear." 54 Justice Alito connects good writing to the law-
yer's persuasive ability, "I think there is a clear relationship between
good, clear writing and good, clear thinking. And if you don't have one,
it's very hard to have the other."55
There are a slew of examples of attorneys using long-winded and
hard-to-follow sentences.5 6 These may confuse the Justices about he
attorneys' objectives and cause the Justices and clerks to lose their focus
on such briefs. How do such phrasings in merits briefs look? In the
school desegregation case of Bradley v. School Board, the School
Board's attorneys include a sentence in the brief:
In this context, any limitations which failed to extend the scope of the
award back to the time of this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) would be arbitrary and productive of
the incongruous result hat many of the school authorities who, with
the massive resources of state treasuries at their disposal, openly de-
fied this Court's earlier mandates against segregated education would
escape the reach of any charge for the payment of fees incurred in the
51. See Miner, supra note 35, at 20 ("Pack the brief with lively arguments, using your own
voice and style of expression. We prefer briefs that are not pompous, dull, or bureaucratic.").
52. Girvan Peck, Strategy of the Brief, LITIGATION, Winter 1984, at 26, 66.
53. See STERN, supra note 37, at 233-40; see also John D. Feerick, Writing like a Lawyer, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 381-83, 386-87 (1994); George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing:
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L. REv. 333, 335 (1987); Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (by Writing)
About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REv. 135, 135-36, 138-39 (1987); Mark K. Osbeck, What Is
"Good Legal Writing" and Why Does It Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. REv. 417, 426 (2012); Harry Preger-
son & Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, The Seven Virtues of Appellate Brief Writing: An Update from
the Bench, 38 Sw. L. REv. 221, 222 (2008); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Dedication to
Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 37, 39 (1994);
Pamela Samuelson, Good Legal Writing: Of Orwell and Window Panes, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 149,
149 (1984).
54. Garner, supra note 1, at 73 (interviewing Justice Antonin Scalia).
55. Id at 170, 179 (interviewing Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.).
56. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 58.
57. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
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torturous litigation which those seeking admission to schools on an
equal basis were forced to undergo.5 8
This 100-word sentence makes several contentions which, when
combined, become quite difficult to follow. Justices and clerks have to
parse such convoluted sentences to make sense of the details of the ar-
gument and such complexity may diminish the Court's focus on the brief
and potentially lead to less consideration of the points therein.
Scholars and judges make clear that the features of high-quality
briefs discussed in this Article are often connected. For instance, well-
written briefs should be succinct and clear.59 In this Article's analysis, I
expect many of these factors to be connected. Based on the expectations
set forth by the Justices themselves, the primary hypothesis of this Arti-
cle is
Quality Hypothesis: Higher-quality briefs will (a) win more cases
than lower quality briefs, and (b) the Court will share more of its opinion
language with higher-quality briefs.
Attorney credibility should play a large independent role in the Jus-
tices' adoption of language from briefs. While attorneys learn more
about the Justices' preferences from increased experience in the Court,
by the time attorneys begin their practice in the Supreme Court the quali-
ty of their legal writing may be fairly solidified.60 Even if the Justices
share more language on the margins with higher-quality briefs, there is
evidence that attorneys with more Supreme Court experience win cases
more often and the Court shares more language with briefs from these
attorneys than it does with briefs from less experienced attorneys.6 The
second hypothesis for this Article is
Credibility Hypothesis: Controlling for differences in brief quality,
Supreme Court opinions will share more language with more experi-
enced attorneys' briefs.
58. Brief of Respondent at 14, Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (No. 72-1322), 1973
WL 172306, at *29-30.
59. William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the Appel-
late Brief 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 3 (1999) ("It would seem that inside of a hundred years the
written brief has largely taken the place that was once reserved for oral argument. For that reason, an
ability to write clearly has become the most important prerequisite for an American appellate law-
yer.").
60. Based on available scholarship I would expect greater differences in brief quality based on
attorney experience in lower courts. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Georg Vanberg & Alixandra B.
Yanus, Targeting the Median Justice: A Content Analysis of Legal Arguments and Judicial Opinions
I1-15 (Jan. 3-7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association), http://mcguire.web.unc.edu/files/2014/01/targetingmedian.pdf.
61. See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 1539-49; see also BLACK & OWENS, supra note 24, at 34-
39, 102-11; Adam Feldman, Who Wins in the Supreme Court? An Examination ofAttorney and Law
Firm Influence, 100 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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A. Empirical Understandings of Quality
Empirical work in the area of merits brief quality, especially with
large-N samples, is quite sparse. Much of the work that purports to ana-
lyze brief quality either does so with unclear conceptual definitions or
with proxy measures for quality. One example of this is in Kearney and
Merrill's article, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme
Court.62 In that paper, the section on brief quality begins, "Because read-
ing and assessing the quality of more than 12,000 individual amicus
briefs was a task far beyond our endurance, we had to come up with a
proxy for briefs that contain information valued highly by the Court." 63
This proxy measure, also adopted in other scholarly works," is based on
attorney experience.65 Such studies of briefs, however, lack measure-
ments based on the actual words of the brief.
Another proxy measure that is designed to account for brief quality
is whether the brief is submitted by the OSG. OSG briefs are often touted
as the highest quality.66 The high quality of briefs from the OSG is often
suggested without a definition of the concept of brief quality, and so the
measure of quality may be wrapped up with the high regard the Justices
67hold for the Solicitor General's (SG's) credibility. To this point, Justice
Ginsburg said, "It's never a problem with the SG. Even if I disagree with
the argument, I know that the brief will give an honest account of the
authorities. That's very important; I know I can trust the SG's brief." 68
One area of scholarship that tackles the question of the relationship
between brief quality and brief success is experimental in nature. These
studies compare judges' responses to different linguistic framings. Sev-
eral such studies, for instance, determined that judges found similar ar-
guments written in plain English more persuasive than in legal jargon.69
While these studies focus more precisely on the relationship between
62. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
63. Id. at 810.
64. E.g., Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson & Matthew P. Hitt, Quality over
Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making, 107 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 446, 447 (2013);
Paul M. Collins Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 917, 931-32 (2015); Pamela C. Cor-
ley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence ofParties' Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468
(2008).
65. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 62, at 813.
66. See, e.g., PACELLE, supra note 24, at 5-6.
67. See, e.g., BLACK & OWENS, supra note 24, at 35-36; see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus
Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts, 41 W. POL. Q. 135,
138 (1988).
68. Garner, supra note 1, at 137 (interviewing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
69. See Sean Flammer, Persuading Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Writing Style, Persua-
sion, and the Use ofPlain English, 16 LEGAL WRITING 183, 199 (2010); see also Robert W. Benson
& Joan B. Kessler, Legalese v. Plain English: An Empirical Study ofPersuasion and Credibility in
Appellate Brief Writing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 301, 313-14 (1987).
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words and judges' decisions, they are still purely hypothetical in nature.70
This Article moves beyond the hypothetical by investigating the relation-
ship between the quality of existing briefs and success before the Court.
Recent forays into the relationship between brief quality and brief
success focus on the readability of briefs. These studies utilize readabil-
ity algorithms such as Flesch Reading Ease scale to determine the ease of
reading of existing briefs.7 1 The algorithms generate measures based on
the relative numbers of words, sentences, and syllables in a text.72 Stud-
ies have still not found a conclusive relationship between a brief's reada-
bility and the chances of a brief's success. In one study utilizing readabil-
ity measures, for instance, the authors found no correlation between the
readability of briefs and case outcomes.73
Finally, several papers employ automated content analysis to de-
duce certain aspects of legal texts.74 These articles use Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count (LIWC) to gauge the complexity of legal opinions and
briefs.75 LIWC uses word dictionaries to measure aspects of sample texts
along multiple categories or dimensions. The program then provides an
output that includes the percentage of words in a text that belongs to each
category. These studies, for example, cluster several word categories that
relate to cognitive complexity to generate their metrics.
B. The Role ofBrief Quality
Statements from judges clarify that they focus their attention on
high-quality briefs. Higher-quality briefs will not lead to favorable out-
comes in all cases however. Justice Breyer is keyed into this point, "[I]f
you don't have a sound view as to how these cases should come out, how
the law should fit together, I doubt that you could make up for it by good
writing. If you're very clear, you might just be very clearly wrong. 76In
close cases, a high-quality brief may persuade the Justices and clerks to
focus their attention on the arguments from that particular brief. On the
other hand, when the law is clear, the brief is limited in its ability to shift
the decision outcome. Even if the law is clear, however, well-written
70. See, e.g., Flammer, supra note 69, at 191 (describing the study's methodology of sending
Plain English and Legalese writing samples to judges asking the judges which sample was more
persuasive).
71. Brady Coleman & Quy Phung, The Language of Supreme Court Briefs: A Large-Scale
Quantitative Investigation, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 83 (2010).
72. I comparatively examine several of these readability measures in the Appendix. See infra
Tables 5-6.
73. See Long & Christensen, supra note 43, at 943-44.
74. See Collins, Corley & Hamner, supra note 64, at 931-32; see also Ryan J. Owens &
Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court
Opinions, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1027, 1039-40 (2011); Ryan J. Owens & Justin Wede-
king, Predicting Drift on Politically Insulated Institutions: A Study of Ideological Drift on the United
States Supreme Court, 74 J. POL. 487, 493 (2012).
75. See generally sources cited supra note 74.
76. Gamer, supra note 1, at 159 (interviewing Justice Stephen G. Breyer).
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briefs can influence the Court to share more language with a particular
brief regardless of whether the brief is written for the winning or losing
77party.
Based on this notion, I generated a second outcome variable (aside
from which side wins the case) derived from the percentage of an opin-
ion's language that is shared with a given merits brief. Although winning
briefs typically share more language with the Court's opinions, this is not
always the case.7 8 A high-quality brief should persuade the Justices and
clerks to place greater focus on it during their deliberations. In effect, a
lawyer may be able to compensate for a position that is not likely to win
with a well-written brief that persuades the Court to share a maximum
amount of opinion language with the brief. For attorneys and parties con-
cemed with the Court's shifts in the law over time, such incremental
benefits can have large downstream payoffs.79 Persuasion from losing
briefs may also involve limiting the magnitude of a negative outcome.
Here, quality may play a similar role to attorney credibility. While
credible attorneys with high levels of experience have the ability to dis-
criminate between cases that are more or less likely to win, inevitably
they will represent clients with losing cases. While their briefs cannot
change the facts or law relevant to the case, they can persuade the Court
that their argument is sound. As Justices and clerks are apt to read briefs
from experienced counsel more closely, especially those from the OSG,
these briefs can persuade the Court to rely on them in resolving issues
extraneous to the main outcome. These issues can also blunt the effect of
the main outcome if the outcome is so clear to the Court based on factors
extraneous to the briefs.
II. METHODS
To test hypotheses regarding the amount of opinion language shared
with briefs, I used two-level hierarchical models on a newly developed
dataset composed entirely of orally argued cases with exactly two merits
briefs for the 1946 through 2013 Supreme Court Terms. The dependent
variables are the case outcomes and the percentage of language in the
opinion that is also located in a merits brief.
77. See, e.g., BLACK & OWENS, supra note 24, at 39; Corley, supra note 64, at 474-76; Adam
Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946-2013, 86 Miss. L.J.
(forthcoming).
78. See Feldman, supra note 77.
79. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 628-29 (2001) ("[W]hen a new precedent
emerges, litigants will react to the precedent in ways that further reinforce and contribute to the path
indicated by that new precedent: Parties whose favored outcomes become more likely in the wake of




After collecting briefs and opinions for these cases and noting the
winning and losing parties, I examined the language overlap between
each individual brief and the corresponding opinion. This measure of
language overlap suggests that the Court either relied on the language in
the brief or found the language sufficiently relevant to be included in the
opinion. I created separate text files for each brief and opinion in every
case. I then ran the briefs and opinions through the software WCopyfind
4.1.1.80 This program allows for pairwise comparison of documents to
analyze instances of shared language.81 The user inputs a base document
(the opinion) with secondary documents (the case briefs) to locate simi-
larities in the language used. I maintained the program's default settings
in a similar manner to Corley and Owens and Black so that the program
would highlight exact or extremely similar language. Accordingly, the
program was set to pick up phrases of at least 80% overlapping language
between the brief and opinion.83 The minimum length of each phrase was
set to six words. These settings were designed to ensure the program
focuses on common language in phrases of sufficient length to be mean-
ingful.
I used different model specifications for the two models in the Arti-
cle, although the models share the same approach. For both models each
observation is based on a brief. There tends to be a high level of correla-
tion between the amount of language opinions share with both briefs in
the same case. To deal with this feature of brief/opinion relationships, I
modeled both briefs in a case as nested in a dyad. I did this by creating
separate observations for each brief/opinion relationship, and I also cre-
ated a common identifier for both briefs in a case. The similarities be-
tween briefs in a case can confound standard errors in normal regression
models. In these situations multilevel models are appropriate.8 4 The de-
pendent variable in the Outcome Model is dichotomous (either the high-
er-quality brief is associated with the winning or losing model). Due to
the dichotomous outcome variable, I applied a multilevel probit model.
The outcome in the Language Overlap Model is continuous and so I used
a standard multilevel model.
80. Louis Bloomfield, WCopyfind, PLAGIARISM RESOURCE SITE,
http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/z-wordpress/software/wcopyfind/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2016).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Corley, supra note 64, at 471 (describing the main WCopyfind parameters as
setting the shortest phrase to six words and the minimum percentage of perfect matches that a phrase
can contain and still be considered a match at eighty).
83. See BLACK & OWENS, supra note 24, at 103 (measuring overlapping language between
Supreme Court opinions and briefs submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General); see also Cor-
ley, supra note 64, at 471-72 (using WCopyfind to analyze the relationship between briefs submitted
to the Supreme Court and Supreme Court opinions).




Since scholars cite multiple aspects of writing as consequential for a
briefs quality, I measured the quality of briefs along multiple dimen-
sions. The indicators of quality discussed by scholars break down into
two categories: those dealing with word choices and those dealing with
sentence structure.8 5 Judges and Justices appear to be drawn to language
and structure that make writing easily comprehensible.
To move beyond past measures, I used dictionary-based software.
The first tool, StyleWriter 4,86 provides the indicators for the bulk of the
factors associated with brief quality including wordiness, lively lan-
guage, passivity, and sentence complexity.87 StyleWriter is writing editor
software with settings that can be modified for specific industries and
purposes such as law.88 StyleWriter has a built-in 200,000 graded word
list and 50,000 word and phrase style and usage checker to analyze the
use of plain language.89
Although StyleWriter measures the quality of writing, it lacks
measurement for one very important dimension-a brief's tone or senti-
ment. Current works in many academic disciplines utilize sentiment
analysis to measure the tone of documents.90 I used a modified version of
the SentiWordNet corpus-based dictionary to measure the sentiment of
the briefs in the dataset.91
To focus on the importance of the factors relating to a brief's quali-
ty, I generated multiple control variables.9 2 Due to the relationship of the
control variables to the dependent variables, some are used in both mod-
els while others are used only in the Language Overlap Model. The first
of these controls is Complexity. Complexity is a measure of the number
85. See generally ALDISERT, supra note 27, at 277-78, 282.
86. StyleWriter's Features, EDITOR SOFTWARE,
http://www.editorsoftware.com/StyleWriterFeatures.html#advance writing statistics_software (last




90. See, e.g., AFFECTIVE COMPUTING AND SENTIMENT ANALYSIS: EMOTION, METAPHOR AND
TERMINOLOGY (Khurshid Ahmad ed., 2011) (describing the use of sentiment analysis in domains
ranging from film reviews to homeland security); Cheng-Jun Wang, Pian-Pian Wang & Jonathan
J.H. Zhu, Discussing Occupy Wall Street on Twitter: Longitudinal Network Analysis of Equality,
Emotion, and Stability of Public Discussion, 16 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & Soc. NETWORKING
679 (2013) (examining the public discussion about social movements on Twitter with the use of
sentiment analysis); Saif Mohammad, From Once upon a Time to Happily Ever After: Tracking
Emotions in Novels and Fairy Tales 105-14 (June 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at
the 5th ACL-HLT Workshop on Language Technology for Cultural Heritage, Social Sciences, and
Humanities),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2107650&CFID=705966001&CFTOKEN=21985198 (using
sentiment analysis to track emotions in mail and books).
91. Stefano Baccianella, Andrea Esuli & Fabrizio Sebastiani, SentiWordNet 3.0: An En-
hanced Lexical Resource for Sentiment Analysis and Opinion Mining 2200-01, 2204 (May 17-23,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Seventh International Conference on Language
Resources and Evaluation), http://www.lrec-conf.org/proceedings/lrec20/pdf/769_Paper.pdf.
92. Some of the variables are based on those used in previous studies looking at similar rela-
tionships. See, e.g., Corley, supra note 64, at 474.
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of legal provisions relied upon and issues raised in the case as coded in
the Supreme Court Database.93 As case complexity rises, the Justices
may look to a larger pool of resources in drafting the opinion. Additional
complexity should decrease a brief's overlap value.
Next, Legal Salience is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 in cases
where the Court strikes down a law as unconstitutional or overturns its
own precedent (as coded in the Supreme Court Database).94 Political
Salience examines when the case is salient to the public and to elites.
When a case is discussed on the front page of the New York Times the
day after the decision is handed down, I coded Political Salience as 1.
Both salience factors should also lead the Justices to focus on a larger
pool of resources and lower the briefs' overlap values.
The next variables relate to party type and issue area. The first is
Solicitor General. It is coded as I when the party on the brief is the Unit-
ed States or an executive branch agency represented by the OSG. It does
not account for individual government employees. The other government
variable is State. While I expect federal government briefs to carry a
strong positive coefficient, the State variable should move in the negative
direction due to the documented, poor-quality of states' briefs and the
often overloaded dockets that states' attorneys face.96 To combine consti-
tutional issue areas, I clustered the Civil Liberties variables together.97
Based on the assessment that many civil liberties cases are highly salient
for the Justices and that the Justices have distinct preferences in such
cases, I expect this variable to carry a negative coefficient.98
I coded a variable for briefs associated with parties that won by a
unanimous decision of the Justices as 1. This is due to the expectation
that the role of ideology is minimized in unanimous cases thus enabling
the Justices to reach consensus on the opinion's language with fewer
conflicting voices.99 Unanimous should carry a positive coefficient. In
contrast, I expect ideological friction among the Justices to play a larger
role in contested decisions. I coded a dummy variable for cases where
93. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis ofLower Court
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration ofPrecedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 538-39 (2002).
94. FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 46 (2000).
95. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72-73
(2000).
96. Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as
Amicus Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298, 300, 304-05 (1987).
97. The Supreme Court Database: Issue Area, WASH. U. L.,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var-issueArea (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (indicating that
the Supreme Court Database issue areas include: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amend-
ment, Due Process, and Privacy).
98. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 138, 147 (2002).
99. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Are Even Unanimous Deci-
sions in the United States Supreme Court Ideological?, 106 NW. U. L. REv. 699, 712-13 (2012); see
also Owens & Simon, supra note 46, at 1224.
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the split of the Justices' votes is Five to Four Vote, and I expect this vari-
able to carry a negative coefficient.
Next, to account for the petitioners' advantage due to the certiorari
process and aggressive grants, I coded a dummy variable, Petitioner's
Brief, as 1 for each brief for the petitioning party, and I expect this varia-
ble to carry a positive coefficient.100 Based on the Justices' votes on the
merits, I coded a dummy variable Winning Brief for the winning party in
a case. As the Justices decide the winner of the case in conference prior
to drafting the opinion, I expect the winning brief to generally set the bar
for the amount of language the Court will share with the briefs in the
case.
To measure an attorney's experience in the Supreme Court, the At-
torney Experience variable tracks the number of times an attorney is
listed as the attorney of record on Supreme Court briefs.' I generated
this variable based on a Westlaw search of briefs for each attorney. Be-
cause the distribution of experience is skewed to the low end with a few
significant outliers, I used the natural log of this experience variable. The
pre-logged number increases by 1 each time the attorney is listed as at-
torney of record on a merits brief.
I next included a control variable for the Justices' Ideological Com-
patibility with the briefs. This variable accounts for the ideological com-
patibility between the Justice and brief and controls for the ideological
direction of the brief. To code this variable, I used Martin-Quinn (MQ)
Scores that measure the Justices' ideological preferences based on their
prior votes.'0 2 I coded the dummy variable 1 when the majority opinion
writer's ideological direction accorded with the ideological direction of
the brief in the observation and 0 otherwise.103
To control for a Justice's relative workload and for the possibility
that the number of clerks in a Justice's chamber affects the amount of
overlap in a Justice's opinions, I added the variable Clerks-Per-
Chamber.1 ' I expect that the addition of more clerks over time functions
as a resource to help gather greater amounts of information so that the
100. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 80 (1998).
101. This is coded similarly to the brief quality variable in Kearney & Merrill, supra note 62, at
814.
102. These scores vary by Supreme Court Term. The scores are negative for liberal and posi-
tive for conservative and range from approximately negative six on the liberal side to near six on the
conservative side. I only coded for ideological compatibility when the Justices' scores were either
less than negative one or more than one indicating that the Justice is not ideologically neutral.
103. This is based on the direction of the lower court decision as coded in the Supreme Court
Database. The Supreme Court Database: Lower Court Disposition Direction, WASH. U. L.,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var-lcDispositionDirection (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).
104. While the majority of the Justices utilize the clerk pool to review certiorari petitions, they
engage in their assessment of cases on the merits by individual chamber. Supreme Court Procedure,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/supreme-court-
procedure/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).
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overlap value should decrease as the number of clerks increase.105 Alt-
hough clerks may have subjective views on the utility of briefs for con-
structing opinions, multiple clerks in the same chamber should lead to
opinion construction based on a greater diversity of sources, notwith-
standing the tradition that individual clerks are generally assigned to fo-
cus on particular cases.ios
Central to the analyses in this Article, I generated several indicators
to measure the quality of briefs. As these are all indicators of the same
overall concept, I used factor analysis to collapse the factors into a latent
variable called Brief Quality.107 All but one of the quality indicators were
derived using StyleWriter's dictionary-based indices that measure char-
acteristics of writing quality.108
The first indicator, Passivity, measures the number of passive verbs
in the document based on the total number of sentences. Passivity makes
writing less clear and incoherent. Examples of passivity include verbs
preceded by "are" and "be."
The next two measures based on StyleWriter's term dictionaries are
Lively Language and Wordiness.'0o Wordiness measures the inclusion of
some of the most common non-pronoun words that are often used to link
parts of speech."o Overuse of these words may detract from the writing
quality. Many of these are also known as stopwords that are often re-
moved from other forms of text analysis."' These words include "the,"
"and," "to," "'of, "is," and 'for.''
Because StyleWriter's indices are term-based, I have a count varia-
ble that measures Sentence Complexity. This variable is a simple average
of the number of words per sentence across a document. Increased sen-
105. There is an underlying issue of a Justice's supervision of clerks in this process. Although
there is a possibility of "rogue" clerks that do tend to rely more or less on brief language when
assisting in opinion drafting, I expect that as a general matter an increasing number of clerks will
also function as a check on other clerks to ensure they are performing their duties in the manner
expected of them. See generally Corley, supra note 64, at 468-69 (discussing the tendency for clerks
and judges to borrow language from persuasive briefs).
106. See Terry Baynes, Insight: The Secret Keepers: Meet the U.S. Supreme Court Clerks,
REUTERS (June 14, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-court-clerks-
idUSBRE85DI7120120614 (describing the practice of individual clerks focusing on particular
cases).
107. Factor analysis was also used to validate this approach showing that all the brief quality
indicators break down to a single factor.
108. For information regarding the disaggregated effects from the brief quality variables, see
infra Appendix.
109. StyleWriter refers to these as "Pep" words. StyleWriter's Editions, EDITOR SOFTWARE,
http://www.editorsoftware.com/StyleWriterEditions.html ( ast visited Sept. 25, 2016).
110. See id.
111. See Justin Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS 267, 273 (2013) ("Often




tence complexity tends to create sentences that are dry and harder to fol-
low.
Finally, with SentiWordNet I was able to measure the overall sen-
timent or tone of each brief. SentiWordNet measures whether a docu-
ment has a positive or negative polarity based on the WordNet database
of synsets (synsets are synonymous terms grouped together in the data-
base).1 12 SentiWordNet determines the sentiment of a document by the
proportion of positively and negatively classified words assigned a label
within it.113
Although SentiWordNet has been validated in a variety of studies as
a sentiment classifier, it lacks one essential tool for sentiment classifica-
tion: negation identification.114 Negation identification is essential to
sentiment classification due to a negation's ability to change the meaning
of terms immediately following it. A simple example is the comparison
of the phrases "the verdict was accurate" and "the verdict was not very
accurate." Although "accurate" can convey a positive sentiment, the ne-
gation changes the meaning of the term.
To deal with negations, I created a regular expression that elimi-
nates negated terms from sentiment classification in order to prevent
these negations from confounding the results."s The sentiment scores
are, therefore, based solely on non-negated terms, both positive and neg-
ative in polarity.
III. RESULTS
To test the importance of brief quality, Table 1 looks at the impact
of brief quality on winning in the Supreme Court.
Table 1: Outcome Model
Multilevel Probit Estimates of Likelihood of Winning
Variable
Petitioner's Brief 0.551 * (0.0325)
Solicitor General 0.402 (0.0631)
State 0.220 (0.0343)
Ideological Compatibility 0.378 (0.0381)
112. See Baccianella, Esuli & Sebastiani, supra note 91.
113. See id. at 2200.
114. See, e.g., Fazal Masud Kundi, Shakeel Ahmad, Aurangzeb Khan & Muhammad Zubair
Asghar, Detection and Scoring of Internet Slangs for Sentiment Analysis Using SentiWordNet, LIFE
SC. J., May 2014, at 66, 68.
115. For the regular expression code, see infra Appendix.
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Attorney Experience (Log) 0.0635 (0.0160)
Brief Quality 0.0373 (0.0137)
Constant -0.538 (0.0225)
N 9498
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.05, "p<0.01, "'p<0.001
The dependent variable in Table 1 is dichotomous as it is coded I if
the brief is for the winning party and 0 if the brief is for the losing party.
The results of this model show that the quality of briefs is in fact signifi-
cant in winning cases as brief quality positively affects the likelihood of
winning. The likelihood of winning a case increases by approximately
20% by moving from the low end of the brief quality spectrum to the
high end.116
Table 2 presents the multilevel model results of the relationship be-
tween brief quality and the overlapping language between opinions and
briefs.
Table 2: Language Overlap Multilevel Model
Variable
Complexity -0.253*** (0.0722)
Legal Salience -0.724*** (0.200)
Political Salience -1.379** (0.188)
Solicitor General 4.006*** (0.279)
State -0.518*** (0.110)
Civil Liberties -0.398** (0.146)
Petitioner's Brief 1.100*** (0.101)
Attorney Experience (Log) 0.315*** (0.0889)
Winning Brief 1.880*** (0.165)
Ideological Compatibility 0.479** (0.168)
Unanimous 0.654** (0.207)




Five to Four Vote -0.765** (0.179)
Clerks Per Chamber -0.0818 (0.0772)
Brief Quality 0.794*** (0.0700)
Constant 8.019*** (0.296)
Variance of Constant 1.279*** (0.0305)




Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on Supreme Court Term.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, "**p<0.001
Model fit using maximum likelihood
Before examining the results, there are several checks I performed
to ensure that the model is correctly specified and that the multilevel
model accounts for the presumed correlation between merits briefs' over-
lap values in a case. First, a likelihood ratio test between each multilevel
model and a linear regression is significant at the 0.001 level. The vari-
ance of the residuals is significant at the 0.001 level, which also helps
support the presumption that the model is accurately specified. The re-
duction of error (PRE) in the two-level model over the one-level model is
20.05%. Finally, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is .408."
As Table 2 shows, brief quality affects the amount of opinion lan-
guage the Court shares with merits. The control variables all move in the
predicted directions. The variables with the greatest magnitudes are for
winning briefs, the presence of the Solicitor General, and for petitioner's
briefs. These three variables have positive coefficients indicating they
lead to a likelihood of more shared language between briefs and opin-
ions.
Both politically and legally salient cases, as well as more complex
cases lead, as predicted, to decreased shared language between briefs and
opinions. This is not surprising given the expectation that the Justices
and clerks look to additional sources in drafting opinions when these
factors are present. Also, as predicted, the Court shares less language
with states' briefs.
117. This measure was derived with non-robust standard errors, yet its magnitude suggests a
substantial portion (over forty percent) of the residual variance is due to the dyadic pairs conditional
on the top-level factors of the two-level model.
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Increased attorney experience positively affects the amount of lan-
guage opinions shared with merits briefs. This finding supports the prop-
osition that credibility plays a role in the amount of language the Justices
and clerks share in their opinions with the briefs. Excluding the quality
factors, the Justices share more language with more experienced attor-
neys' briefs. Opinions also share more language with briefs for winning
parties in unanimous decisions and tend to share less language with both
briefs in cases decided by five-to-four votes. Finally, and as expected, the
Justices tend to share more language with briefs based on their ideologi-
cal compatibility with the direction of the briefs.
Most importantly, the result for brief quality is significant and
moves in the predicted direction. To understand the magnitude of the
effect of brief quality, Figure I below depicts the marginal effects of
increased brief quality on opinions' overlap values.
Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Brief Quality on Overlap Values
C14
0
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 1O
Brief Quality
Note: Dashed outer lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
The figure shows that as brief quality increases, so does the amount
of language the Justices and clerks share with briefs. There is more than
a fourfold increase in the amount of language that opinions tend to share
with briefs that meet he upper bounds of the brief quality when com-
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pared with briefs at the lower bounds."'8 This suggests that an increased
focus on writing quality does indeed enhance the Court's focus and reli-
ance on particular merits briefs.
Table 3 underscores the difference between the amount of language
the Court shares with high and low quality briefs. This table examines
statistics from the top 100 and bottom 100 briefs based on the quality
measure.
Table 3: Overlap Score Statistics for
Top and Bottom 100 Brief Quality Scores





Table 3 shows that the average amount of language that the Court
shares with the top 100 briefs in the dataset based on brief quality is al-
most double that for the bottom 100. The overlap values for the top 100
briefs based on brief quality are also less dispersed as the variance and
skewness are both smaller than those for the bottom 100 briefs. These
values indicate that the top 100 briefs' overlap values are less driven by
outliers than the bottom 100 briefs' values.
IV. ATTORNEY EXPERIENCE
Do more experienced Supreme Court attorneys draft higher-quality
briefs? On one hand, one might expect that by the time attorneys file
briefs in Supreme Court cases they have already honed their legal writing
skills through appellate legal practice. Without additional input and writ-
ing training, an attorney's writing ability should be well defined by the
time practitioners begin writing Supreme Court briefs. On the other hand,
experienced Supreme Court practitioners may have gained a skillset,
based on their specific knowledge of the Justices, which only those with
such experience can acquire. The results in Table 4 provide evidence of
the relationship between Supreme Court attorney experience and brief
quality and show that to some extent both suppositions are correct.
118. The margins command in Stata bases its results on mean values for all other variables.
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Table 4: Overlap Values and Quality Index by
Attorney Experience Level
Overlap Value Brief Quality N
(mean) (mean)
Overall 9.55 0.00 9498
Repeat Player 11.54 0.05 3415
Non-Repeat 8.44 -.03 6063
Player
Difference 3.10 0.08
Note: Difference in means tests for overlap and quality both show
the means are statistically different from each other at the .001 level.
Repeat Player refers to attorneys with more than one brief filed in the
Supreme Court.
According to Table 4, there is a slight difference in the quality of
briefs from more experienced attorneys whose briefs are, on average,
higher quality. This may be attributed to their increased Supreme Court
brief writing experience. The difference in mean overlap scores between
these two groups, however, is quite large at over three-percent per opin-
ion. Differences in brief quality alone cannot account for this large dif-
ference in overlap values. This leads to the conclusion that an experi-
enced attorney's credibility before the Court enhances the overlap values
of their briefs more than quality alone would indicate.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first attempt to empirically trace the effects of
merits brief writing quality on Supreme Court case outcomes as well as
on the amount of language majority opinions share with merits briefs."9
Perhaps not surprisingly, the main finding is that quality does indeed
matter. Higher-quality writing increases the likelihood of winning and
increases the amount of language the Court shares with briefs. Low qual-
ity writing can have the opposite effect.
These findings are significant in our understanding of the role of
Supreme Court advocacy. Well-written briefs may help win otherwise
close cases by focusing the Court on a particular party's argument in the
merits brief. Even when a party is likely to lose on the merits, however,
the insights about increased brief quality can benefit the party on the
119. See Ryan C. Black, Matthew E. K. Hall, Ryan J. Owens & Eve M. Ringsmuth, The Role
of Emotional Language in Briefs Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 J.L. & CTS. 377, 378 (2016)
(examining whether emotional language in briefs affects a briefs likelihood of success).
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margins by leading the Justices and clerks to insert a greater amount of
language from the brief in the opinion.
Attorney experience and credibility also play large roles in the Jus-
tices' decisions, and their effects are augmented by higher-quality brief
writing. When we observe the Court sharing more language with losing
rather than winning briefs, the losing brief is often from more experi-
enced attorneys. While the Court may not agree with the losing party's
argument on the merits, the attorney's credibility can still lead the Court
to share more language with this party's brief. A prime example of this
relationship often occurs when the SG loses cases on the merits.
Based on this Article's results, which correspond with the Justices
statements, the Justices appear to practice what they preach by favoring
and awarding more shared language to higher-quality briefs.
APPENDIX
A. Readability Algorithms
The algorithms found below are alternative readability algorithms
that are used in other linguistic studies. The data comparisons below,
based on a random sample of 1,000 briefs, show how well these
measures compare to the readability measure used in this Article.
Flesch Reading Ease (FRE)
FRE=206.835-1.015(W/S)-84.6(Y/W) (1)
W=total words, S=total sentences, Y=syllables
Flesch Kincaid Grade Level (FGL)
FGL=.39(W/S)+11.8(Y/W)-15.59 (2)
Gunning Fog Index (GFI)
GFI=.4[(W/S)+100(CW/W)] (3)
CW= complex words
Table 5: Comparison of Readability Measures' R2 Values
Metric R2
Quality Measure in this Article .0237
Flesch reading ease .0072




Note: R2 values computed based on linear regression of readability
measure on the outcome of overlap value with values clustered on Su-
preme Court term.
B. Regular Expression Code
\b(neverlno nothinglnowherelnoonelnonenotlhaventlhasnthadntlcantlcoul
dntlshouldnt wontlwouldntldont doesntldidntlisntIarentlaint)(?:\W+\w+) {0
,3 } ?\W+(.*)\b
C. Quality Variables Multilevel Model
Table 6: Multilevel Model with Quality Variables
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Complexity -0.177* (0.0719)
Legal Salience -0.808*** (0.197)
Political Salience -1.172*** (0.198)
Solicitor General 3.638*** (0.291)
State -0.712*** (0.115)
Civil Liberties -0.188 (0.147)
Petitioner's Brief 1.079*** (0.105)
Attorney Experience (Log) 0.344*** (0.0891)
Winning Brief 1.912'** (0.166)
Ideological Compatibility 0.472 ** (0.168)
Unanimous 0.679*** (0.205)
Five to Four Vote -0.688*** (0.177)
Clerks Per Chamber -0.205* (0.0804)
Passivity -0.0289* (0.0117)
Wordiness -0.0748* (0.0326)
Lively Language 0.0261 (0.0329)
Sentence Complexity -0.285*** (0.0841)
Sentiment 0.143*** (0.0316)
Constant 12.85*** (1.691)
Variance of Constant 1.251*** (0.0304)
Variance of Residual 1.487*** (0.0285)
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Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on Supreme Court term.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Model fit using maximum likelihood
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Confidentiality is a challenge and an opportunity for university ad-
ministrators in charge of resolving campus sexual misconduct. As an
opportunity, confidentiality can be used to build trust, provide self-
determination, and ensure privacy for survivors and alleged perpetrators.
Confidentiality also presents significant challenges because it may pre-
vent people from the reporting of all known instances of sexual miscon-
duct. Without knowing about an instance of sexual misconduct, universi-
ty officials are unable to investigate and remedy problems, potentially
exposing the institution to liability. Title IX Coordinators oversee a com-
pliance regime that mandates reporting but in practice results in wide-
spread underreporting of campus sexual misconduct. Both formal and
informal reporting mechanisms are necessary to manage sexual miscon-
duct disputes, but currently neither Ombuds nor Title IX Coordinators
adhere to their respective archetypes. The result is increased liability risk
to the institution, fewer procedural choices for survivors and alleged per-
petrators, and processes that lack legitimacy. In order to fulfill the man-
dates of Title IX, universities must implement and utilize organizational
Ombuds offices that adhere to the International Ombudsman Associa-
tion's (IOA) standards of practice. Non-conforming Ombuds must be
mandatory reporters, as only a true alternative reporting mechanism can
overcome the current ineffectiveness of the formal complaint system.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a University Title IX Coordinator who uses formal-
ized processes modeled in some ways on procedures used by prosecutors
and courts in order to ensure a hostility-free educational environment. A
female undergraduate student is in your office telling you she was a vic-
tim of a sexual assault. You believe her, but you believe it is a coin toss
as to whether the evidence will be enough to prove the assault occurred.
She never wants to see the perpetrator again, she does not want her par-
ents to find out, and she is wary of going through a public hearing. She is
very emotional and simply wants someone to know what happened. She
tells you, "I knew it was a mistake coming here!" According to the 2011
Dear Colleague letter' and your university's official policies, you have an
obligation to investigate every instance of sexual misconduct. Yet you
Editors' Note: Portions of this Article reference, quote, and discuss confidential inter-
views as part of the Author's qualitative dissertation research. The Editors of the Denver Law Re-
view did not verify this content due to the Author's Confidential Disclosure Agreements with
the Interviewees. Conducted using widely accepted research methods, the Author's research was
supervised by the School of Public Affairs and Administration and approved by the University of
Kansas Institutional Review Board.
I. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4,
2011) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. The Department of Educa-
tion determined that this letter was a "significant guidance document" under the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
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also know that the hearing process in this case would be arduous and
could generate considerable publicity. Further, if you begin even the first
step of the formal process of investigation and hearings as required by
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter2 and university policy,3 you will be una-
ble to guarantee confidentiality to this distraught student. What do you
do?
Consider another scenario. Imagine you are a University Ombuds
tasked with providing an informal means for hearing complaints. The
same student is in your office telling you she was a victim of a sexual
assault. Your institution is under investigation for the mishandling of
prior sexual assault complaints.4 Because of this investigation and the
heightened attention to adhering strictly to the guidelines in the U.S. De-
partment of Education, Office for Civil Rights 2011 Dear Colleague Let-
ter,5 you face considerable pressure to report any instances of sexual
misconduct. To do otherwise would seem to the investigators, and your
university superiors, as an instance of sweeping abuses under the rug.6
But, as an Ombuds, you are bound by a commitment requiring you to
maintain the confidentiality of every person who makes a complaint to
you.7 The student before you asks you about the investigation and hear-
ing process, which you know to be difficult for victims and often does
not result in a finding of misconduct. Hearing your description of the
process, she says that she does not want to be dragged through such an
ordeal. This is the second person over the past year to come into your
office and make an allegation against this particular perpetrator. The two
complaints are quite similar. They seem to you to be quite credible and
compelling evidence that the university has a sexual predator on campus.
What do you do?
As illustrated by the above scenarios, sexual misconduct is an ongo-
ing problem on university campuses,8 and universities are scrambling to
2. Id. at 4.
3. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., UNIVERSITY POLICY ON
RELATIONSHIP VIOLENCE & SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 24-25 (rev. ed. Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/uwidepolproc/RVSMPolicy.pdf.
4. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2016) (listing 282 open federal investiga-
tions).
5. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Kirsten Gillibrand, We Will Not Allow These Crimes to Be Swept Under the Rug Any
Longer, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/100144/kirsten-gillibrand-campus-sexual-assault/.
7. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.8 (INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N 2009),
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/IOAStandardsofPracticeOctO9.p
df.
8. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY
ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 57 tbl.3-2 (2015),
https://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAUPublications/AAU-Reports/SexualAssaultCampusSur
vey/Report%20on%20the%20AAU%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey%2Oon%2OSexual%2OAssa
ult%20and%2OSexual%20Misconduct.pdf (stating that since entering college, 23.1% of female
undergraduates surveyed reported experiencing nonconsensual penetration or sexual touching in-
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address it. 9 This Article focuses on two alternative structures for address-
ing university sexual misconduct. The first of these university structures
is the Title IX Coordinator, an official charged with enforcing the law
through law-informed procedures.o The second is the Ombuds, an offi-
cial who, although given no formally defined responsibility, is available
to hear all manner of complaints and usually performs this role through
no law-like procedures." Each of these structures hears and responds to
complaints in an increasingly legalized environment plagued by an epi-
demic of peer sexual violence.
A. The Problem of Campus Sexual Misconduct
The difficulty facing universities in the area of sexual misconduct,
and the high stakes accompanying the tension between these two alterna-
tive procedures, is compounded by sharp crosscutting pressures. There is
an epidemic of peer sexual violence occurring on campuses across the
nation.12 A recent study found one-third of undergraduate female seniors
report being a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact at least once dur-
ing college.13 Drugs and alcohol surely contribute to many of these as-
saults, accentuating the problem as so many college students drink to
excess.14 Evidence indicates sexual misconduct is widely underreport-
ed.15 Non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and a belief the pro-
cess will not work or not be fair.16 The problem especially occurs within
relationships (romantic as well as hierarchical), making it more difficult
for survivors to come forward.17 In part, the problem is a product of the
university context itself, requiring that institutions take action to remedi-
ate the effects of sexual misconduct.18 Perceptions of organizational tol-
erance to sexual harassment are significantly related to the frequency of
sexual harassment incidents and the effectiveness in combating the prob-
lem.19 Organizationally, studies reveal that where a choice of sanctions
volving physical force or incapacitation); Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, upra
note 4.
9. About ATIXA and Title IX, ATIXA, https://atixa.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2016)
("Now, schools are scrambling to update policies, implement raining, and understand the Office for
Civil Rights' (OCR) expectations for prevention.").
10. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 7.
11. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, §§ 4.1-4.5.
12. See generally CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf;
David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).
13. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at xiv.
14. William DeJong, The Impact of Alcohol on Campus Life, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON
THE COLLEGE CAMPUS: PROMOTING STUDENT GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND REAWAKENING
THE SPIRIT OF CAMPUS COMMUNITY 101, 104 (David R. Karp & Thom Alena eds., 2004).
15. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
19. Camille Gallivan Nelson, Jane A. Halpert & Douglas F. Cellar, Organizational Responses
for Preventing and Stopping Sexual Harassment: Effective Deterrents or Continued Endurance?, 56
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for harassment is available, it is common for the least stringent to be se-
lected, such as a formal or informal warning without further action.20
Such responses indicate a deflection of organizational responsibility and
may indicate a "climate of tolerance."2 1
In sum, Title IX Coordinators face a context in which there is a lot
of sexual misconduct, misconduct especially occurs within romantic and
other relationships involving power dynamics, and survivors are very
hesitant to come forward. Universities must implement processes that
facilitate rather than discourage individuals to make complaints. Fur-
thermore, these processes must fairly adjudicate responsibility for mis-
conduct. Finally, universities need mechanisms for ensuring that univer-
sity leaders know about significant problems and must develop ways to
address these problems.
B. The Legal Context of Campus Sexual Misconduct
The legal environment puts pressure on universities to address the
problem of sexual misconduct through the lens of individual com-
plaints.22 The Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
is tasked with enforcing Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972.23 Title IX promotes equity in academic and athletics programs,
prohibits hostile environments on the basis of sex, prohibits sexual har-
assment and sexual violence, and directs universities to protect com-
plainants against retaliation and to remedy the effects of other gender-
based forms of discrimination.2 4 Originally codified in the Title IX im-
plementing regulations, federal funding recipients are required to "desig-
nate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and
carry out its responsibilities under [Title IX], including any investigation
of any complaint communicated to such recipient alleging its noncompli-
ance with [Title IX] or alleging any actions which would be prohibited
by [Title IX]." 25 In response to Title IX, universities created Title IX
compliance officers and organizational mechanisms for addressing indi-
SEX ROLES 811, 811 (2007); see also Kathi Miner-Rubino & Lilia M. Cortina, Working in a Context
of Hostility Toward Women: Implications for Employees' Well-Being, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (2004).
20. Denise Salin, Organisational Responses to Workplace Harassment: An Exploratory
Study, 38 PERSONNEL REV. 26, 39-40 (2008).
21. Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the Literature,
14 INT'L J. MOMT. REVIEWS 1, 21 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 590, 614
(2016) ("1 observe here that, thus far, we have been thinking of campus sexual assault as a private
and individualized criminal or quasi-criminal wrong in which campus authorities become involved
because of the need to resolve disputes between and among students.").
23. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html ( ast modified Apr. 29, 2015).
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE 3, 11, 15-16,24 (2015) (hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX
RESOURCE GUIDE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-title-ix-coordinators-guide-
201504.pdf.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (2016).
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vidual complaints of sexual harassment and gender inequities.26 Over
thirty years after Title IX's implementation, compliance officers are now
known as Title IX Coordinators.27
According to the Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA),
there are 25,000 individuals who assure Title IX compliance in schools,
colleges, and universities across the country.28 This means coordinating
investigations and providing information and consultation to potential
complainants, and receiving formal notice of complaints.2 9 Title IX Co-
ordinators or their staff schedule, coordinate or oversee grievance hear-
ings, conduct investigations, make findings of violations of Title IX,
notify parties of decisions, and provide information of the right and pro-
cedures of appeal.30 They also train staff, maintain records, ensure that
timelines and procedures are followed, and provide ongoing training,
consultation, and technical assistance.31 The authority of a Title IX coor-
dinator is to conduct a formal and defined process to determine whether
32there has been a violation of the law. All educational institutions are
bound by their own policies and procedures, constitutional due process
mandates, state contract and civil rights law, federal education laws, and
the oversight of the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.33
Dear Colleague Letters, issued through OCR, specify and clarify the re-
quirements of Title IX. 34 While these Dear Colleague Letters lack the
force of law, courts pay them great attention.3 5 The legal standards for
compliance by universities remained unclear until OCR issued a Dear
Colleague Letter on April 4, 2011.36
The Dear Colleague Letter issued on April 4, 2011 dramatically
shifted the interpretation of Title IX enforcement by prescribing the
knowledge37 and evidentiary standards38 for handling sexual misconduct
26. RISA L. LIEBERWITZ ET AL., AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE HISTORY, USES, AND
ABUSES OF TITLE IX 102 (2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/TitlelXreport.pdf.
27. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 1.
28. About ATIXA and Title IX, supra note 9.
29. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 2, 4, 16.
30. About ATIXA and Title IX, supra note 9, at 2, 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See generally Mathew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking
the Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 492
(2012).
34. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2.
35. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(directing courts to defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except
when those interpretations contravene the law).
36. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 1, at 2-3.
37. Id. at 4 (providing that a university must take action "[i]f a school knows or reasonably
should know about student-on-student harassment hat creates a hostile environment"). This interpre-
tation represented a sharp departure from the "actual knowledge and deliberate indifference" stand-
ard for private lawsuits for monetary damages. See id. at 4 n.12. Schools can no longer avoid
knowledge of sexual harassment, and it is much easier to show that responsible university employees
knew or should have known of the misconduct.
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disputes and by requiring universities to address student-to-student sexu-
al misconduct on or off campus.39 The letter also provides guidance on
what constitutes fair procedures, including discouraging schools from
allowing the parties to question or cross-examine one another, giving
institutions discretion to determine whether to permit parties to have
counsel (provided both sides are treated equally), and mandating that
40both parties have the right to invoke an appeal process.
The Letter also requires educational training for employees,4i im-
plementation of preventative education programs, and provision of com-
prehensive survivor resources.42 Finally, the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
affirms the requirement that universities are required to employ a Ti-
tle IX Coordinator and clarifies Title IX Coordinators should not have
other job responsibilities that may create a conflict of interest.43
OCR released a Question and Answers document in 2014 and a Re-
source Guide in 2015 to provide further clarification on what constitutes
compliance with Title IX." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,45
the "Campus SaVE Act" within the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act," the Clery Act,47 FERPA,4 8 due process rights,49
38. Id. at 11 (requiring the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard and noting that
"[t]he 'clear and convincing' standard . .. currently used by some schools, is a higher [and improper]
standard of proof').
39. Id. at 4 (dramatically increasing the scope of cases for which Title IX Coordinators are
responsible by providing that "[s]chools may have an obligation to respond to student-on-student
sexual harassment that initially occurred off school grounds, outside a school's education program or
activity" and that "[i]f a student files a complaint with the school, regardless of where the conduct
occurred, the school must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures").
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 4, 12 (requiring training for employees likely to witness or receive reports of sexual
misconduct and declaring that in sexual violence cases the fact-finder and the decision-maker should
have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual violence).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 7 ("[S]erving as the Title IX coordinator and a disciplinary hearing board member or
general counsel may create a conflict of interest.").
44. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24; OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(2014) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS],
http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. The Department of Education
determined that he questions and answers document was a "significant guidance document" under
the Office of Management and Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Practices, 72 Fed. Reg.
3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating in the terms
and conditions of employment based upon "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"), limited on
constitutional grounds by Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008).
46. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127
Stat. 54, 89-92 (2013) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012)). The Campus Sexual
Violence Elimination Act of 2013, or "Campus SaVE Act," is embedded within the 2013 reauthori-
zation of 1994's Violence Against Women Act. Id.
47. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crimes Statistics (Clery)
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012). The Clery Act was originally called the Crime Awareness and
Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 105-542, 104 Stat. 2381, 2384-87, and was amended by
the Campus SaVE Act, Pub. L. No 113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89-92.
48. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513,
88 Stat. 484, 571-74 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)).
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and administrative law all add additional legal requirements. Further,
survivors may enforce their rights via private action initiated against her
school.o
In concert with the new law, federal administrators are making it
clear that preventing and handling campus sexual assaults must be a uni-
versity priority. In January 2014, President Obama pledged to develop a
coordinated federal response to combat campus sexual assault.51 Presi-
dent Obama created a White House Task Force on Protecting Students
From Sexual Assault, designed to provide colleges with information on
best practices, to ensure compliance with legal obligations, to increase
the transparency of federal enforcement, to increase the public's aware-
ness of individual college's compliance with the law, and to facilitate
coordination among federal agencies.52 The White House Task Force
(WHTF) issued its first report, "Not Alone," in April 2014, and created a
website, NotAlone.gov, to provide resources for schools and students.53
The task force report recommends campus climate surveys,54 actively
engaging with men, and actively creating campus bystander programs to
change campus cultures.55 The report also recommends giving survivors
more control over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential
advice and support.56 It recommends training officials in how to address
the trauma that attends sexual assault.
Since OCR began tracking sexual misconduct Title IX complaints
in 2009, the number of complaints filed against colleges has tripled from
eleven in 2009 to thirty-three through April of 2014.8 As of November
29, 2016, there were 287 open federal Title IX investigations under-
way.5 9 Despite this trend, an analysis of Title IX complaints filed with
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (binding the states to the
same language).
50. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding a private damages
action for sexual harassment may proceed on Title IX grounds only where the funding recipient acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment and the harassment is "so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit").
51. Libby Sander, Obama Promises Governmentwide Scrutiny of Campus Rape, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Obama-Promises-
Govemmentwide/144147/.
52. Id.
53. See THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT,
NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM
SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report 0.pdf
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id at 11.
57. Id at 3.
58. Jonah Newman & Libby Sander, A Promise Unfulfilled, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 9,
2014, at A20, A24.
59. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, supra note 4.
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the Department of Education from 2003 to 2013 found that fewer than
one in ten led to a formal agreement o change campus policies.60
Increased attention to sexual misconduct has also led to a prolifera-
tion of complaints and lawsuits. In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino
and four other complainants made a federal complaint against the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill accusing the university of negli-
gently handling its responses to rape. Students elsewhere filed similar
complaints against Amherst, Berkeley, Dartmouth, Occidental, Swarth-
more, and Vanderbilt and other universities.62 Students accused of sexual
misconduct are also finding success after filing complaints. In 2015,
Middlebury College, the University of Southern California, and Univer-
sity of California, San Diego were all ordered to reinstate expelled stu-
dents.63 Nearly fifty lawsuits by accused students are in process, an in-
crease from roughly twelve in 2013. 4 Young men are as unhappy with
the outcome of college investigations as their accusers, and often, both
sides find the process unfair.6 5 In a June, 2016 report issued by the Amer-
ican Association of University Professors (AAUP), incorrect OCR inter-
pretation and overzealous administrative implementation were described
as the cause of undue restrictions on teaching, research, speech, academ-
ic freedom, and due process.66 The AAUP argued that both the university
response and the criminal justice system serve "neither survivors nor
alleged perpetrators with any notable degree of fairness."67 The core due
process arguments advanced include (1) a lack of a hearing with (2) the
right to confrontation and cross-examination and (3) incorrect use of the
preponderance of evidence standard of proof.68
An additional criticism against current Title IX enforcement is that
the Dear Colleague Letters are not merely interpretive, but instead prom-
ulgate new rules and requirements in violation of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.69 Considered interpretive rules, the Dear Colleague Letters
60. Newman & Sander, supra note 58, at A21.
61. See Libby Sander, Anti-Rape Activist, in The Chronicle List: This Year's Newsmakers,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 9, 2013, at A20.
62. Id.
63. Tovia Smith, For Students Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights,
NPR.ORG (Oct. 15, 2015, 4:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-
accused-of-campus-rape-legal-victories-win-back-rights.
64. Id.
65. Robin Wilson, On New Front in Rape Debate, Student Tells Education Dept. His Side,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 2014, at A 1l.
66. LIEBERWITZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 69, 82-87 (describing the use of role playing exer-
cises in a Deviance in U.S. Society course and other content that could trigger victims, mandating
reporting requirements in sexual harassment research activities, and describing freedom of speech
issues with anonymous technology apps and student publications).
67. Id at 90.
68. Id. at 79.
69. See Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sen.%20Lankford%201etter%20to%2ODept.%200f
%20Education%201.7.16.pdf (discussing the rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure
792016]
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are defined by the Supreme Court as those "issued by an agency to ad-
vise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers" that otherwise "do not have the force and effect of
law." 70 Despite lacking the force of law, courts pay them great atten-
tion.7 1 Recent letters from Oklahoma Senator James Lankford to the U.S.
Department of Education challenges the legitimacy of recent Dear Col-
league Letters by arguing they create substantive changes and require the
use of the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking procedures.72
With the election of Donald Trump, federal oversight of how col-
leges and universities handle sexual assault will likely subside or disap-
pear.73 The Republican Platform notes that sexual assault should be "in-
vestigated by civil authorities and prosecuted in a courtroom, not a facul-
ty lounge."7 4 Despite facing less enforcement from the federal govern-
ment, universities and colleges will likely still follow the letter and spirit
of Title IX as Title IX and the accompanying regulations will still be
obligatory. In sum, Title IX Coordinators address campus sexual mis-
conduct in an unstable but legalized environment that is characterized by
growing complaints, liability pressure, and specific directives from the
U.S. Department of Education's OCR.
Universities face a dilemma in determining how to create fair, con-
sistent, and reliable processes that respect the rights of both alleged per-
petrators and victims, while at the same time encouraging people to bring
complaints forward. Without active reporting and effective processes for
handling complaints, universities are unable to maintain a safe environ-
ment for all students. The difficulty of the dilemma is compounded by
the fact that universities are increasingly expected to change the culture
and norms shaping campus sexual misconduct so as to reduce the extent
of the problem. As will be described below, some measures to achieve
Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 553, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553
(2012)).
70. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
71. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (di-
recting courts to defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except when
those interpretations contravene the law).
72. Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.4.1`6%20Lankford%201etter/`2Oto%2ODept.%20of
%20Education.pdf; Letter from Senator James Lankford to the Honorable John B. King, Jr., supra
note 69.
73. Robin Wilson, Trump Administration May Back Away from Title IX but Campuses Won't,




74. Jake New, Campus Sexual Assault in a Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/10/trump-and-gop-likely-try-scale-back-title-ix-
enforcement-sexual-assault.
75. Wilson, supra note 73.
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these goals seem to require greater formality in procedures; some seem
to require greater informality.
C. Compliance Requires Both Formal and Informal Mechanisms
This Article examines how two university offices respond to the
confidentiality challenge of campus sexual misconduct. One is the long-
standing office of Ombuds, which by tradition and ethical norms has
been committed to using informal processes for hearing complaints. The
other is the office of Title IX Coordinator, which uses formalized pro-
cesses modeled in some ways on procedures used by prosecutors and
courts. Data collection comprised of a review of 1,200 documents and
interviews with fourteen Ombuds and thirteen Title IX Coordinators
from twenty-two large institutions of higher education. Conducted be-
tween 2011 and 2014, the research methods consisted of open-ended
interviews, content analysis of these interviews, and the analysis of doc-
uments relating to Title IX. The participants were from every region of
the country. Participants were primarily from large doctoral degree grant-
ing public and private research institutions, but several master's level
institutions were also included. The sensitive nature of the topic restrict-
ed the sample size. As the numbers interviewed grew, the stories and
commentary became repetitive. While it is possible that the twenty-seven
officials who agreed to be interviewed were somehow systematically
different from others who declined, I suspect that they were more typical
than unique. The participants, while relatively small in number, do not
appear to be systematically skewed in any obvious ways. These inter-
views provide insight into the nature of Title IX compliance between
2011 and 2014.
First, this Article describes the mandatory reporting requirements,
the current compliance regime in place at universities, and the Title IX
archetype that must, by nature, prioritize the interests of compliance over
those of confidentiality. Next the Article describes the limits of a compli-
ance regime, including the tensions between individual self-
determination and community safety and managerial efficiency versus
legal compliance. In each of these areas, Title IX Coordinators frequently
depart from the legal requirements of the role. Third, Ombuds are pro-
moted as a means of satisfying the underlying aims of Title IX. The ben-
efits of informal reporting options are described-specifically, the bene-
fits to the formal processes for providing individuals with confidentiality
and protecting the formal mechanism's independence and impartiality.
Essentially, Title IX Coordinators can retain their compliance function
with a well-designed informal mechanism. As described below, in reality
many Ombuds do not practice to the standards of the archetype, necessi-
tating reforms to ensure effective compliance.
The Article concludes that both formal and informal reporting
mechanisms are necessary and required to manage sexual misconduct
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disputes. Currently neither Ombuds nor Title IX Coordinators adhere to
their respective archetypes, resulting in increased liability risk to univer-
sities, fewer procedural choices for survivors and alleged perpetrators,
and processes that lack legitimacy. Fundamentally, in order to bring
complaints of misconduct out of the shadows, universities require
properly designed and executed formal and informal administrative
mechanisms. Simply put, universities require Ombuds-adhering to their
professional norms-in order to comply with Title IX.
I. REPORTING MISCONDUCT IN A COMPLIANCE REGIME
Title IX Coordinators promise confidentiality, but only to the extent
that it does not interfere with the law and interests of compliance.76 Put
simply, Coordinators give priority to reporting and compliance.77 As an
office of notice, for Coordinators, confidentiality is a relative concept
and is not given priority over compliance with mandatory reporting.78
This Section describes the Title IX Coordinator's archetypal obligations
and provides evidence of Title IX Coordinators complying with the mod-
el.
A. The Title IX Coordinator Archetype: Mandatory Reporting in a Com-
pliance Regime
Universities encourage mandatory reporting to support their interest
in bringing forward complaints of sexual misconduct, so the complaints
can be investigated, the perpetrators punished, and abuses deterred.79
Additionally, mandatory reporting limits potential exposure to liability.
The key question for Title IX Coordinators is whether it is appropriate
for organizational members without a recognized privilege (medical,
legal, religious, or psychological) to be exempt from mandatory report-
ing requirements. In order to bring as many complaints forward as possi-
ble, organizations often impose zero tolerance mandatory reporting re-
quirements.80 There is tension between preserving privacy and requiring
reporting by every employee so no complaint "slips through the
cracks."8' Specifically addressing the reporting question, David Miller
notes:
[W]ho could not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence or any
other kind of violence . .. exposed to the full consequence of their
76. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
78. See infra text accompanying note 153.
79. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 17; see also
infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
80. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 19-20.
81. w. ScoTr LEWIS, SAUNDRA K. SCHUSTER, BRETT A. SOKOLOW & DANIEL C. SWINTON,
THE TOP TEN THINGS WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TITLE IX (THAT THE DCL DIDN'T TELL US) 10
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.ncherm.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/2013-NCHERM-Whitepaper-FINAL-1.18.13.pdf.
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actions, along with those who knowingly abet their horrible behav-
ior? Knowledge is responsibility, and those in the know must also be
held responsible for not acting on what they know if not acting be-
trays the public trust.82
In order to combat a culture of non-reporting, Title IX Coordinators
typically do not promise confidentiality to complainants. Confidentiality
impedes the public's right to know,83 contravenes the transparency of
courts, keeps critical information from people who most need to know,
and shields the institution from needing to provide oversight and ac-
countability.84 The Title IX Coordinator ensures compliance with Ti-
tle IX and reflects a compliance regime that seeks to prevent, elicit re-
ports of, and eliminate instances of sexual misconduct. All of this, in the
view of the Title IX model, requires disclosing information about com-
plaints to those who can act on that information. The Title IX Coordina-
tor archetype must be informed of all reports raising Title IX issues, even
if originally filed with or handled by another individual or office.85 Re-
porting requirements are waived for employees who are in a recognized
counseling relationship with a potential complainant.86
Most university policies provide for confidentiality to the extent al-
lowed by law, prohibit retaliation for making complaints, and allow the
institution to investigate incidents of which it has become aware without
a formal complaint.87 Further, in order to ensure that no incident goes
unattended, many colleges impose mandatory reporting requirements on
all faculty, staff, and employees.8 Title IX requires reporting from "re-
sponsible employees" or those with the authority to address and remedy
gender based discrimination, those with responsibility to report sexual
misconduct to a supervisor, or those a student would reasonably believe
must do either of the above.89 As an example of mandatory reporting
requirements, the Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process at the
University of Kansas specifies that all "unit heads and others who serve
in leadership roles in the university" are required to report discriminatory
82. David Miller, In Whom Can We Trust?, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN Ass'N, 2011, at 6,6.
83. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 947
(2006).
84. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let Some Sun
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 463, 465-66, 518-19 (2006).
85. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 16; OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 10-11.
86. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 22.
87. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. STATE UNIV., supra note 3, at 14, 32, 34.
88. ATIXA Presentation: The 2013 ATIXA Campus Title IX Coordinator and Administrator
Training & Certification Course Materials 15 (Sept. 19-22, 2013) [hereinafter ATIXA Training &
Certification Course Materials], https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-
IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc.
89. Id. at 107.
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actions.90 All deans, directors, administrators, supervisors, faculty mem-
bers, graduate teaching assistants, and academic advisors are required to
contact the Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access to initiate an
investigation if "they know or have reason to believe that discriminatory
practice(s) may have occurred."91 Similarly, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity requires "with the exception of confidential support providers, all
Penn State employees are responsible employees and are obligated to
pass along information they learn about incidents of sexual misconduct
to the University's Title IX Coordinator."92 Harvard University notes:
[U]niversity officers, other than those who are prohibited from re-
porting because of a legal confidentiality obligation or prohibition
against reporting, must promptly notify the School or unit Title IX
Coordinator about possible sexual or gender-based harassment, re-
gardless of whether a complaint is filed. Such reporting is necessary
for various reasons, including to ensure that persons possibly subject-
ed to such conduct receive appropriate services and information; that
the University can track incidents and identify patterns; and that,
where appropriate, the University can take steps to protect the Har-
vard community.93
Mandatory reporting requirements put pressure on faculty members,
resident advisors, and others lacking a privilege, yet who promise priva-
cy or confidentiality to students approaching them for assistance. ATIXA
recommends that all employees report incidents of misconduct to the
Title IX Coordinator within twenty-four hours.94 Some non-supervisory
or non-responsible employees may be able to make anonymous reports
initially but may need to provide details later at the direction of the Ti-
tle IX Coordinator. OCR considers this category of reporter as "non-
professional counselors or advocates" and describes them as individuals
who work or volunteer in on-campus sexual assault centers, victim advo-
cacy offices, women's centers, or health centers, including front desk
staff and students.95 These individuals are required to "report only gen-
eral information about incidents of sexual violence such as the nature,
date, time, and general location of the incident and should take care to
avoid reporting personally identifiable information about a student."96
90. Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process. Who Must Report Discriminatory Ac-
tions?, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR., http://policy.ku.edu/IOA/discrimination-complaint-
resolution#WhoMustReport (last updated Aug. 31, 2016).
91. Id.
92. A Note About Confidentiality, PA. ST. U., http://titleix.psu.edu/filing-a-report/ (last visited
Nov. 30, 2016).
93. FACULTY OF ARTS & Scis., HARVARD UNIV., SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED
HARASSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES HARVARD
UNIVERSITY 6 (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.fas.harvard.edu/files/fas/files/fassexual and gender-
based harassmentpolicy and procedures-1-13-16.pdfm=1453319539.
94. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 108.
95. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 23.
96. Id. at 24.
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Notably, ATIXA's Training Manual notes: "No employee should
ever promise absolute confidentiality, though some (such as licensed
counselors) are better able to protect information than others (though
even licensed counselors, etc. have some situations where they must re-
port if they have a duty to warn). Ombuds are not exempt from expecta-
tions of reporting."97 The ATIXA Training Manual further states that all
employees should be trained that "reports are private, but not confiden-
tial (unless made to a confidential resource)" and how to "convey this to
victims without chilling the victim's willingness to report. It takes tact,
but it can be done."98 As a result, the model Title IX Coordinator is a
private, but not necessarily confidential, office of notice and investiga-
tion.
Fundamentally, Title IX Coordinators cannot guarantee confidenti-
ality. A directive in the University of Kansas Discrimination Complaint
Resolution Process notes
The Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access will handle all
discrimination and harassment complaints discreetly but cannot guar-
antee confidentiality or anonymity because the University has an ob-
ligation to investigate complaints of discrimination and harassment
and to maintain a safe environment, free from harassment and dis-
crimination. Because of its obligations under the law, KU will not be
able to honor all requests for confidentiality or all requests that a
complaint not be pursued.99
Harvard's Title IX procedures state, "Information will be disclosed
in this manner only to those at the University who, in the judgment of the
Title IX Officer or School or unit Title IX Coordinator, have a need to
know."100
Therefore, complainants wishing to report, but not participate in the
ensuing investigation-or avoid an investigation altogether-may not
have a choice to not participate. The ATIXA Training Manual notes that
colleges are required "at minimum [to conduct] an investigation in all
cases, to determine the extent of the harassment, the acuity of the threat it
represents to students, and what might be necessary to put an end to
it."' 1 Confidentiality is thus a secondary goal to following and comply-
ing with the law. Coordinator archetypes are offices of notice, which
officially makes the institution they represent aware of, and thus respon-
sible for, any complaints or reports of sexual misconduct. The ATIXA
Training Manual describes these confidentiality responsibilities as a "co-
97. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 108-09.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process: Confidentiality, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
http://policy.ku.eduiIOA/discrimination-complaint-resolution#confidentiality (last updated Aug. 31,
2016).
100. FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIS., supra note 93, at 6.
101. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 14.
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nundrum" because "[i]nstitutional authorities who have notice of alleged
sexual assaults/harassment are not likely to be able to keep those inci-
dents completely confidential, as a result of the institution's affirmative
obligation to investigate and act to resolve the incident."l02 This tension
between protecting confidentiality and fulfilling the obligations of Ti-
tle IX is evident in the ATIXA Training Manual: "The privacy of all
parties to a complaint of sexual misconduct must be respected, except
insofar as it interferes with the university's obligation to fully investigate
allegations of sexual misconduct."'1
03
While complainant's confidentiality must be considered, it is sec-
ondary to the goal of compliance and campus safety. The OCR 2014
Q&A document states, "OCR strongly supports a student's interest in
confidentiality in cases involving sexual violence. There are situations in
which a school must override a student's request for confidentiality in
order to meet its Title IX obligations."'0 Such instances should be "lim-
ited and the information should only be shared with individuals who are
responsible for handling the school's response to incidents of sexual vio-
lence."05 Recognizing the potential for damage to the integrity and trust
in the process, OCR mandates that, "[t]o improve trust in the process for
investigating sexual violence complaints, a school must notify students
of the information that will be disclosed, to whom it will be disclosed,
and why."1 06 Most notably, OCR recognizes the detrimental impact of
breaching confidentiality: "A school should be aware that disregarding
requests for confidentiality can have a chilling effect and discourage oth-
er students from reporting sexual violence.',io7
When complainants insist their identifiable information not be dis-
closed, schools must inform survivors of its limited ability to respond
and of a prohibition against retaliation.'os Complainants still preferring
anonymity require schools to "evaluate the request in the context of the
school's responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory environ-
ment for all students."09 Because the Title IX Coordinator must have
knowledge of all complaints, OCR notes that this individual is in the best
position "to evaluate a student's request for confidentiality in the context
of the school's responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory
environment for all students."'lo
102. Id at 15.
103. Id at 31.
104. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 18-19.




109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 11.
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The ATIXA Training Manual also provides guidance to Title IX
Coordinators on how to handle requests for confidentiality. Where survi-
vors are reluctant to make formal complaints, or withdraw formal com-
plaints, the request should be honored and efforts need to be made "to
persuade (not coerce) the alleged victim to reconsider," including re-
minding the person that (1) the institution will vigorously enforce its
retaliation policy, (2) if he/she does not act, the perpetrator may harm
someone else, (3) they can take time to consider and come back to make
a decision, and (4) interim accommodations can be used to make report-
ing easier.' If a survivor refuses to file a formal complaint or will not
allow his or her name to be revealed, a decision must be made "on
whether sufficient threat is present to warrant an investigation independ-
ent of the cooperation of the alleged victim." 1 2
Confidentiality is related to the Title IX Coordinator archetype's re-
porting requirements. The Clery Act requires all colleges and universities
that participate in federal financial aid programs to keep and disclose
information about crime on and near their respective campuses.1"3 For
example, schools must publish policies designed to prevent sexual vio-
lence and respond to it once it occurs.114 These policies must include
specific information about (1) reporting,115 (2) the survivor's right to
notify law enforcement and receive school assistance in doing so,"6 (3)
instructions to survivors as how to preserve evidence of sexual vio-
lence,"7 (4) information about options and assistance for changing living
and educational arrangement,"8 and (5) disciplinary procedures that ex-
plicitly treat accuser and accused equally in terms of having others pre-
sent at hearings and to know disciplinary outcomes."l9
In 2014, federal regulations clarified the 2013 Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) reauthorization requirements relating to confiden-
tiality.1 20 Specifically, they require institutions to maintain statistics (in-
cluding numbers of unfounded crime reports), to educate incoming stu-
dents and new employees, to engage in ongoing awareness campaigns, to
describe disciplinary proceedings in detail, to detail a list of possible
sanctions, and to indicate the range of protective measures the institution
may offer.121
111. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 53-54.
112. Id. at 54.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1), (a)(1)(0) (2012).
114. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(A)(i)-(ii).
115. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii).
116. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(I11)(aa)-(bb).
117. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(I).
118. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vii).
119. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv).




The Family Educational Rights and. Privacy Act (FERPA) guaran-
tees student rights to confidentiality and impacts the handling of sexual
misconduct complaints.122 Specifically, FERPA protects against the un-
authorized disclosure of confidential student education records. It grants
parents of minor-aged students and students eighteen and older the right
to access educational records, to challenge the records' contents, and to
have control over disclosure of personally identifiable information in the
records.123 In terms of its impact on campus sexual misconduct, schools
must inform the complainant that if she (or he) wishes to file a formal
complaint, the school cannot ensure confidentiality. Conversely, if the
complainant wishes to maintain her (or his) confidentiality, the school
must inform the complainant that the school's ability to address the prob-
lem may be limited because investigators will be precluded from giving
the complainant's identity to the alleged perpetrator and this will fore-
close a full investigation of the complaint.124 Accordingly, the school
should weigh complainant requests for confidentiality against the follow-
ing factors: the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the complainant's
age, any complaints about the same individual, and the alleged harasser's
right to receive information about the allegations if the information is
maintained as an "education record" under FERPA.125 The Federal Gov-
ernment provides specific guidance on the intersection between Title IX,
FERPA, and the Clery Act. 126 Notably, where FERPA and Title IX con-
flict, "the requirements of title IX override any conflicting FERPA provi-
,,127sion.
To comply with this maze of regulation, the ATIXA Training Man-
ual notes Coordinators are to "[o]rganize and maintain grievance files,
disposition reports, and other records regarding Title IX compliance,
including annual reports of the number and nature of filed complaints
and the disposition of said complaints, data collection, climate assess-
ment, [and] pattern monitoring."1 2 8 This reporting and data collection
requirement affects the confidentiality of shared information and requires
formal record keeping relating to confidentiality. For example, the
ATIXA Training Manual notes that interviewers should not promise ab-
solute confidentiality, that complainants should sign a statement hat they
understand the process and that complainants should sign a consent
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.33 (2012).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.33.
124. Gary Pavela & Daniel Swinton, Presentation for Magna Online Seminars: Resolving
Sexual Violence Allegations: OCR Guidance and the Law 3 (June 16, 2011).
125. Id. at 2.
126. Intersection of Title IX and the Clery Act, NAT'L CTR. CAMPUS PUB. SAFETY,
http://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Intersection-of Title IX Clery.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2016) (outlining a side-by-side comparison, the purpose of which is "to clarify the reporting
requirements of Title IX and the Clery Act in cases of sexual violence and to resolve any concerns
about apparent conflicts between the two laws").
127. Id.
128. ATIXA Training & Certification Course Materials, supra note 88, at 5-6.
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statement acknowledging that the complaint may be revealed to the ac-
cused student and to witnesses as necessary.129 The person making the
complaint should sign this consent, and "[i]f s/he does not, s/he is not
entitled to view the complaint."1 30 Further, intake officers "should stress
the need to get the complaint in writing, and can write the complaint,
solicit the written complaint from the complainant, or assist the com-
plainant in writing the complaint.",13
Where the individual's privacy is not absolutely protected by the
model Title IX Coordinator, it will be controlled on a "need-to-know"
basis.'32 Report of an allegation that includes evidence that a felony has
occurred must be reported to the local police (although this does not
mean that charges will automatically be filed or that the survivor must
speak with police).133 Where there is not conclusive evidence of a felony,
victims have
[t]he right to be informed by university officials of options to notify
proper law enforcement authorities, including on-campus and local
police, and the option to be assisted by campus authorities in notify-
ing such authorities, if the [victim] so chooses. This also includes the
right not to report, if this is the victim's desire. 134
This right not to report does not include the institutional require-
ment to report any incidents without personally identifiable information
in its campus crime report.135
In situations where the survivor does not want the institution to pur-
sue an investigation, the threat must be low enough to not require adjudi-
cation. Nonetheless, ATIXA guidance cautions "college officials would
be well advised to fully document their conclusion, supported by an ap-
propriate investigation, and ask the victim to acknowledge that he/she
concurs with the college's conclusion, and asks that no further action be
taken."'136 Further, a letter to the survivor "should indicate that his/her
refusal to cooperate with investigators and campus conduct personnel
may prevent the college from pursuing the complaint to resolution."37
In sum, the Title IX Coordinator archetype does not promise abso-
lute confidentiality because there is a responsibility to address known
problems, which requires sharing information with others who can ad-
dress the problem. The model Title IX Coordinator addresses complain-
129. Id. at 53.
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id at 52.
132. Id. at 31-32.
133. Id. at 32.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 31-32.




ants' interest in confidentiality by seeking as much as possible to respect
complainants' wishes and to provide privacy-but where these interests
conflict with addressing a known and serious problem, the Title IX Co-
ordinator archetype is to give priority to addressing the problem. Title IX
Coordinators reflect a compliance regime that seeks to elicit formal com-
plaints and then discipline, prevent, and eliminate instances of sexual
misconduct. The next Part provides evidence that many Title IX Coordi-
nators adhere to the compliance archetype.
B. Compliance over Confidentiality: Title IX Coordinators Adhering to
the Archetype
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype act as offices of
notice and investigation and require employees who are designated as
mandatory reporters to provide the office with information. These Ti-
tle IX Coordinators also prioritize compliance over confidentiality and
maintain and use records necessary to ensure a quality investigation.
First, these Title IX Coordinators emphasize their role as offices of no-
tice. For example, one Title IX Coordinator explained, "[T]his is not the
office to come and vent. We have those offices. . .. If you want to talk,
you go there, because you're putting the university on notice when you
come to me [and I need to do something about it]. So I make that distinc-
tion upfront."1 3 8
Second, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require
other university employees to provide their office with information about
violations. In order to comply with Title IX, Coordinators must actively
seek to elicit reports about any and all incidents of sexual misconduct.
This requires that all employees be informed of the obligation to report
information about sexual misconduct. For example, a Coordinator de-
scribed mandatory reporters as "[a]nybody with any information [includ-
ing an Ombuds], [who must make a report] on anything associated with
discrimination [or] sexual misconduct [or anything required by
law] . . . .""9 Title IX Coordinators described these reporting require-
ments as mandatory for an effective institutional response:
If [a complainant] start[s] at the police department, [the police] have
a connection and work very closely with us to make sure we get the
information we need once that person makes contact with
them ... [and the] dean of students does the same [for the police]. So
we have a very good collaborative working relationship that all of us
138. Interviewee 1, T1OA9:35-41. Note that the latter part of citations referring to "Interview-
ees" as part of my confidential study indicate page and line numbers of transcripts and are included
for my own records.
139. Interviewee 2, T4A8:28-30.
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at some point will be notified of a concern so that we can all do what
we need to do to resolve it. 140
Title IX Coordinators observed that there is growing interest in re-
porting on their campuses due to the increasing importance of the issue.
Thus, one said,
Every time anybody says anything that just is remotely connected to
some sort of Title IX issue, [administrators had] all read the Dear
Colleague Letter, but they didn't really know what we were doing be-
fore. . . . [and] it just put everyone in a tizzy and it's sort of been in-
teresting politically because . . . you can feel a political tug there
where they really want to be in charge of it. Kind of . .. because it's a
new and scary frontier and that's a career maker if you're 35 [years
old] and have your PhD and you're looking to move up in the organi-
zation .... They call me about the slightest thing that any young
woman says. Any little thing, "We just thought we should refer this
[to] you."'41
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype do not exempt
anyone from reporting unless it is required by law-and this includes
Ombuds. For example, an Ombuds noted a requirement to call the Title
IX Coordinator and say "'Here is the situation, would you be comforta-
ble if we try to resolve it informally?' And if [the Title IX Coordinator]
thinks that it's okay, we can do it and if [the Title IX Coordinator]
doesn't, we can't." 4 2 Another Ombuds noted the lack of a good working
relationship with the Title IX Coordinator because "they think we're on
their turf. . . . [t]hey think they should be handling it all." 43
Coordinators following the archetype prefer anonymous complaints
to not reporting. As one observed,
[E]ven if we are unable to use the situation directly, [fjirst thing we
try to do is make sure that there's an education that comes on the
heels of [a complaint]. .. . [To ask] "when are you having your next
faculty meeting?" or staff meeting if it's involving staff, or if it's not,
if it's a fraternity or something like that, "when can we provide some
education around [sexual misconduct]?"
Another Coordinator described creating a system that allows for
anonymous reporting and how the Title IX office investigates anony-
mous complaints:
We'll go as far as we can go [investigating anonymous complaints],
but if we receive information, and we think we have enough infor-
140. Interviewee 3, TI3A10:12-18.
141. Interviewee 4, TI2All:22-32.
142. Interviewee 5, 014B9:16-18.
143. Interviewee 6, 09B13:16-18.
144. Interviewee 7, T5A9:18-22.
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mation to take some action in terms of looking into some of the con-
cerns, we'll definitely do that. And we'll go as far as we can go. It's
very difficult not having the person [who complained], so, in terms of
resolution there may not be very much that can be done, but certainly
we'll investigate it, we'll look into it and we'll see if there's any evi-
dence to suggest that what the person has claimed . . . has validity. If
so, we'll maybe try to take some action [to remediate, even if only
providing] some education ... .145
Other Coordinators who adhere to the compliance archetype prefer
detailed rather than general information. For example, an Ombuds de-
scribed the Title IX Coordinator's preferences:
The [formal office director] is an attorney [who] just wants the facts.
I can't single out ... three departments [with one being the potential
culprit]. If [I am asked] how come they got singled out, what am I
going to say? [The formal office director] tells me, "[e]ither we give
training to the whole campus or we don't, and we don't have the re-
sources to do it for the whole campus so it ain't gonna happen. Now,
if you have a victim, I want to see them, you send them to me, and
we'll start an investigation and we'll follow the numbers, but in the
absence of that I don't want to hear about it." 146
Third, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype give prior-
ity to compliance over confidentiality because they must, above all else,
comply with Title IX law and policy. Compliance requires that they give
priority to compliance over confidentiality. For example, a Coordinator
said she tells visitors "[w]hat you say here is confidential to the extent
allowable by law."147 Another Coordinator explained,
[It's important to inform] the person that you're not a confidential re-
source and there are times when the institution has to act or chooses
to act even if it's not what he or she wants. I do my best to explain
why and keep their concerns at the center of what our plan is so they
can inform [our approach] as we move forward.148
Another Coordinator echoed the above observations:
I tell people that I cannot guarantee confidentiality, but I can promise
them discretion and that only those with a need to know will know
that we have confidential records, [and] that I take their privacy very
seriously. But because there are some issues involved I cannot guar-
antee that I will not have to tell someone.149
145. Interviewee 3, TI 3A7:42-8:5.
146. Interviewee 8, 1O0B13:22-29.
147. Interviewee 1, TIOA7:19-20.
148. Interviewee 9, T8A5:31-34.
149. Interviewee 4, T12A9:8-1 1.
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Many Coordinators attempt to provide a "warning" to visitors about the
Coordinator's obligation to conduct an investigation. Thus, one ob-
served,
[W]e let them know that we have an obligation to the institution to
conduct an investigation if we learn something that we think needs to
be investigated, whether they want to file a complaint or not. It's very
common for people to come here and say "I want to tell you about
something, but I don't want an investigation done." We stop them in
their tracks and tell them "look, it's not up to you whether we con-
duct an investigation or not." So it's very clear to them what the obli-
gations [are] on our part. Sometimes people walk away. We try to
have them not walk away, we want to investigate if something's
wrong, but sometimes we have no choice.150
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require participation
in the investigation. As one observed,
We have in our policy that failure to cooperate with an investigation
can [result in] disciplinary action. And that is in there for people who
either falsify information [or] flat out refuse to cooperate with an in-
vestigation.. . . So if someone [has] information, [and] I know they
have information, [and] they refuse to cooperate or come in and don't
provide full cooperation and I [can] prove [it], then you're going to
be disciplined for it. In other words . . . this is a responsibility . . . to
make sure the process works. So if you're not going to be part of the
process, then we're going to have to deal with that. I don't want to
have to deal with the discipline, I just want . .. you cooperating and
giving me the information and giving me true and accurate infor-
mation. Then you're done. I'm giving you the word that no one is go-
ing to know what you told me until and unless it is subpoenaed. I
rarely [have that happen as] . . . most attorneys . . . want to do their
own depositions and everything. ... We're going to protect your in-
formation, but you're going to give me that information. If you don't
give me the information, and you're just refusing to do that, I'm go-
ing to discipline you because you're not going to put a spoke in the
wheel of this process.
There are, of course, exceptions to the requirement to participate in
the process, but these illustrate the general rule described by a Coordina-
tor:
[I]f a person is named in any way in an investigation, yes, they are
required to participate in the process. . . . [Although] sometimes we
make exceptions for the complainant, it depends on the situa-
tion.... [W]ith Title IX cases if we do an investigation, there is the
possibility that the investigator can go to the hearing and testify
150. Interviewee 10, T7A9:17-29.
151. Interviewee 1, T1OA12:1-22.
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based on their investigation and their findings, which would not force
the complainant to have to [testify]. So there are ways, depending on
the situation . .. in which the complainant may not have to participate
in the [formal] process if they do not wish to. Of course, if they don't
want to pursue a case, then we are bound to support their wishes un-
less there's some threat to the campus why we must move forward.152
Another Coordinator sums up the priority of investigation over confiden-
tiality:
I never promise them confidentiality. But I still investigate as much
as I possibly can, with or without their cooperation, because if they
tell me, and I do nothing, then they can come back and say "hey,
[that person is] the office of notice and I told [them], and whether I
participated or not, [she is] showing deliberate indifference to my
complaint. [She] didn't check to see if I was telling the truth, [She]
didn't check to see if there were other people," so I'm not going
down that road. I'm not going to jail for anybody.153
Fourth, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use and
maintain records in order to ensure a documented investigation. A Title
IX Coordinator described effective record keeping as necessary to ensur-
ing correct information: "We summarize [the complainant's statement]
and then we send them a summary of their allegations and ask them if
they agree with them, if they have anything they want to add."l5 4 A simi-
lar process is used by other Coordinators, who "write [the allegations]
down, then type it up, we send it out, [and ask the respondent o] please
make any corrections .... ."5 Typically the name of the complainant and
the summary of the complaint are then provided to the alleged offender,
to make them "fully aware" of the situation."' Several Coordinators ex-
pressed frustration at the gossip and breaches of confidentiality that make
investigating difficult:
[E]ven though the campus is huge, it's still small [and] people hear
everything. There is no confidentiality on this campus. Let me repeat
that: none. None at all. As soon as a phone call is made, as soon as
somebody makes a complaint, every-fricken-body on campus knows
about it. . . . It makes my investigation hard because I have to figure
out what is it you know and what it is you were told and I have to
separate opinion from fact.157
In sum, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetypal model
give priority to the organizational interest in investigation and enforce-
152. Interviewee 3, T13A8:10-21.
153. Interviewee 11, T1IA7:12-19.
154. Interviewee 3, TI3A9:18-19.
155. Interviewee 1, TIOA8:20-21.
156. Interviewee 1, T1OA8:13.
157. Interviewee 11, TI IAl3:36-39, 15:11-13.
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ment over the complainant's interest in influencing the course of the pro-
cess and confidentiality. In reality, just as many Title IX Coordinators
interviewed between 2011 and 2014 departed from the compliance ar-
chetype. The next Section describes the limits of coercive compliance
and the tension between individual and organizational interests.
II. THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE COMPLIANCE
A. The Limited Effectiveness of Coercive Compliance
In their conceptualization of power as the ability to influence, John
French and Bertram Raven identified legitimacy as one of five bases of
power; the other four were reward, coercion, expertise, and reference.158
Raven later included information as an additional basis of power.159 Us-
ing coercion as the basis of power, the deterrence model of compliance
dominates law and public policy.1 60 Focusing on the power of legal au-
thorities to shape behavior through the use of negative sanctions for rule
breaking, punishment is seen as critical to deter people from criminal
behavior.'6 ' The deterrence model is closely related to rational choice
theory and neoclassical economics162 as it creates the prospect of heavy
losses that will outweigh any anticipated gains of engaging in criminal
behavior. While research shows that people's behavior is often shaped by
their estimate of the likelihood of being caught and punished if they dis-
obey the law, 16 3 research also shows these likelihood perceptions have a
relatively minor influence on behavior and, thus, the deterrence model
has had limited success.6
The main problem with the deterrence model is that it requires near-
constant surveillance of individual behavior as rule breakers have a
strong motivation to hide illegal behavior.165 The use of surveillance
leads people to experience such intrusions as unjust and to create adver-
158. John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN
SOCIAL POWER 150, 150-67 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959).
159. See Jojanneke van der Toorn, Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, More than Fair: Outcome
Dependence, System Justification, and the Perceived Legitimacy of Authority Figures, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 127, 128-29, 129 n.4 (2011).
160. Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, Psychology and the Law: Reconciling Normative and De-
scriptive Accounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF
BASIC PRINCIPLES 807, 809 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
161. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413,
425, 436 (1999).
162. See generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, JACQUELINE COHEN & DANIEL NAGIN, DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES
(1978).
163. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Per-
ceived Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded Concept of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 562
(1991); Raymond Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common
Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 7, 8 (1989).
164. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 460-
63 (1997); Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 810.
165. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 810.
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sarial relationships between legal authorities and community members,
especially racial and ethnic minorities.' 66 The result is a public less com-
pliant with both the law and assisting the police.167 Evidence indicates
the deterrence model works best for crimes in which a prospective rule
breaker weighs the expected costs and benefits.168 Short-term reductions
in crime have been observed due to changes in laws that create greater
media exposure and thus increased estimates of being caught and pun-
ished.169 Crimes committed while intoxicated are likewise unaffected by
deterrence strategies.170 Ultimately, people complying only with coercive
power are seen to be less likely to obey the law in the future '7 as it di-
minishes internal motivation to obey the law.1 72
The legal system depends on the consent of citizens to cooperate
with legal authorities.173 Cooperation is most likely to occur if people
view the law as (1) determined and implemented through procedurally
fair means, and (2) consistent with moral values.174 Ultimately the legit-
imacy of legal authorities is essential to greater compliance and coopera-
tion. Fundamentally a "law enforcement frame" requires a focus on the
"adequacy of the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual assault."',7
The current compliance regime is ineffective due to (1) the funda-
mental tension between individual self-determination and organizational
interests in safety and avoiding liability, (2) the current university culture
of non-reporting, and (3) a crisis of legitimacy as neither survivors nor
alleged perpetrators trust universities to effectively handle sexual mis-
conduct disputes. Each of these issues is now reviewed in turn.
1. The Fundamental Tension
Confidentiality and the reporting of sexual misconduct illustrate the
tension between self-determination and organizational interests. By en-
suring confidentiality, officials serve the values of encouraging people to
report misconduct, assisting survivors in getting any needed support, and
providing survivors with self-determination in maintaining control re-
garding what will happen with the complaint. This view was best ex-
166. See ToM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002).
167. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513, 534-37 (2003).
168. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 809-10.
169. See id. at 810.
170. See id. at 811.
171. Id. at 812.
172. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 44 (2000).
173. Tyler & Jost, supra note 160, at 813.
174. Id.
175. Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX's Unrealized Capacity to Prevent
Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1068 (2015).
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pressed in the Report of the White House Task Force to Protect Students
from Sexual Assault:
Sexual assault survivors respond in different ways. Some are ready to
make a formal complaint right away, and want their school to move
swiftly to hold the perpetrator accountable. Others, however, aren't
so sure. Sexual assault can leave victims feeling powerless-and they
need support from the beginning to regain a sense of control. Some,
at least at first, don't want their assailant (or the assailant's friends,
classmates, teammates or club members) to know they've reported
what happened. But they do want someone on campus to talk to-
and many want to talk in confidence, so they can sort through their
options at their own pace. If victims don't have a confidential place
to go, or think a school will launch a full-scale investigation against
their wishes, many will stay silent. In recent years, some schools
have directed nearly all their employees (including those who typi-
cally offer confidential services, like rape crisis and women's cen-
ters) to report all the details of an incident to school officials-which
can mean that a survivor quickly loses control over what happens
next. That practice, however well-intentioned, leaves survivors with
fewer places to tum.176
On the one hand, an individual who feels she has been subjected to
sexual harassment or assault has a strong interest in shaping whether and
how the university pursues an investigation and disciplinary action in
response to her grievance. Often, these individuals do not even file a
complaint because they fear losing control of the process.
By contrast, universities have a strong interest in vigorously inves-
tigating these cases and carrying out discipline when it is merited. This
interest serves the value of setting clear norms, punishing bad actors, and
deterring future misconduct. Each university holds an interest in protect-
ing the broader university community from sexual misconduct. That in-
terest also serves the value of protecting the university from liability for
failing to do enough to stamp out misconduct. In pursuit of these goals, a
university will often want to investigate and discipline even if the com-
plainant does not. Reconciling these tensions is difficult.
The benefits of confidentiality especially conflict with the principle
of mandatory reporting. The values served by mandatory reporting are to
set clear norms against sexual violence by encouraging reporting, punish-
ing bad behavior, and deterring future misconduct. These organizational
values also serve to protect the organization from liability. Confidentiali-
ty and control over the complaint encourages individuals to report, but a
culture of under-reporting requires the institution to surface as many
176. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra
note 53, at 11.
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complaints as possible in order to ensure compliance and change cultural
norms.
Mandatory reporting policies are often designed to trigger the use of
formal mechanisms.177 Zero tolerance policies often create a tension be-
tween efficiently solving problems at the lowest level (e.g., "by helping
people act on their own") and establishing "complete control over all
unacceptable behavior by centralizing conflict management."1 7 8 Essen-
tially, the question of settlement versus precedent is also one about indi-
vidual self-determination versus organizational interests. Settling a com-
plaint through a mutual agreement rather than an official determination
serves the interests of individual self-determination over how a dispute is
handled, privacy, and efficiency. Settlement may also serve an institu-
tional interest in avoiding publicity and public liability. By contrast,
making an official decision regarding a complaint establishes a precedent
and this serves the interest in setting clear norms regarding sexual mis-
conduct. These precedents may clearly send the message that misconduct
will not be tolerated. Navigating the tension between individual self-
determination and organizational interests in safety and avoiding liability
places Title IX Coordinators in difficult situations given the current cul-
ture of non-reporting.
2. A Culture of Non-Reporting and a Crisis of Legitimacy
Despite the Title IX compliance regime, evidence indicates sexual
misconduct is widely underreported. A 2007 survey indicated that only
16% of physically forced survivors and 8% of incapacitated sexual as-
sault survivors contacted a survivor's, crisis, or health care center after
the incident.179 Only 2% of incapacitated survivors and 13% of physical-
ly forced survivors report the incident to law enforcement.180 Other stud-
ies estimate that 90% or more of survivors of campus sexual assault do
not report the incident.'8 1 A 2015 study of twenty-seven institutions of
higher education found "[a] relatively small percentage (e.g., 28% or
less) of even the most serious incidents are reported."'82
Evidence indicates non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and
a belief the process will not work or not be fair.' 83 In a 2001 survey of
graduate students, 21% of those experiencing harassment reported the
behavior, 30% experienced retaliation after reporting, and 58% believed
177. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 24, at 2.
178. Mary Rowe, Linda Wilcox & Howard Gadlin, Dealing with-or Reporting-
"Unacceptable" Behavior, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, 2009, at 52, 57.
179. KREBS ET AL., supra note 12, at xvii.
180. Id.
181. BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., NAT'L INST. JUSTICE & BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 23-24 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf.
182. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at iv.
183. FISHER ET AL., supra note 181, at 23-24.
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the reporting process and complaint handling could be improved. 184 Ac-
cording to a 2015 study, "[m]ore than 50% of victims of even the most
serious incidents (e.g., forced penetration) do not report because they do
not consider it serious enough."185
Relationship dynamics make it more difficult for survivors to come
forward. Most perpetrators of rape or attempted rape are known to the
survivor, including classmates and friends (70% of completed rapes), and
boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (23.7% of completed rates and 14.5% of
attempted rapes).186 The decentralized environment, the focus on aca-
demic pursuits, and the hierarchical intellectual environment allow har-
assing behaviors to go unchecked in academic institutions.18 7
In part, the problem is due to a crisis of legitimacy. Neither survi-
vors nor alleged perpetrators trust universities to effectively handle sexu-
al misconduct disputes. The university context for sexual misconduct
requires institutions take action to remediate the effects of sexual mis-
conduct. In a 2014 survey of more than 300 schools, commissioned by
Senator Claire McCaskill, "[m]ore than 40% of U.S. colleges and univer-
sities have conducted no investigations of sexual assault[] [allegations]
over the last five years."'8 8 Further, the survey found that only 16% of
schools conduct "climate surveys" to determine the prevalence of sexual
assault on campus, and only about half of colleges have a hotline that
survivors can call to report a sexual assault.'89 Nearly 73% of schools do
not have protocols for how campus authorities and local law enforcement
should work together on cases.190
Perceptions of organizational tolerance to sexual harassment are
significantly related to the frequency of sexual harassment incidents and
the effectiveness in combating the problem.191 Organizationally, studies
reveal that where a choice of sanctions for harassment is available, it is
common for the least stringent to be selected, such as a formal or infor-
mal warning without further action.192 Such responses indicate a deflec-
184. STUDENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION CTR., UNIV. OF MINN., ACADEMIC INCIVILITY AND THE
GRADUATE/PROFESSIONAL STUDENT EXPERIENCE: SUMMARY OF SPRING 2011 SURVEY OF UMN-
TC GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS 5 (2011),
http://www.sos.umn.edu/assets/pdf/Survey%20Summary%202011`%20(revised%208-12- 1l).pdf.
185. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 8, at iv (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. FISHER ET AL., supra note 181, at 19.
187. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Workplace Harassment in the Academic Environ-
ment, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 81, 83 (2011).
188. Mary Beth Marklein & Deirdre Shesgreen, Colleges Ignoring Sexual Assault, Senator
Charges, USA TODAY (July 9, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://usat.ly/ImfL6Cf.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Miner-Rubino & Cortina, supra note 19, at 109; Nelson, Halpert & Cellar, supra note 19,
at 812.
192. Salin, supra note 20, at 40.
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tion of organizational responsibility and may indicate a "climate of toler-
ance." 193
The legitimacy crisis has also led to a proliferation of complaints
and lawsuits. In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino, two other stu-
dents, an alumna, and a former administrator made a federal complaint
against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill accusing the uni-
versity of negligently handling its responses to rape.194 Students else-
where filed similar complaints against Amherst, Berkeley, Dartmouth,
Occidental, Swarthmore, Vanderbilt and other universities.'95 In 2014,
the University of Connecticut announced it would pay nearly $1.3 mil-
lion to settle a federal lawsuit filed by five current and former female
undergraduate students claiming the university had mishandled their sex-
ual assault complaints.'96 In 2016, Florida State agreed to pay $950,000
to settle a federal lawsuit with an accuser of quarterback Jameis Win-
ston.197
Students accused of sexual misconduct are also filing complaints.
Daniel Kopin, a former student at Brown University, sent a letter to the
U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, sharing his side
of a sexual encounter that resulted in his suspension.198 In June 2013,
Peter Yu sued Vassar College, arguing that the college denied him due
process throughout the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and had
discriminated against him because of his sex.'99 Specifically, Yu claimed
officials did not properly advise him of grievance policies and did not
allow him legal representation at the disciplinary hearing.200 Similar
complaints were filed against St. Joseph's University in July 2013, and a
federal lawsuit was filed against Xavier University in August 2013,
claiming that the university conducted a fundamentally unfair hearing.201
These three lawsuits all share several allegations in common: campus
officials withheld key evidence in hearings, were hasty to rush to judg-
ment, and a general presumption of guilt prevailed.202 In 2015, Middle-
bury College, the University of Southern California, and University of
California, San Diego were all ordered to reinstate expelled students.203
193. McDonald, supra note 21, at 8.
194. Sander, supra note 61.
195. Id.
196. Monica Vendituoli, UConn Will Pay $1.3-Million to Settle 5 Women's Sexual-Assault
Lawsuit, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 1, 2014, at A4.
197. Rachel Axon, Florida State Agrees to Pay Winston Accuser $950,000 to Settle Suit, USA
TODAY (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/01/25/florida-
state-settles-title-ix-lawsuit-erica-kinsman-jameis-winston/79299304/.
198. Wilson, supra note 65.
199. Libby Sander, 3 Accused of Sexual Misconduct Say Colleges Acted Hastily and Assumed
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Nearly fifty lawsuits by accused students are in process, an increase from
roughly twelve in 2013.204 In sum, young men are as unhappy with the
outcome of college investigations as their accusers, and often both sides,
find the process unfair.205
Attorneys representing both survivors and the accused report they
are seeing an uptick in cases. Brett Sokolow, president of the National
Center for Higher Education Risk Management, which also oversees
ATIXA, notes receiving nearly sixty calls from accused students and
their parents, of which he is now representing roughly a dozen. 20 Anoth-
er attorney, Andrew Miltenberg, reported receiving fifteen calls each
207month in 2014. Recent changes in Title IX compliance are designed to
reform formal complaint systems that are not seen as safe, accessible,
and credible, or that ignore "ugly behavior that is not overtly illegal."2 08
This includes bullying, hazing, or any activities that may be seen as "tra-
ditional high jinks," "everyone does it," or "no harm was intended."20 9
Title IX compliance efforts must reform systems that discourage
people from making complaints. Common complaint system problems
also include confidentiality violations, requiring written complaints,
lengthy time periods to resolve complaints, officials with little under-
standing of the law or inadequate training on proper procedures, percep-
tions that important people are treated differently, or that the system it-
210
self is overseen by the people seen as the source of the problem. Inher-
ently the culture of non-reporting and the tension between individual and
organizational interests result in a compliance regime that is severely
limited in its effectiveness. As evidenced in the next Part, in seeking to
navigate these tensions, Title IX Coordinators frequently depart from the
compliance archetype. Reasons for the departure include efforts to seek
substantive justice for both survivors and alleged perpetrators and con-
cerns that the formal system is too formalistic and rigid.
B. Title IX Coordinators Depart from Compliance to Address the Ineffec-
tiveness of the Compliance Regime
Departures from the archetype occur primarily to address the needs
of survivors or alleged perpetrators, out of frustration with the inefficien-
204. Id.
205. Wilson, supra note 65.
206. Robin Wilson, Presumed Guilty, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Presumed-Guilty/148529.
207. Id.
208. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 56.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 57.
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cies of excessive formalism, and to address the organization's interest in
resolving disputes and avoiding liability. 2 1 1
One Coordinator poignantly describes frustration with the formal
system:
[T]he part that makes [it] really difficult is that the ... conduct hear-
ing is very formal [and] the victim is expected to mount her own de-
fense. She must call her own witnesses. She must question her own
witnesses. She must answer questions from the panel.... It's very
problematic, and I will tell you .. . [the conduct panel gives the com-
plainant] X number of days to get their documentation in while [a
complainant may be] grieving over the loss of her virginity and feel-
ing frightened for her physical safety and all these things are going
on. The dad [is] trying to help get the paperwork together and gather
the names of the witnesses and get witness statements. There's all
these requirements. ... Here, we don't even make you fill out a form.
You come in, we take notes. . .. I struggled when you said positive
outcome because there's not a young woman that's been through this
process that has not said to me "the process was worse [than what
happened to me]." It is re-victimization. The one that went [to the
next step] said "I don't want money, I just don't want another girl to
have to go through this."
212
Further, some Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype be-
cause they see the formal process as too confrontational and thus harmful
to survivors. For example,
You don't know how it's burdened my heart. I often see them right
after, the day after. They're traumatized. They cry.. . . They [are of-
ten] furious .. .. Furious. [She] said that everyone over there was in-
competent, unfeeling ... our process is so victim unfriendly.213
Coordinators often expressed strong dissatisfaction with the formal
process. For example, "knowing what our adjudication process is
like . . .when they first come [in], I just dread it. Because I know what's
coming. I just think 'oh my God, how can I do this to this person?"'
214
Another Coordinator concurred:
I think once you're into a process such as a Title IX process, it's so
formal at that particular point, and the requirements are so different
that it's hard to maintain that sense of safety and security of why you
came to university. . . . I really try to make it as non-intrusive as I can
when we're doing complaints with students. That's not what they re-
ally signed up for, so we try to get through them quicker than the
211. Brian Pappas, Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance with
the Laws Governing Campus Sexual Misconduct, 52 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
212. Interviewee 4, T12B3:8-1l; 7:33-39; 3:39-43.
213. Interviewee 4, T12B48:13, 23, 19.
214. Interviewee 4, T12B8:17-18.
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employees, let's get in there, let's find out the facts and get out so
that they can finish their studies.215
Specifically, regarding confidentiality, the departure from formality
is evidenced by Title IX Coordinators' respect for Ombuds commitment
to confidentiality. By not insisting that all offices must provide the Coor-
dinator with information about complaints, Title IX Coordinators depart
from the archetypal model. A Coordinator notes, "Ombuds don't have
the legal [confidentiality] privilege, but they have that code and our cam-
pus completely respects that."216 Yet another Coordinator explained,
[W]e recognize [the Ombuds Office] as being a place where employ-
ees or students can come and get hings off their chests, share with
someone, and maybe get some good advice where they will know
that the information that they share doesn't necessarily have to be
acted upon. That's important for individuals who are afraid to go
through the process. The [formal] process can be very intimidating,
depending on the circumstance, so again I think that's a valuable out-
let for employees and students. Years ago when we established [the
Ombuds] Office there was a ground swelling of support from staff
and students to say "we need something like this on our campus," so
it was established. So I think it definitely serves a great purpose but I
think those individuals have to be very knowledgeable [about] the
campus in order to give people really good advice.217
Title IX Coordinators also depart from the compliance archetype
with. the understanding that gaining complainants' trust will lead com-
plainants to be more willing to participate in the formal process. Some of
these Coordinators depart from Coordinator archetype in ways that are
aimed at building complainants' trust. For example,
If the information comes to us and they've not shared the name of the
accused with the first responder, meaning if it happens on campus
and they share that information with one of our resident assis-
tants .. . but they don't give a name, and they don't want to, then of
course they haven't told them, they haven't told the police, they're
not going to tell us. Sometimes they might [if we establish a relation-
ship]. You want to see if you can build enough trust in the conversa-
tion or support in the conversation that the person will [see this as a
safe place to report].218
Typically, resident assistants are mandatory reporters, indicating
that the above Title IX Coordinator is departing from the compliance
archetype in favor of building trust and legitimacy. Over deferring to
individuals' control over confidentiality is one type of departure.
215. Interviewee 1, TIOA14:3-10.
216. Interviewee 4, T12B4:9-10.
217. Interviewee 3, TI 3A5:42-6:7.
218. Interviewee 12, T2B4:17-26.
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Often a Coordinator may truly want to provide the visitor with con-
trol. In the clearest example, a Title IX Coordinator described conversa-
tions with students but taking no notes:
I do not take notes .. . [and make] [n]o record of the conversation. So
in that way, it's kind of like the Ombuds experience. I give people an
opportunity to state their case. What is the problem, what do they
think the problem is, how do they want to resolve it? .. . [I do not
provide any initial statement before students start talking] I'm just
letting [the student] get it off [their] chest and see where we're going
with this. . . . Because a lot of times they just want to vent. They just
want somebody else to hear what's going on and tell them whether or
not they're crazy. If they are serious about it, I have a formal intake
form to fill where they can file a complaint. It's pretty simple and
straightforward. . . . Usually when it's sexual in nature ... there are
some key things that a person will come in and tell me that will lead
me to believe that something was not consensual and now we've got
to do something. I tell them, "I need to stop you. I need to review
what I've heard, and I need you to know that this is no longer a 'what
do I do conversation,' this is a 'what are we going to do' conversa-
tion." Because there's just too much information, there's too many
things going on making my skin crawl, and now we've got to address
it. I don't care if they tell me they want to investigate it or not, if I've
got evidence, I'm investigating, especially sexual harassment. There
are no ifs, ands, or buts about it. If they have evidence to prove that
something unseemly was going on and it wasn't consensual, I'm
checking it out.219
Other Coordinators also depart from the archetype by not docu-
menting visitors' statements:
We have a complaint form, but . .. I am loathe to require that they
complete it until we talk.... I'm also loathe to tape record because it
changes the tenor of a meeting when you put that thing between the
two of you, and [on that point] the general counsel and I [disa-
gree]. 220
Still other Title IX Coordinators provide complainants with control
over whether the Title IX Coordinator will investigate-a clear departure
from the archetypal model. For example, a Coordinator noted "the goal
of the meeting is to give [visitors] their options and to hear if they made
a decision about a complaint. What do they want to have happen?"221
Another Coordinator described the decision to go forward with a com-
plaint as a "collaborative decision" in which anything said by the visitor
219. Interviewee I1, TI 1A45:8-14, 20-24, 29-34; 13:1-10; 7:4-8.
220. Interviewee 4, T12A6:37-42.
221. Interviewee 9, T8Al2:28-29.
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222could be used for their detriment. Other Coordinators described telling
visitors their options:
[Does the visitor want to use the] Ombuds or [Title IX Coordinator],
or [do they] want to deal with it on their own, because that's always
an option, or do they just want to drop it? They always have options.
Once they tell me where they want to go with it, because some of
them are adamant about "no, I want to nail him to the wall, so you're
the person I want to talk to." I tell them "here's the form" because I
never want them to make a decision in the heat of the moment.
"Here's my ... complaint form, my intake form." . . . And I ask them
to write out or type up their complaint, which requires them to go
away, think about what they've said, what they want to do, and come
back. Sometimes I never see them again because once they put it in
writing and they see it they change their minds.223
While some Title IX Coordinators provide more confidentiality and
control to survivors than the compliance archetype requires, other Ti-
tle IX Coordinators do not adequately protect confidentiality. Many Ti-
tle IX Coordinators reveal more information to more officials than may
be absolutely necessary to ensure effective enforcement. For example, an
Ombuds critically described the university's Title IX Coordinator:
Well, they don't keep confidentiality. I mean, they always say "of
course we keep confidentiality except on a need to know basis," but
their idea of who needs to know is wide and broad, so you can be
fairly certain that if you go to [a formal office] that everybody will
know that you went and what you said. If you go you can [also] be
fairly certain that their bias will be for the university, no questions
asked.224
Another Coordinator described reporting to the president and other
administrators on "everything and anything that could be a potential em-
barrassment to the institution, that could be a headline tomorrow morn-
ing. I don't want them being blindsided by anything. It's what any good
subordinate does for [his or her] boss."225
Still other Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype by mak-
ing pre-conversation statements that provide basic information but not
enough to educate visitors about their options.
[We try to explain this] before we've heard the complainant's entire
story, so it allows the complainant to kind of decide how much
they're going to share with us and how detailed we're going to get,
[and] that's where we can give them some control. ... If what you
222. Interviewee 9, T8Al3:1-6.
223. Interviewee 11, TIIA6:1-13.
224. Interviewee 6, 09A9:21-26.
225. Interviewee 10, T7A4:4-8.
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tell us on its face violates a policy, then we're going to be doing a full
investigation.226
Many Coordinators attempt to provide a "warning" to visitors about
the Coordinator's obligation to conduct an investigation, albeit ineffec-
tively. Thus, one observed,
I do an investigation based upon the information you give me. My
role is not to talk and give you options. Unless there is nothing in
your conversation to suggest that you're being subjected to discrimi-
nation, and it is just bad behavior that you don't like and it doesn't
rise to the level of protected activity, of course I won't do anything.
But, for students who come in and say, "I've been sexually harassed
in the last month, but I don't want you to say anything," I stop them
and say, "I can't. This isn't the place for you." 227
Another Coordinator noted using a hypothetical that hen also takes
control away from the survivor.
In our office we generally don't use a form.... [w]e just collect
basic information: name, if the person was a student, faculty, or staff,
the nature of their complaint, who the witnesses may have been, if
there were any witnesses, what the complaint is in reference to. Usu-
ally, we'll have a conversation even before we get started, before the
person starts talking. We'll talk to them a little bit about our office
and what we do and let them know our obligations to move forward
if we have enough information to indicate that something is potential-
ly a violation of our policy [and] we have an obligation to investi-
gate. So if a person feels that they don't want to engage in that we
say you can give us a hypothetical, but if we have names and infor-
mation we may have to move forward. We try to advise them on the
front end before they begin to share information and try to gain their
confidence in our process and explain how our process works.228
In sum, in sharp contrast to the Title IX Coordinators who strictly
adhere to the archetypal model by giving top priority to investigation and
enforcement, some Coordinators grant more-or less-confidentiality
than the archetype demands, seek to build trust but only to entice com-
plainants into divulging more information than they seem to be willing to
provide, or provide complainants with control over whether to investi-
gate that directly undermines the commitment to investigation and en-
forcement.
226. Interviewee 13, TIB19:35-10:2.
227. Interviewee 1, Ti0A9:42-10:2.
228. Interviewee 3, T13A8:31-45.
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C. Reconciling Compliance with Cooperation
Title IX law and policy recognizes the limits of a compliance re-
gime. The White House Task Force Report recommends that university
officials should give the survivors of sexual misconduct more control
over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential advice and
support.229 The Report observes that survivors are especially concerned
about maintaining their confidentiality and are hesitant to come forward
with allegations.2 30 While many survivors want he school to respond
quickly, others are not so sure and want someone to talk to before they
lose control of what happens next. Mandating that all employees report
sexual misconduct leaves survivors with fewer places to turn, and the
Task Force recommends that "[s]chools should identify trained, confi-
dential survivor advocates who can provide emergency and ongoing sup-
,,231
port. It recommends that these confidential resources should include
on-campus counselors and advocates, survivor advocacy offices, wom-
en's and health centers, and licensed and pastoral counselors.23 2 Ombuds
offices are not included in the list of confidential resources.
In order to reconcile compliance with cooperation and address the
crisis of legitimacy facing Title IX Coordinators, universities must pro-
vide clear and understandable grievance policies and processes. The dif-
ficulty in achieving clarity is illustrated by fundamental disagreements
about issues of due process. There are concerns about what constitutes a
"hearing" and whether Title IX enforcement is being interpreted consist-
ently, as required, with federally guaranteed due process rights.233 There
are also questions of the equality of interim accommodations. Recent
OCR guidance indicates that interim measures to address a complaint-
e.g., to ensure that misconduct is stopped-should be taken immediately
and should "minimize the burden on the complainant."234 Proponents of
respondent rights argue this is harmful to the due process rights of the
accused as "alleged perpetrators [would thus face] expulsion from their
residences upon accusation."235 Survivors' advocates argue "innocent
until proven guilty" is beneficial to the accused, harmful to the rights of
the survivor, and an indication of the depth to which the criminal law
mindset still pervades institutional responses.236 Burden of proof ques-
tions also persist, with commenters and one federal court suggesting that
229. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra
note 53, at 10-11.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 3.
233. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 13.
234. Id at 32-33.
235. Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. Ky. L. REV. 49,62 (2013).
236. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary Through the
Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613, 686 (2009).
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the required preponderance of the evidence standard23 7 is inappropriate
and that clear and convincing proof is a necessary standard to ensure
adequate protection of the accused student's right to procedural due pro-
238cess.
Regardless of the correct legal standards applied, grievance proce-
dures today are difficult for anyone to follow and understand, especially
undergraduates experiencing sexual misconduct or facing misconduct
allegations. For example, the University of Kansas Sexual Harassment
and Sexual Violence Policy is a document of over 8,000 words239 that
links to a Student Non-Academic Conduct Procedures Policy of over
5,000 words.2 40 The Michigan State University Policy on Relationship
Violence and Sexual Misconduct241 is nearly 14,000 words and contains
242nine appendixes. By comparison, Pennsylvania State University's
website describes Title IX Procedures is under 2,000 words,243 but links
to the Code of Conduct and Student Conduct Procedures document of
nearly 10,000 words, nearly 2,000 of which are devoted to sexual mis-
conduct across multiple sections.244 Notably, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity provides for both a hearing and investigative model, contributing to a
lack of clarity.245 Complicated grievance policies may provide for cer-
tainty and predictability, but may be of little use to victims and alleged
perpetrators when they are difficult to understand and follow.
Confidential resources like on-campus counselors and advocates,
survivor advocacy offices, women's and health centers, and licensed and
pastoral counselors must be able to help survivors and alleged perpetra-
tors understand the range of options available to them. Given the ineffec-
tiveness of the compliance regime, universities require an impartial, in-
dependent, and confidential resource that can help to surface complaints
while providing individuals with clear guidance on options. This re-
source exists in the form of university Ombuds who practice to the
standards of their professional archetype. The next Section describes
237. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 26.
238. Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the
Scale Against Males Accused ofSexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV.
591, 614 (2013); Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence
as the Standard of Proof or University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Com-
plaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1639 (2012).
239. Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence, U. KAN. POL'Y LtBR.,
https://policy.ku.edu/IOA/sexual-harassment-sexual-violence-procedures (last updated Aug. 31,
2016).
240. Student Non-Academic Conduct Procedures, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
https://policy.ku.edu/student-affairs/non-academic-student-conduct (follow "Nonacademic Miscon-
duct Procedures_8.22.2016.pdf" hyperlink) (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
241. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MICH. ST. UNIV., supra note 3.
242. Id. Appendix H, describing the student conduct hearing procedures, is nearly three thou-
sand words. Id. app. H.
243. Title IX Procedures, supra note 92.
244. OFFICE OF STUDENT CONDUCT, PA. STATE UNIV., CODE OF CONDUCT & STUDENT
CONDUCT PROCEDURES (2016), http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/conduct/docs/OSCProcedures.docx.
245. Id. at 13-14.
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university Ombuds as a prerequisite for compliance with Title IX law
and policy.
III. OMBUDS: A REQUIREMENT FOR TITLE IX COMPLIANCE
As Title IX Coordinators are a key element of the formal mecha-
nism for ensuring compliance with Title IX, the archetypal Title IX Co-
ordinator model treats confidentiality very differently than the model
Ombuds. Instead of utilizing confidentiality to encourage reporting, Ti-
tle IX law and policy works to strengthen protections for complainants
from retaliation and to educate potential complainants about where con-
fidentiality can and cannot be maintained. This is in stark contrast to the
model Ombuds, whose confidentiality requirements provide their visitors
with control over the extent of the intervention. First, this Section de-
scribes the confidentiality obligations as detailed by the Office for Civil
Rights. Ombuds are then described as a mechanism to strengthen the
work of Title IX Compliance offices. Specifically, the Ombuds model
and the guidelines for confidentiality are discussed, followed by exam-
ples of Ombuds adhering to the archetype. Ombuds impartiality and in-
dependence guidelines are then analyzed as they relate to confidentiality.
As the compliance regime is not effectively encouraging reports of sexu-
al misconduct, informal alternatives that provide confidentiality can
augment and strengthen the formal reporting mechanisms.
The formal system's general lack of legitimacy and broader ineffec-
tiveness in encouraging reports is addressed in recent OCR guidance.
The 2014 OCR Q&A document provides guidance on how to balance the
conflicting goal of providing self-determination yet encouraging report-
ing.246 First, OCR directs universities to "make clear to all of its employ-
ees and students which staff members are responsible employees so that
students can make informed decisions about whether to disclose infor-
mation to those employees."247 Second, employees are required to pro-
vide an initial warning, and "[blefore a student reveals information that
he or she may wish to keep confidential, [the employee] should make
every effort to ensure that the student understands."248 Information that
should be shared includes the employee's reporting obligations (includ-
ing the names of the survivor and perpetrator and relevant facts regarding
the incident), where the employee must report, and the individual's right
to request confidentiality.249 The responsible employee must specifically
inform the student of his ability "to share the information confidentially
with counseling, advocacy, health, mental health, or sexual-assault-
related services (e.g., sexual assault resource centers, campus health cen-
246. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
247. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 15.




ters, pastoral counselors, and campus mental health centers)."250 In terms
of the different levels of confidentiality that may be provided, profes-
sional and pastoral counselors have the ability to provide completely
confidential support services to victims of sexual violence.251 Non-
professional counselors are allowed to maintain the confidentiality of
personally identifiable information about incidents of sexual violence,
but must make reports.252 Non-professional counselors are defined as
individuals who "work or volunteer in on-campus sexual assault centers,
victim advocacy offices, women's centers, or health centers."253 Non-
professional counselors must report "aggregate data" of general infor-
mation (nature, date, time, and general location of the incident) and
"should take care to avoid reporting information that would personally
identify a student."2 54 Non-professional counselors are advised to "con-
sult with students regarding what information needs to be withheld to
protect their identity."255 Ombuds are presumably non-professional coun-
selors and must provide general information about any incident of which
256they become aware.
There are three reasons the OCR guidance is ineffective at best.
First, efforts to educate large campuses about reporting requirements
tend to include online trainings that serve to reduce the universities' pro-
spective liability but do not indicate increased knowledge of the require-
ments. Checking the box of completing training does not mean the train-
ing is effective. Second, individuals reporting sexual misconduct do not
always signal the responsible employee of what they are about to say. To
require an initial warning is neither realistic nor always possible. Third,
complicated grievance policies are a challenge for individuals serving in
a counseling or professional role.257 Professional counselors may not
understand or desire to provide survivors and alleged perpetrators with
unbiased or complete information about their options. Given the chal-
lenge of balancing individual self-determination with organizational in-
terests in safety and avoiding liability, how can institutions encourage
survivors to come forward? Mary Rowe, Linda Wilcox, and Howard
Gadlin encourage the use of Ombuds offices as "[t]here is no single poli-
cy that will make an organization seem trustworthy and no single proce-
250. Id.





256. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.) (providing no change to Ombuds status as a
mandatory reporter); Rick Koepke, Exec. Dir., Int'l Ombudsman Ass'n, Comment Letter on FR
Doc# 2014-14384 (July 14, 2014),
https://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/IOA-Public-Comment-for-FR-Doc-
2014-14384.pdf (requesting that colleges and universities be permitted to designate Ombuds as a
"confidential resource" rather than as a "responsible employee").
257. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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dure or practice that will guarantee that people will overcome all the bar-
riers to coming forward." 258
A. What is an Ombuds?
Charles Howard, author of The Organizational Ombudsman, de-
scribes the origins of the Ombuds' function as a response to the ineffec-
tiveness of formal complaint systems.2 59 As legal, compliance, and hu-
man resources personnel are unable to provide confidentiality to employ-
ees seeking to report misconduct or other conflicts,260 legislators and
organizations sought other means of complying with the law and resolv-
ing interorganizational conflict. The Ombudsman role is the least under-
stood option in the alternative dispute resolution field.261 There is signifi-
cant confusion about what an Ombuds is and significant dispute on the
issue among Ombuds themselves.262 There is basic confusion resulting
from a lack of a common "definition of the term Ombudsman, how it is
interpreted, and who uses it." 263 There is also confusion as to whether the
term "Ombudsman" is gender-specific.264
There are many different types of Ombuds. "Classical Ombuds" are
those originating from the Swedish parliament in the early 1800s and
which have statutory independence, the authority to investigate com-
265plaints, and the authority to issue reports or recommendations. By con-
trast, Organizational Ombuds are established not by statute but by their
organization's institutional governance structure and do not typically
have a formal investigative function.266 While the first university and
corporate Ombuds were "truly amateurs" selected on the basis of their
knowledge of the institution and their personal reputations for integrity,
fairness, and sympathy, over time the Ombuds' role became institutional-
ized and standards of practice developed.26 7
Many organizations founded Ombuds programs as a means of
providing alternatives to formal grievance systems and for attending to
the underlying interests that give rise to disputes, which often are not
well addressed by formal rules and organizational guidelines.268 Ombuds
are now common mechanisms in both the private and public sector. One
survey found that 20 federal agencies and over 1,000 U.S. corporations
258. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 63.
259. CHARLES L. HOWARD, THE ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMAN: ORIGINS, ROLES, AND
OPERATIONS-A LEGAL GUIDE 144 (2010).
260. Id.
261. Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: What's in a Name?, 16 NEGOT. J. 37, 37 (2000).
262. Id.
263. Samantha Levine-Finley & John S. Carter, Then and Now: Interviews with Expert US.
Organizational Ombudsmen, 28 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 111, 127 (2010).
264. This Article uses the term "Ombuds" except in quotations that use another term.
265. Gadlin, supra note 261, at 38.
266. Id. at 39.
267. Id. at 40.
268. Id. at 43.
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use Ombuds.26 9 Educational Ombuds first appeared in the 1960s with the
establishment of offices at Michigan State University and Eastern Mon-
tana College to hear student and faculty complaints during a time of
widespread student unrest.270 Today, there are at least 200 college and
university Ombuds in the United States who handle problems affecting
students, faculty, and staff.
271
Functionally, a university or college Ombuds is a confidential re-
source for anyone who has a complaint or concern about a university
employee or policy. Ombuds are intended to help defuse situations be-
fore they become larger problems by helping individuals think through
options, clarify goals, and improve communication. Ombuds do not tell
people what to do. Instead, they are intended to listen without judgment.
Most importantly, Ombuds provide confidentiality to individuals and do
not put the institution on "notice" for purposes of creating a legal respon-
sibility to act. Ombuds do not duplicate any services, in the sense that
they have no authority to formally resolve a dispute, impose a sanction,
or order a remedy. Instead, they merely provide a place for people to turn
if they don't know where to go.
B. Confidentiality Encourages Reporting
As confidentiality encourages the filing of complaints, Ombuds are
an ideal mechanism for encouraging reporting of sexual misconduct. 272
The most common reasons individuals decide not to make a complaint or
take other steps to stop behavior they find unacceptable includes "fear of
loss of relationships, and loss of privacy, fear of unspecified 'bad conse-
quences' or retaliation, and insufficient evidence."273 A 2002 Time/CNN
Survey/Harris Interactive poll revealed that 87% of the public perceived
274that whistleblowers face retaliation some or most of the time. In a
1999 survey of whistleblowers, 69% stated that they lost their jobs or
were forced to retire as a result of coming forward, and another 69%
reported that they were criticized or avoided by their co-workers.275 Fear
of retaliation is a common reason to avoid reporting, but forbidding retal-
iation is not very effective because "few people understand or trust such
269. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices in the Federal Government-An Emerging
Trend?, AM. B. Ass'N ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 1997, at 6.
270. Scott C. Van Soye, Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman's Compliance with
Accepted Ethical Standards, 8 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 117, 123 (2007).
271. DOUGLAS H. YARN, GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2:14 (2016).
272. Koepke, supra note 256 ("Organizational Ombudsman, without breaching the confidence
of any individual inquirer, can often provide options for surfacing systemic issues or concerns that
can greatly benefit their institutions.").
273. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 52.
274. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TR. & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2003), https://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/SR-03-04.pdf.
275. Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management
Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 107, 120 (1999).
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a policy," and retaliation is hard to prove and prevent where "delayed,
indirect, diffuse, outside the workplace, or covert."27 6
Anonymous hotlines or reporting mechanisms are sometimes pro-
posed as a way of encouraging the making of complaints, but some re-
search suggests that these mechanisms are not as effective for this pur-
pose as sometimes believed.277 Despite a 2007 survey indicating that half
of employees had personally observed violations of "company ethics
standards, policy, or the law," 27 8 a 2007 survey of over 650 companies
revealed reporting rates were less than 1%.279
A possible explanation for why anonymous reporting mechanisms
do not encourage reporting is because survivors want someone they can
talk to confidentially before deciding whether to make an official report.
In a 2007 study, 39% of college students indicated that students had con-
flicts they wanted to pursue but did not, most commonly due to fear of
retribution (37%), expectation of a negative outcome (38%), and lack of
knowledge of how to pursue the conflict (33%).280 Several dozen reasons
explain why people do not act directly and effectively when they see
unacceptable behavior and do not use conflict management systems in
timely and appropriate ways.281 Reasons include fear of loss of relation-
ships, fear of retaliation or other bad consequences, fear that they will not
appear credible to management, and inaccessibility or lack of credibility
of those who might make a difference.282 Additional factors include (1) a
belief that people lack "enough evidence" to pursue an issue, (2) lack of
knowledge about relevant resources or policies, (3) distrust of senior
management, (4) shame, and (5) a belief that no one will listen.283 Hesi-
tance with anonymous, impersonal reporting is echoed in the data on
bystander interventions, noting over half of respondents in a national
survey of adults suspected a friend, family member, or co-worker was a
survivor of domestic violence, but 65% wanted more information about
what to do.284 Further, 58% of college students surveyed did not know
285
how to help a survivor.
276. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 54.
277. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 161 (summarizing the research indicating limitations on
hotline effectiveness).
278. Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. SEC. EXEC. COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE HOTLINE
BENCHMARKING REPORT 11 (2007).
280. Tyler R. Harrison, My Professor Is So Unfair: Student Attitudes and Experiences of Con-
flict with Faculty, 24 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 349,356-57 (2007).
281. Mary Rowe, An Organizational Ombuds Office in a System for Dealing with Conflict and
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Ombuds are the ideal mechanism for restoring individuals' beliefs
in the legitimacy of the organization. The organizational context can be a
barrier to reporting when the complaint system is not seen as safe, acces-
sible, and credible.286 Further, there could be the perception that im-
portant people get treated differently or the system's procedures are not
accessible, take a long period of time, do not respect privacy, or are over-
seen by the people seen as the source of the problem.287
In contrast to anonymous hotlines, in-person mechanisms that
promise confidentiality, like Ombuds, have been shown to increase trust
in the organization and possibly encourage the making of complaints.2 88
A study of campus Ombuds, by Tyler Harrison and Marya Doerfel,
found that over 50% of students bringing an issue to an Ombuds received
favorable or somewhat favorable outcomes.289 Of students who did not
receive a favorable outcome, a majority still thought the process was fair
and contributed to feeling trust and commitment toward the organiza-
290tion.
Ombuds are capable of providing survivors with confidentiality and
self-determination, and research indicates student satisfaction rates of
60%291 to 90% after using an Ombuds on a range of student-faculty dis-
292putes from grading policies to harassment. Most importantly, prior
research indicates female students may especially benefit from speaking
with an Ombuds. A survey of students who used an Ombuds found fe-
male students were significantly more likely to pursue a future grievance
of harassment.293 Women were also significantly more concerned than
men about confidentiality, specifically the effect of pursuing a grievance
on their department standing, potential retribution, and they were more
likely than men to expect negative outcomes.294
Mandatory reporting policies may inhibit reporting because individ-
uals do not want to get other people fired or in trouble and do not trust
the employer to do a fair investigation.295 Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin
state it best, "If the dilemmas are managed badly by providing too few
286. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 56.
287. Id. at 57.
288. Michael L. Sulkowski, An Investigation of Students' Willingness to Report Threats of
Violence in Campus Communities, I PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 53,61 (2011).
289. Tyler R. Harrison & Marya L. Doerfel, Competitive and Cooperative Conflict Communi-
cation Climates: The Influence ofOmbuds Processes on Trust and Commitment o the Organization,
17 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 129,145 (2006).
290. Id.
291. Mary P. Rowe, Case 3. Academic Ombudsman Cost Estimates, 15 J. HEALTH & HUM.
RESOURCES ADMIN. 299, 300 (1993).
292. Tyler R. Harrison, What Is Success in Ombuds Processes? Evaluation of a University
Ombudsman, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 313,315 (2004).
293. Id. at 358.
294. Id. at 359.
295. Rowe, Wilcox & Gadlin, supra note 178, at 58.
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options (and zero tolerance may offer no options), fewer people will
come forward."296 Miller echoes this view:
[T]he provision of a safe place in which options for action and re-
sponse can safely be heard, away from the clamor of police sirens
and media-fuelled public approbation, can help to protect the indi-
vidual and public interest by ensuring that matters have a greater
likelihood of swift resolution. ... [An Ombuds'] very informality,
neutrality and confidentiality enable the exercise of justice by ensur-
ing that alleged victims and perpetrators can safely and more fully
consider their options for exercising their rights.297
Providing confidentiality to visitors is necessary in order to allow
students and employees to feel comfortable asking for help or making a
complaint. Noted Ombuds Brian Bloch, David Miller, and Mary Rowe
believe that promising confidentiality helps people come forward.
Our experience is that only a relatively small proportion of the popu-
lation is comfortable with formal actions (although importantly, some
in this group are satisfied only by formal investigations and formal
action). But most people, most of the time, are quite reluctant to act
on the spot, or report unacceptable behavior, if they believe this will
result in formal action. This is one of the reasons why options are
needed in a complaint system.298
Ombuds are ideal for individuals who do not know where to go,
need help understanding the maze of options, want complete confidenti-
ality, and want to retain their control over the next steps. Instead of re-
quiring Title IX Coordinators to be flexible in their formal compliance
function, Ombuds can be utilized to realize the best of both formal and
informal dispute mechanisms. The next Part describes the model Om-
buds' confidentiality requirements.
C. Ombuds' Confidentiality Requirements
The model Ombuds is not an office of notice, meaning that any
communications made to the Ombuds would constitute making the uni-
versity officially aware of the complaint and thus responsible for reme-
dying the misconduct. The principles of the Ombuds model require that
these offices maintain the confidentiality of visitors' identities and any
information that could lead to their identification.2 99 Ombuds give priori-
ty to confidentiality over compliance. They promise absolute confidenti-
ality and do not make reports about specific individuals. Ombuds only
296. Id
297. Miller, supra note 82, at 6-7.
298. Brian Bloch, David Miller & Mary Rowe, Systems for Dealing with Conflict and Learning
from Conflict-Options for Complaint-Handling: An Illustrative Case, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
239, 240 (2009) (alteration in original).
299. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1.
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make reports about trends when the complete anonymity of the visitor
can be ensured.300
Confidentiality is an International Ombudsman Association (IOA)
Standard of Practice, with Standard 3.1 requiring Ombuds hold commu-
nications in strict confidence by not revealing, or being required to reveal
(without express permission), the identity or information that could lead
to identification of any visitors contacting the office.301 Further, the Om-
buds only takes action with the individual's express permission. This is
done at the discretion of the Ombuds and only when it can be done safe-
guarding the individual's identity. Describing confidentiality as a privi-
lege, the standard provides an exception where there appears to be immi-
nent risk of serious harm, which is an assessment that is to be made by
the Ombuds.302 Standard 3.2 specifically states that communication be-
tween the Ombuds and others is privileged, with the privilege held by
(and thus only waivable by) the Ombuds.303 Confidentiality should be
discussed with visitors prior to them sharing their concerns.304 The IOA
Best Practices states that the Ombuds may negotiate with the organiza-
tion to be exempt from mandatory reporting requirements, and imminent
risk of serious harm should be construed as narrowly as possible.30 5
IOA Standard 3.3 extends the principle of confidentiality to prohibit
Ombuds from testifying in any formal process within or outside the or-
ganization.306 This prohibition operates whether the individual provides
permission or requests the Ombuds come forward.307 Other IOA Stand-
ards regarding confidentiality include 3.5, requiring the Ombuds to keep
no records containing identifying information on behalf of the organiza-
tion,308 and 3.6, requiring the Ombuds to maintain information such as
notes, phone messages, calendars, in a secure location, protected from
inspection, with a standard, consistent practice for destroying infor-
mation.3 09 IOA Standard 3.8 dictates that the communications made to
Ombuds are not considered notice to the organization, Ombuds are not
agents of the organization, Ombuds should not be designated as agents,
and Ombuds will not accept notice to the institution.310
300. Id. § 3.7.
301. Id. § 3.1.
302. Id.
303. Id. § 3.2.
304. IOA BEST PRACTICES: A SUPPLEMENT TO IOA'S STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 3.2 cmt. at 6
(INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, Version 3, Supp. 2009),
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOA_Main/media/SiteFiles/IOA Best-PracticesVersion3_1013
090.pdf.
305. Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 6.
306. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.3.
307. Id
308. Id. § 3.5.
309. Id. § 3.6.
310. Id. § 3.8.
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The IOA Best Practices specifies that even in situations in which the
visitor provides permission to the Ombuds to discuss a concern, the
model Ombuds should only discuss the issue in general terms and should
311not specify names, dates, or events. If the Ombuds receives permission
to share, notice occurs via the conversation between the Ombuds and the
organizational representative, not when the visitor communicates with
the Ombuds.3 12 As a result, there are "no circumstances [in which] the
original communication to the Ombudsman [becomes] part of the notice
6,13communication.
Further, the IOA Best Practices recommends that Ombuds publicize
their promises of confidentiality, be situated in a location designed to
protect visitors' privacy, and that permission to reveal information
should not be provided once the issue is being handled in a formal pro-
cess.314 Often, visitors will grant permission for an Ombuds to reveal
their identity or other information as they work to help them resolve the
issue. Once a visitor uses a formal process, an Ombuds should not agree
to release any information learned while working with that visitor.315
Despite the specific confidentiality restrictions of the role, Ombuds may
identify trends and issues about policies and procedures without breach-
ing confidentiality or anonymity.316
D. Ombuds as a Reporting Safety Net
Despite the stringent confidentiality requirements, Ombuds are able
to make reports about trends, policy issues, and any report as long as an
individual's anonymity is safeguarded. Two IOA provisions address re-
porting. First, Standard 3.4 requires that the Ombuds safeguard individu-
als' identities when providing systematic, upward feedback.3 17 Second,
Standard 3.7 requires the Ombuds to prepare reports and data in a way
that protects confidentiality.318 Under these constraints, an Ombuds may
act as a safety net ensuring that complaints are addressed, even in the
aggregate. The IOA Best Practices states that if issues cannot be raised in
confidence, individuals may be unwilling to raise them, thereby "depriv-
ing the organization of an opportunity to address issues and rectify mis-
conduct that has not yet surfaced through other channels."319 Organiza-
tions need confidential and anonymous channels of communication to
resolve workplace conflict and help people report misconduct.
311. IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, § 3.8 cmt. at 8.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. § 3.1 cmt. at 6.
315. Id. § 3.2 cmt. at 6.
316. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,supra note 7, § 4.6.
317. Id. § 3.4.
318. Id. § 3.7.
319. Id. § 3.2 cmt. at 7.
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Ombuds also assist with larger organizational issues because "[t]he
freedom from management responsibility, combined with the everyday
process of speaking with people from any and all levels or locations of
the organization, give the ombuds a unique perspective on how the or-
ganization is performing and what problems it and its people face."320
Armed with this information, an Ombuds can provide recommendations
to organizational leaders on how to address broad institutional problems.
This is done anonymously in order to protect confidentiality. Through
feedback, improvements can be instituted, but these are neither suggested
nor administered by the Ombuds. By presenting the data that help to
identify trends, Ombuds can persuade managers to buy into system
change.321 As a result, Ombuds have many roles including "an institu-
tional response to curb wrongdoing or unethical behavior, a facilitator of
appropriate conduct by both individuals and the organization itself, and
an agent for promoting systemic change where necessary."322
Through these organizational activities, Ombuds serve an important
function of identifying problems missed by other processes due to the
ability to provide confidentiality and to bring issues identified as trends
to the forefront. The Ombuds mechanism may be an effective alternative,
as research indicates that individuals are often hesitant to file formal
complaints.323 Ombuds issue annual or biannual reports, and the 2009-
2011 report from the University of Kansas Ombuds echoes the need for
informal options.324 The report notes, "[n]o one solution, department, or
university unit can respond effectively to all situations. It is important
that the University of Kansas provides both formal and informal options
for campus members to address their concerns."325 The report describes
the results of a user survey of 102 of the 786 individuals meeting with
the Ombuds during the 2009 to 2011 reporting period.326 Individuals
accessing the Ombuds Office included faculty, students, and staff with
issues ranging from grade disputes to promotion issues and tenure con-
flicts.3 27 When asked what they would have done without the Ombuds
Office, a sample of the survey respondents indicated they would have
done the following: resigned, hired an attorney, left the university, esca-
lated the problem at additional time and cost, and nothing as they had
320. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 80.
321. Marsha L. Wagner, The Organizational Ombudsman as Change Agent, 16 NEGOT. J. 99,
108 (2000).
322. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 80-81.
323. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
324. KELLIE HARMON, MARIA ORIVE & STEPHEN GRABOW, UNIV. OMBUDS OFFICE, UNIV. OF
KAN., UNIVERSITY OMBUDS OFFICE BIENNIAL REPORT 2009-2011 (2011),
https://ombuds.ku.edu/sites/ombuds.ku.edulfiles/docs/2009-2011`%20biennial%20report.pdf.
325. Id. at 15.
326. Id. at 6-9, 15.
327. See id at 10.
118 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
nowhere else to go.328 In the 2011-2013 report, whistleblowing and fear
of retaliation are described as an issue of ongoing concern.329
For purposes of a direct comparison of reporting rates for one cam-
pus, the Title IX Coordinator at the University of Michigan released an
inaugural annual report indicating that 129 instances of sexual miscon-
duct were reported between 2013 and 2014.330 Of the 129 reports, fifty-
eight, or 45%, were deemed to not fall under the purview of the sexual
misconduct policy.331 By comparison, the report of the Ombuds at the
University of Michigan for the same timeframe (2012-2013) indicates
the Ombuds met with 217 visitors, 86% of whom were students.3 2 Of
ninety-eight non-academic concerns brought to the Ombuds attention,
twenty-five concerned harassment and discrimination.333
Noted Ombuds Mary Rowe observed that "there are options other
than (a) keeping silent or (b) breaching confidentiality."3 34 These options
include discussing the facts, laws, and rules and, in doing so, encourag-
ing the visitor to decide to act responsibly to prevent future harm to oth-
ers. 335 Further, many visitors may be willing to come forward after time
has passed and circumstances have changed.336 Other visitors may be
willing to provide an anonymous note or give the Ombuds permission to
act in place of the visitor as long as the visitor's anonymity can be main-
tained.337 With the visitor's information, the Ombuds may be able to in-
stigate a "generic approach," like a routine safety audit and follow-up
training and catch the problem.338 Another option includes helping the
visitor prepare for the conversations and aiding them in learning the
skills necessary for acting effectively.339 Further, understanding whistle-
blower protection laws and policies against retaliation and finding an
"accompanying person" who shares their concerns may make the visitors
more likely to come forward.340
In addition to identifying problems and restoring individuals' views
that the institution cares about their concerns, much of the basis for the
use of Ombuds offices is related to confidentiality and avoiding legal
328. Id. at 15.
329. Id. at 7.
330. OFFICE FOR INSTITUTIONAL EQUAL., UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
STUDENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ANNUAL REPORT JULY 2013-JUNE 2014, at 2 (rev. ed. 2015),
https://hr.umich.edu/sites/default/files/student-sexual-misconduct-annual-report-2014.pdf.
331. Id. at 3.
332. TOM LEHKER, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, UNIV. OF MICH., ANNUAL REPORT 2012-
2013, at 2-3 (2013), https://studentlife.umich.edulfiles/ombuds/OmbudsReport20l3.pdf.
333. Id. at 5.
334. Mary Rowe, What Happens to Confidentiality If the Visitor Refuses to Report Unaccepta-
ble Behavior?, J. INT'L OMBUDSMAN ASS'N, 2011, at 40, 40.
335. Id. at 41.
336. Id. at 42.
337. Id.





liability. Ombuds are able to provide an "early warning" to "'con-
sult ... front-line staff or ... direct reports about morale or behavior or
procedures in a certain area" as long as they protect the anonymity of the
individuals involved.3 4 1 Remedial steps such as focused training, depart-
ment level surveys to determine specific issues, and other such mecha-
nisms can be used to address misconduct.342 Ombuds can provide these
services if confidentiality can be maintained and, thus, can ameliorate the
effects of conflict that often linger within the organization. A survey of
government workers indicated the damages caused by sexual harassment
are not limited to the initial event but instead can hurt the target, har-
asser, and organization members for an extended period.343 In sum, Om-
buds provide confidentiality to visitors but may report upwards in ways
that protect the institution from liability.
E. Ombuds Complying with the Archetype
Archetypal Ombuds are offices of informal deliberation and confi-
dentiality that use the principle of confidentiality to provide self-
determination to visitors as they consider whether or how to invoke more
formal organizational processes that typically promise much less-or
no-confidentiality. Many particular Ombuds offices emphasize the
principle of confidentiality in their documents or statements of practice.
For example, the University Senate Rules and Regulations at the Univer-
sity of Kansas specifically provide confidentiality as a power granted to
the Ombuds Office: "All proceedings in individual cases shall be held
confidential by the Ombudsman unless otherwise authorized by the com-
plainant."344 Notably, this contravenes IOA Standard 3.2, which specifi-
cally states that communication between the Ombuds, while serving in
that capacity, and others is privileged with the privilege held by the Om-
buds and the Ombuds office and not any other person.345 The University
of Kansas Ombuds Office provides that it has no power to receive notice
for the University and "all communications with an Ombuds are made
with the understanding that communication is confidential, off-the-
record, and that no one from the Omsbud Office will be called to testify
as a witness in any formal or legal proceeding to reveal confidential
communications, unless compelled by judicial subpoena or court or-
der."3 46 Michigan State University's Ombuds website echoes this view
and notes, "[i]nformation concerning any visit will not be disclosed
341. Wagner, supra note 321, at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. See id
343. Jeong-Yeon Lee, Sharon Gibson Heilmann & Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle on
Sexual Harassment: Test ofa Model ofPredictors and Outcomes, 57 HUM. REL. 297, 318 (2004).
344. University Senate Rules and Regulations (USRR) § 6.2.2.1, U. KAN. POL'Y LIBR.,
http://policy.ku.edu/govemance/USRR#art6sect2 (last updated Oct. 25, 2016).
345. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.2.
346. Authority and Limits of the Ombuds Office, U. KAN. OMBUDS OFF.,
https://ombuds.ku.edu/authority#receiving (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
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without the visitor's permission, absent compelling reasons (e.g., a court
order or potential risk to safety)."347
More generally, Ombuds who follow the archetype are not offices
of "notice" or compliance and maintain visitors' confidentiality and the
confidentiality of information that may lead to identifying a visitor. Ad-
herence to these principles includes maintaining confidentiality in diffi-
cult environments in which others are violating confidentiality, maintain-
ing the confidentiality of e-mail and phone communications, and report-
ing responsibly according to the archetypal model. Ombuds practicing to
the archetype also provide their visitors with control over whether and
how to report allegations of sexual misconduct.
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype face a series of dilemmas in
maintaining the confidentiality standard. Ombuds must subordinate other
values in order to maintain their commitment to confidentiality, and Om-
buds are very aware of the required tradeoff. For example, Ombuds who
adhere to the confidentiality standard are unable to report a sexual mis-
conduct violation even when it is egregious and done by a repeat violator
who is a professor and is preying on vulnerable students. One Ombuds
described maintaining confidentiality, even at the expense of the Om-
bud's preference for reporting:
I really do, again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I of-
fer that it is confidential and would really protect that value, even at
the risk of some others. If someone were the victim of a sexual as-
sault and came here, I assume they came here because I was obligat-
ed to keep that confidential. If they wanted [someone to be] more ac-
tive in terms of a response, [the visitor] would have gone to the po-
lice or they would have gone to the Title IX Coordinator, neither of
whom are obligated to keep that confidential and both of whom are
obligated to be more active in investigating that claim. . . . I really
would encourage . .. and work with [the visitor] in terms of what it is
they're so afraid about to actually [report] . . . . [I]f they're a victim
of sexual assault I would say go to the police first. I'd be happy to
support them in doing that. I would even go with them if they needed
me to. I'd walk them over, I'd call for them, something. Same with
the Title IX Coordinator if that's the way they wanted to go. I would
really encourage them as strongly as I could. [But at] the end of the
day, if they came here because of the protection of confidentiality, I
would honor that.348
Ombuds who adhere to the achetype must do so at the expense of
other values. For example, an Ombuds first described the situation,
347. About the Office of the University Ombudsperson, MICH. ST. U.,
https://www.msu.edu/unit/ombud/Aboutlindex.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
348. Interviewee 14, 04A10:1-5, 7:27-8:2.
2016] 121
DENVER LAW REVIEW
[O]n any ... research university campus . .. there are a number of
faculty who take advantage of their positions to ... develop amorous
relationships with their students, particularly their graduate students.
[One in particular had] a habit of inviting students to co-author
[something, which] ... is going to look really great on their resume
when they go out to look for a job. [This offer always came with an]
invit[ation] to engage in sexual acts . .. [that created] the perception
on the part of the graduate student, "if I say no, I will lose this pro-
fessional opportunity." I have had any number of [this faculty mem-
ber's] students come to me [over the years].349
Next the Ombuds described their own preferences.
I would have loved . . . to [have any of them be] the first one to step
forward. I would have loved to say if [the visitor] says "oh, no, I
don't want to go through all that, I'll just find another job" . . . "you
realize that by doing that you are sealing the fate of somebody else
that's going to be in here . . . the next person he's going to proposi-
tion, you realize that, right?" . . . I'd like to be able to say that, but I
can't in my role.350
Then the Ombuds explained when it is possible to raise the issue.
I have been to both the chair of [the] department and the dean and I
have told them, not during the time that anyone that I'm aware of is
actively being solicited, but I'll wait for the last person to see me to
leave, and then I'll go [talk to the department chair and the dean].3 51
What the Ombuds communicated to the chair or dean is next de-
scribed:
Look, over the last [several] years I've had [a number of] different
people come to me and tell me this general kind of story about [this
faculty member's] behavior . . .. Now I don't do investigations, I
don't apply lie detector tests, but [numerous people] telling me an
almost identical pattern of behavior . . .. I am concerned and I hope
that you are too, Ms. Chair or Mr. Dean, that sooner or later one of
these people is going to take one of the formal options I'm [telling]
them [about] and [that will result in] an investigation, embarrass-
ment, and hassle that could be avoided if this ... behavior were to be
altered. So whether there's any truth to these allegations or not, and
I'm not saying there is, I'm just saying that even if they're all made
up, my job is to tell them that one of their options is to go to the
[formal] office and file a charge and ultimately to the [govern-
ment] ... and [that will result in] federal investigators poking
349. Interviewee 8, 010B5:41-6:17.
350. Interviewee 8, Ol0OB11:19-27.
351. Interviewee 8, OlOB 1l:44-48.
122 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
around . . .and I assume that you would prefer to avoid that. So I just
thought you'd want to know.352
Finally, the Ombuds noted how she maintained confidentiality and
also impartiality in the face of very difficult circumstances.
The hardest part of this job is knowing that in the next year or two
there will be another one of [the faculty member's] victims in my of-
fice, and there's an innocent person out there who may not be in the
program yet who's going to be victimized . .. if somebody doesn't
stand up and stop it. The only people that have .. . [the] standing to
do that is a victim . . . . I will tell people . . ."if you choose to
leave . . . you'll be out from under this person's control, please con-
sider writing down your experiences and sending them to the dean or
appropriate individual so that some kind of record exists of these be-
haviors." But frankly, that almost never happens .... They want to
start a new chapter in their life and put this behind them. . . . But
yeah, my preference is that these people stand up to these victimizers
and call them out for what they are and put them and the people re-
sponsible for their behavior on notice so that we can reduce the
chances of future innocent victims. Do I ever make a consultee aware
that that's my preference? Absolutely not. That would not be being
neutral on my part.353
Ombuds who want to stop egregious sexual misconduct may only
report under an exception for danger of imminent harm. One Ombuds
noted, "I would not be comfortable with [reporting while keeping the
visitor's identity anonymous], unless there [is] imminent risk of harm to
somebody... ."35 Sexual misconduct in particular presents a significant
challenge to Ombuds' confidentiality and determining when there is im-
minent risk of harm. Again following the archetypal model, an Ombuds
noted that risk of serious or imminent harm must be understood narrow-
ly:
[It] can be harm to oneself or someone else [but] typically what we
are more concerned about is someone hurting them-
selves.... [T]hey'll mention they've thought about suicide and those
sorts of things and you have to quickly . .. coordinate some support
for them. . . . I have [also] had someone make a terrorist threat in my
office before, so that happens too. 355
When Ombuds maintain confidentiality, they often also must sacri-
fice the goal of stopping misconduct. One Ombuds described educating
his visitor about his options but secretly wanting the person to report the
misconduct.
352. Interviewee 8, Ol0B 11:47-12:13.
353. Interviewee 8, 010B8:13-34.
354. Interviewee 15, 011A12:1-2.
355. Interviewee 16, 08A5:6-10.
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[W]hen a difficult case comes forward, and I would say that sexual
harassment is to me the hardest . .. I want it to be reported. I want the
behavior to stop, and I do everything I can to educate my visitors
about what their options are. . . . That's problematic in our field be-
cause if you take sexual harassment as an example, if we report it, or
we come forward with the information or even part of the meeting
where someone lse talks about it, we're part of putting the organiza-
tion on notice. From a purist [sic] point of view, Ombuds are not
supposed to do that.356
Ombuds who resist organizational efforts to encourage reporting
even must subordinate their professional reputations to their commitment
to the confidentiality standard. They also potentially endanger the per-
ceived usefulness of their Ombuds offices. With increased pressure fa-
voring a collaborative institutional approach to identifying and address-
ing sexual misconduct, protecting confidentiality is increasingly a chal-
lenge for Ombuds.
Even if I don't use . . . [the visitor's] name on the phone, the [visitor]
is going to go right over [to that office] and engage in that procedure.
[The personnel in that office will] assume it was that [visitor] that I
called about . .. [and] that compromises confidentiality.357
Given the lack of certain protection for confidentiality, Ombuds are
often dependent on their institutions acting in good faith to uphold the
promise of confidentiality. "[My] [u]niversity basically says, '[Y]ou are
not an office of notice and the University is allowing you to offer confi-
dentiality to the extent permitted by law."' 358 Often, Ombuds practicing
to the archetype must defend against being required or mandated to make
specific reports that will put the institution on notice.
I was vehemently opposed to being a mandated reporter. In fact, my
arguments were persuasive and the University has agreed that I can
be a confidential [office], even in regard to [sexual misconduct].359
[T[he whole cornerstone of Ombudsing is confidentiality,. . . [i]f you
don't have confidentiality and you're not off-the-record and informal
there's no reason to have an Ombud[s] Office.. . . So I honestly
would resign in protest if I had to [be a mandatory reporter on issues
of sexual misconduct].360
Further, because of Title IX requirements and the resulting institu-
tional interest in reporting all known instances of sexual misconduct,
other administrators may view Ombuds who refuse to report violations as
356. Interviewee 5, 014A9:34-10:2.
357. Interviewee 8, 010A8:1-4.
358. Interviewee 6, 09A5:18-20.
359. Interviewee 14, 04A10:23-26.
360. Interviewee 17, 012A8:26, 28-30.
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an impediment to stopping sexual misconduct. Ombuds who adhere to
the confidentiality standard and who do not serve as an office of notice
often must sacrifice their professional reputations. One Ombuds de-
scribed helping a visitor think through the confidentiality of a situation
and how the administration might see the conversation:
[I will say to visitors] "Let's talk about retaliation.. .What might
happen to you if he or she can put two and two togeth-
er?" . . . [W]e're not an office of . .. notice. I think the [administra-
tors] would say "no, don't say anything that might discourage [visi-
tors] from coming forward." 361
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype do, however, make some re-
ports to universities. The question of when and how an Ombuds may
reveal communication is fundamental to the role itself. Ombuds who
follow the archetype draft an annual report detailing numbers of cases
falling into general categories specified by the IOA. These reports may
not provide any information that would identify a visitor. For example,
"things . .. specific to a particular procedure or particular office I do not
report publicly in my annual report.. . . I do report the number of [cases]
I engaged in, but I do not specify . . . what individuals or departments
were involved .... "3 6 2 Another Ombuds noted not using any intake form
for visitors to complete, and in terms of collection of demographic in-
formation, "it is visual, whatever I see [in order to avoid records and
maintain anonymity]."363 Many Ombuds adhering to the archetype also
provide periodic feedback to administrators on trends and potential pro-
cess improvements. For example, an Ombuds explained that she meets
with the president quarterly to talk about the state of the campus, but that
she doesn't provide any information about her cases.3M
Ombuds who give priority to confidentiality often must do so as a
detriment to developing relationships. One Ombuds described being
careful not to put the institution on notice by communicating any infor-
mation from the Ombuds to a university agent capable of receiving no-
tice.
I think that an Ombuds always needs to be aware that unless they're
talking to another Ombudsperson, anybody else they talk with at their
institution they're putting them on notice if they talk about certain
.365
things.
361. Interviewee 18, 01113:30, 32-37.
362. Interviewee 8, 010A3:3-6.
363. Interviewee 19, 07A 11:34-35.
364. Interviewee 5, 014A7:12-14 ("[We have a] meeting with [the president] quarterly [to]
talk about the state of the campus, [but] [w]e don't [provide] any information about our cases at
all.").
365. Interviewee 17, 012A7:38-41.
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Another Ombuds noted the challenge of working at a big university
in a small town.
I think I'm excellent at confidentiality ... [but I have] neighbors on
my block who work at the university, everyone I meet is affiliat-
ed ... [T]here was no one I could talk to about anything I'm doing
other than [with] people [who work] in my office. I would get ques-
tions . .. all the time . . . even [from] people who [understand] the
[functions of an Ombuds] office [but still] say "[c]an you tell me
about this case?" Someone would read an article in the paper and say,
"Are you involved in this?" Constantly, people were .. .asking me if
I knew something about [a] situation and I had to figure out appropri-
ate ways of responding.366
This observation is echoed by another Ombuds who stated, "When
they see [me] walking around, . . . the[y] look [at me and seem to
say] . . . 'I wonder what [he or she] knows' and if they did some-
thing ... they're wondering, 'Well, I wonder if he or she knows about
something that I don't want them to know."'
367
While maintaining confidentiality requires tradeoffs, Ombuds who
adhere to the confidentiality standard also protect impartiality and infor-
mality and support other values, such as trust, safety, reputation, and
self-determination. An Ombuds described his informal process providing
confidentiality and control as key to establishing trust with visitors:
[S]he felt like it was a place she could trust, that it was a place she
could go, have a confidential, off the record discussion, and brain-
storm with someone who knows the university policies and proce-
dures and could advise her on the policy and what to expect and that
type of thing. And I think it really helped her to be able to talk to
someone without fear that it would not be confidential. I think she
did fear [a lack of] confidentiality ... [and] it meant a lot to her that
she had a place to go . . .without giving up that control, and that that
she had time to decide. It felt safe to her and she didn't have to feel
like by coming to me it would automatically get reported. She had
time to process and decide what she wanted to do. I do think the
brainstorming process and just letting her have some time was bene-
ficial. 368
Another Ombuds clearly articulated the same benefits, but by dis-
tinguishing the informal Ombuds practice from more formal processes.
You can't have it both ways. If you're not going to be an agent of no-
tice, and you're going to participate in formal [processes] . . . you
start crossing those other lines. You do not have the right to claim no
366. Interviewee 5, 014A3:25-34.
367. Interviewee 18, 01 Al 1:23-26.
368. Interviewee 17, 012B3:40-52.
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notice and you are not really Ombudsing. . . . Many of the people
who come to me to talk about sexual harassment .. . come to me first
and foremost for a reality check. "This happened to me. It feels like
that. Does that make sense? Is that rational? Do you think someone
else to whom this had occurred might feel that way?" Those are what
draw people here, and if they have to compromise their confidentiali-
ty and provide notice and [be forced into] formal [processes], just to
get those questions answered, they're not going to come. They want a
safe place to come and discuss first, to use the words that some of
them use: "Am I crazy, or is this sexual harassment?" And then a safe
and trusted place to come to say, "ok, if I wanted to do something
about it, what are the kinds of things I might consider doing?" With-
out obligating themselves to do any of them. And those are two func-
tions that we as Ombudsmen can perform only because we are not
agents of notice and we are confidential.369
Many Ombuds described safety as the reason they would only re-
port on an individual situation if the visitor provides them with permis-
s1on.
[I]f someone came to me about a sexual harassment issue and didn't
want to deal with it until they left the organization, either graduated
as a student or got another job or something like that and then they
gave me permission to go forward I would figure out a way to do that
even if it's just one person. Sexual harassment, you don't peck at
numbers, [someone might say] "it's just one." But if I [do not have
permission, and I] have to maintain . .. anonymity, I'm never going
to be able to go forward. These situations are too unique . ... 99.9%
of the time all I can do is try to work with my visitor to try to see if
there's a way that they're comfortable going forward them-
selves .... I just feel like that person is very vulnerable, and I can't
do anything to endanger them. It really ties my hands ... . I don't
think I've ever been in a situation where I felt I could provide enough
anonymity for my visitors that I could go forward with those is-
370sues.
Ombuds widely discussed their views on how and when they might
share confidential communications, with many discussing the level of
anonymity necessary in order to make a disclosure. One Ombuds com-
mented,
The only way we can [report], and I think it would almost never hap-
pen with racial discrimination or sexual harassment, is if we had
enough complaints that we felt we could go forward with the report
without identifying any individual visitor. It's extremely rare that that
369. Interviewee 8, Ol0A 1:41-12:19.
370. Interviewee 5, 014A11:27-34, 16-18; 9:1-2.
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happens in my experience .. . because typically it's only one person
who's being affected at a time.3 71
Another Ombuds who adheres to the archetype indicated only re-
porting on general trends: "[I] provide upward feedback on trends and
,372patterns I have seen ... ." The same Ombuds further notes,
[I]f it's an isolated incident, I won't report it. And I don't know
where that line is honestly, but when I feel it's a trend, [and] I feel
like I've heard enough of the complaints ... I can say to the Dean,
"I've had several students come to me and here is the theme that I'm
hearing. This ... might constitute a pattern or trend, and . . . you
might want to look into [the situation]. But know that I have not
talked to the [unit director]." And saying it in that way, there's no
way that the Dean would know who came to see me, and who they
came to see me about. Especially in a big unit, you know, that deals
with students from all over the university.373
Reporting on general trends becomes even easier for the adhering-
to-the-archetype Ombuds when the issue is one of policy or procedural
irregularity.
I would certainly bring [a systemic issue] to the attention of the peo-
ple I report to or to the unit . . . even if it's sexual harass-
ment ... . [I]f it is a problem with the policy and it's not a problem
with a certain person . . . I would certainly bring [it] up to the person
who deals with sexual harassment.374
An Ombuds described confidentiality and the trust and safety it en-
genders as a motivating factor that leads people to seek out the office.
Well, I know why they came to me; they came to me because I'm
trusted. They knew it was a safe place to come and that they wouldn't
be outed and that their confidentiality would be honored here, and
there aren't a whole lot of place [sic] on this campus [where that is
the case].375
I've said this to our [formal offices] . . . "[t]here are ticking time
bombs out there that you're never going to find out about because
people are afraid to come forward because they can't go someplace
and just talk about it and feel safe about having that conversation."376
Maintaining confidentiality and building trust is also a way for Om-
buds who adhere to the archetype to develop reputations as safe, reliable
371. Interviewee 5, 014A8:29-33.
372. Interviewee 17, 012A5:41-43.
373. Interviewee 17, 012Bl3:29-36.
374. Interviewee 17, 012A8:8-13.
375. Interviewee 8, 010B3:33-36.
376. Interviewee 19, 07A17:21-26.
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offices to bring concerns. This is especially important given misconcep-
tions about confidentiality are commonplace, as indicated by an Ombuds
who explained, "[t]here are misconceptions about confidentiality. A lot
of people think that we automatically call the supervisor involved or
[other formal office], and we'll report things."m Another Ombuds dis-
cussed the importance of building a reputation for maintaining confiden-
tiality:
[I]f you're one step removed from the back channel that has a lot of
control over information going upwards or not at all, then you're not
compromised by it. But it's dangerous because this is where
knowledge is power, and people want to know what you know, be-
cause if you maintain your confidentiality, your principles and your
self-discipline, you don't divulge who comes to your office, what is
said, [and] people know that's your function. And they know you're
not one to talk.378
Helping visitors explore potential options without requiring them to pur-
sue any particular avenue is a common activity of Ombuds who follow
the archetype.
I'm really showing [the visitor] "look, I'm not a little naive, here. I
understand that there's politics and people who can get nas-
ty.. .. [The institution] can only protect you to a point. So I want to
make sure that if you want me to go forward, and I'm more than hap-
py to go forward, I want to make sure that you're thinking about all
the other angles that you may not have thought about."379
Another Ombuds noted,
I just talk it through with the visitor to see if they have any other ide-
as about how [they might come forward in a way that is acceptable to
them] .. . so I do [pose hypotheticals] but .. . I do not have any kind
of rules written down or anything like that.380
Ultimately, the same Ombuds concluded,
[A] lot of time people are bothered by something but they can't quite
put their finger on what they're bothered about. . . . [Visitors] just
[want] a place to figure [it] out . .. without worrying about having to
[take the issue further] if [they don't] want [it] to.381
For Ombuds who comply with the archetype, discussion about op-
tions includes both informal and formal methods. The following Ombuds
377. Interviewee 5, 014Al7:35-37.
378. Interviewee 18, OlAl 1:15-22.
379. Interviewee 18, 01B13:39-14:3.
380. Interviewee 19, 07Al2:32-13:4.
381. Interviewee 19, 07B2:43-3:6.
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described how confidentiality impacts the ability of Title IX Coordina-
tors to provide informal coaching.
One distinction, one important distinction is that in the course of [a]
conversation, if [you] say for example . . . "[H]e made a sexual ges-
ture towards me" . . . [the Title IX Coordinator] may be obligat-
ed ... to respond to that [and force you into a formal pro-
cess] . . . . Well, I can hear [those things] and have that conversation
[but] leave [you] in control of how ... to proceed.382
One Ombuds wrestling with this distinction articulated the priority of
maintaining confidentiality over reporting sexual misconduct.
I would hope that I could be persuasive enough with one or more of
the victims here that would put them in a place where they would be
willing to speak to our Title IX coordinators or the police to go ahead
and file reports about that or request a release from their confidential-
ity promise so I could do something on their behalf. I really do,
again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I offer that it is
confidential and would really protect that value, even at the risk of
some others.383
One Ombuds described the role as "a keeper of secrets" and confi-
dentiality as the aspect "where [Ombuds] start to [earn their] trust and
that's where [the Ombuds'] power comes, because people . .. know that
you keep your word and you preserve their confidences."384 In sum, Om-
buds who adhere to the archetype seem deeply committed to the princi-
ple of confidentiality, even though maintaining this commitment requires
a tradeoff of other values like relationships, access, efficiency, reputa-
tion, and stopping egregious behavior. Maintaining confidentiality also
protects other standards like impartiality and informality and supports
values like trust, safety, reputation, and self-determination. The next Part
describes the impartiality and independence requirements of Ombuds and
the resulting benefits to the university.
F. Ombuds' Impartiality and Independence Obligations
Title IX Coordinators are to be impartial to the interests of both the
complainant and the respondent but partial to the goals and requirements
of the law. Ombuds' impartiality and independence provides the larger
compliance system with legitimacy and supports the formal compliance
offices in their missions. For example, one Ombuds described a visitor
who wanted her to resolve their issue formally:
I talked about [formal options and told her] "there are plenty of peo-
ple on campus that can do that" . . . and [I] referred this person to
382. Interviewee 20, 013B4:26-32.
383. Interviewee 14, 04A9:39-10:5.
384. Interviewee 18, 01A5:4, 7-10.
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some of those people if she wanted to exercise that option. There is
nobody else on campus that has confidentiality, independence, and
neutrality, so if I [handle complaints formally], not only am I dupli-
cating an existing service, I am negating the unique and essential
function of my role.385
Independence requires that Ombuds and their offices are independ-
ent from other organizational entities 3 8 6 and hold no other organizational
position that might compromise independence.387 Specifically, independ-
ence requires that the Ombuds report directly to the highest level of the
organization, with an employment status indicating that they are not sub-
ordinate to senior officials. Functionally, independence means operating
"independently from control, limitation, or interference."3 8 8 Although
employed by the university and typically reporting to the president, Om-
buds sit outside the formal administrative structure. A survey of higher
education Ombuds found that most university Ombuds report high up in
the organization and are independent of lower-level supervisors.389 Om-
buds have several sources of authority other than managerial position.
These include the ability to gain access to information, the ability to es-
tablish professional relationships with the very top of the organization,
the ability to recommend cases to more formal options, their problem-
solving skills, and their personal credibility based in charisma and moral
authority.390 Because extensive knowledge of the organization and its
operations is important, most Ombuds are picked from within the organi-
zation.391 Ombuds' independence also requires the Ombuds to retain sole
discretion with how to act regarding specific concerns or observed
trends,392 to have access to all organizational information and individuals
as permitted by law, 393 and to have the ability to select their own staff
and manage their budget and operations.394
Impartiality requires Ombuds to be "neutral, impartial, and una-
ligned," while "striv[ing] for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the
treatment of people and the consideration of issues. " This includes not
385. Interviewee 8, 010B5:17-22.
386. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, at § 1.1.
387. Id. § 1.2.
388. IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, § 1.1 cmt. at 2.
389. SANDRA R. HAYDEN, THE OMBUDS OFFICE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (Educ, Res. Info.
Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Educ. photo. reprint 1998) (1997), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED415784.pdf
(finding that thirty-eight of the fifty-eight responding Ombuds reported to the President, Chancellor,
or Vice-President and Provost levels of the organization).
390. Andrea McGrath, The Corporate Ombuds Office: An ADR Tool No Company Should Be
Without, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 452, 473-74 (1997).
391. Id. at 471; Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3
NEGOT. J. 127,137 (1987).
392. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 1.3.
393. Id. § 1.4.
394. Id. § 1.5.
395. Id. §§ 2.1, 2.2; see also IOA BEST PRACTICES, supra note 304, §§ 2.1, 2.2.
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advocating on behalf of any individual within the organization and advo-
cating for processes that are fair and equitably administered.
Impartiality and independence are strongly related to the confidenti-
ality obligation. Maintaining confidentiality can also be a means of en-
suring impartiality, as indicated by one Ombuds:
I explain [to visitors] that I don't keep records and if they want me to
read something I will, but [afterwards] I'll either shred it or give it
back to them. So I'm really clear about that. And I explain one of the
reasons is because we are neutral and I don't want to have documents
that could result in having to become a witness in [a formal pro-
cess] . . . . That would mean I'm not a neutral person. I would have to
be on one side of a case or another. I don't want to do that.396
Another Ombuds echoed the advantage to impartiality of maintaining
confidentiality:
I would not report it naming any student ever without their permis-
sion, nor would I name the individual about whom a complaint has
been made multiple times. However, one tool that I know some of
my colleagues use occasionally is the sort of generic option . .. [of]
going to an administrator with responsibility over the alleged har-
asser and suggest that some sort of training effort might be advanta-
geous for the entire unit. But I think it's important that Ombuds re-
main neutral and not be in that leading the lynch mob kind of role.397
In order to provide confidentiality, Ombuds must protect both their
impartiality and independence. Used incorrectly, Ombuds' confidentiali-
ty, impartiality, and independence can be used to protect perpetrators.
Ombuds David Miller notes,
Knowledge is responsibility, and those in the know must also be held
responsible for not acting on what they know if not acting betrays the
public trust.. . . [F]or some, Ombudsman informality offers too much
ambiguity, and confidentiality is seen as conspiracy to preserve the
interests of such perpetrators against the exercise of justice . . . . Who
could not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence or any other
kind of violence . . . exposed to the full consequence of their actions,
along with those who knowingly abet their horrible behavior?398
Proponents of formal reporting mechanisms see the archetypal Om-
buds model's informality and confidentiality as a Band-Aid for the fail-
ures in formal processes and prefer to solve the problem at its source by
improving the formal process. The ultimate weakness of the Ombuds
archetype's confidentiality system occurs when individuals decide not to
396. Interviewee 19, 07A11:27-33.
397. Interviewee 21, 02A7:32-8:2.
398. Miller, supra note 82, at 6.
132 [Vol. 94:1
OUT FROM THE SHADOWS
pursue their complaints. While many conflicts do not involve allegations
of legal wrongdoing, sexual harassment can involve organizational iabil-
ity and the violation of individuals' rights. To what extent does the Om-
buds archetype's principle against reporting such behaviors and lack of
notice to the institution exacerbate efforts to elicit complaints of and pre-
vent illegal behavior? The next Section describes Ombuds departing
from the archetype and prescribes ways of ensuring Ombuds adhere to
the model's obligations. Ombuds conforming to the model provide es-
sential support to the formal compliance mechanism and ensure individ-
ual self-determination and autonomy. Ombuds non-conforming to the
IOA Standards harm compliance efforts and assist in sweeping abuses
under the rug. Ombuds non-conforming to the standards must be manda-
tory reporters for the purposes of sexual misconduct.
IV. UNIVERSITIES NEED ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDS THAT ADHERE TO
THE IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
Confidentiality encourages and supports victims in coming forward,
but it also masks problems and may inhibit an institution's ability to ad-
dress serious issues. On one hand is the Ombuds: "[A] silky-voiced char-
acter who manipulates the hapless, under resourced Employee or Con-
sumer through various cognitive heuristics into willingly foregoing meri-
torious claims, thus protecting the organization from shouldering costs
associated with investigation, procedure and possible impacts on human
resources."399 Inherently the question of Ombuds' confidentiality is one
of whether it simply becomes a mechanism by which universities may
insulate themselves from liability.
On the other hand is the Title IX Coordinator set on establishing an
official precedent and dragging hapless individuals through an official
process that they may greatly wish to avoid and which further harms
their emotional health. The ultimate question is how can institutions en-
courage victims to come forward? Both formal and informal mechanisms
are valuable for encouraging reporting but no one mechanism can pro-
vide for confidentiality and at the same time bring forward complaints
for appropriate disposition. Because currently neither Ombuds nor Coor-
dinators adhere to their respective archetypes, universities face increased
liability risks, survivors and alleged perpetrators have fewer procedural
choices, and processes lack legitimacy.
A. Ombuds Departing From the Archetype
Ombuds interviewed were frequently observed to depart from the
confidentiality guidelines and the related impartiality guidelines. One




Ombuds described the difficulty in remaining impartial while providing
the visitor with control:
I've never [sent something] through a grievance procedure [because I
have] never seen anybody win their case. I don't want to say that I
deter people from [formal options]. What I do is I usually recom-
mend that they talk to the [formal personnel] confidentially to get a
feel for what that process might be like, and then decide if that's
something that they'll want to do or if it's something that I can help
them out with. [Right now the formal process is] ... a system of frus-
tration for students and staff and faculty to utilize [as] I've never seen
any[one] [win a case against a victimizer]. 400
One Ombuds described a clear departure from the impartiality standard:
[If a policy has been violated] we'll try to talk to the offending per-
son and see if there was a mistake made and if they want to correct
[it]. And if they don't want to correct that and we think that it was a
violation of policy and we give them an opportunity to make it right
and they don't, then we'll probably go on to their supervisor and
work our way up the chain.401
Whenever we get into something that looks like it truly is sexual har-
assment or borderline sexual harassment or racial discrimination, I
always try to involve [the formal office]. I try to get the person in my
office to walk over [to the formal office] and file a complaint with
them, because as much as I'm willing to entertain people's com-
plaints about that and will promise them confidentiality, if they insist
on it, I really think that everybody's better served by going on the
record with all that.402
Ombuds also noted a goal of making sure the administration is
aware of problems that could cause damage to the institution, which is a
departure from the impartiality and independent guidelines:
[T]here are three [exceptions to confidentiality]. One is any time
somebody discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can't keep that
in confidence, or any disclosures of child or elder abuse, that can't be
kept in confidence, and then the other, the third area is if someone
was to disclose that they had knowledge of somebody's life or health
being at risk, then we would have to disclose that to the appropriate
authorities... . Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If
something doesn't fall in those domains but if I think about it and
over time it's going to do significant damage to the institution I
might decide to do something with that information. But I have to be
careful because people didn't give me express permission to go for-
ward .... [So] if I [go forward it is] because I weighed it and I said
400. Interviewee 16, 08A12:20-26, 13:11-14.
401. Interviewee 6, 09A14:3-9.
402. Interviewee 6, 09Bl:29-34.
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"you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause signifi-
cant damage to the institution" and so part of my job as an Ombuds-
man is to give decision makers a head's up.403
Regarding confidentiality, Ombuds who depart from the archetype
often serve as notice to the institution, both in their ability to receive no-
tice and in reporting in ways that violate confidentiality and anonymity.
Ombuds often described visitors' expectations about confidentiality:
Most people think, almost invariably, when people come to me about
discrimination, that they're coming to get something on the record. In
fact, about a third of the people that come through the office think
they [are] putting something on the record.. . . They want me to
make note, put it on the record, put it in [my] files because down the
road when they are fired or something else happens [someone will
know] this happened.404
Sometimes universities require Ombuds to report any instances of
sexual harassment that they learn about. This policy directly violates the
norm of confidentiality and places the Ombuds in a difficult position:
[Mandatory reporting is] [t]he nightmare for an Ombuds Office, and
there are [many] Ombuds offices who have to deal with this . . . [I]f a
sexual harassment complaint is reported we have to report it
[and] . . . put the campus on [notice]. So basically the university is
being put on notice ... by the visitor coming to us.405
Often Ombuds are required to report all instances of sexual miscon-
duct. One Ombuds noted, "I know some Ombuds Offices have to report
sexual harassment but to me that's against the standards of practice and
what's the point of having an Ombuds Office if it's going to be treated
like a formal office."406 Another Ombuds described his general counsel
as "not feel[ing] good at all about the privilege of the Ombudsperson,
and of course most forms of harassment are not illegal .. . but you've got
to go with [what] each organization and general counsel feels comforta-
ble with." 407 This observation is echoed by other Ombuds who have an
organizational obligation to report issues of sexual misconduct. For ex-
ample, a Title IX Coordinator explained when a visitor's statements must
be reported:
[I]f it's something that I really do need to know about, [the Ombuds]
will advise [the visitor] that they . .. speak to me or, depending upon
the nature of it, there's a duty for [the Ombuds] to report it if it [is]
403. Interviewee 18, 01A9:33-40, 10:10-18.
404. Interviewee 6, 09B3:6-7, 27-29.
405. Interviewee 5, 014B10:39-11:3.
406. Interviewee 17, 012A8:22-24.
407. Interviewee 16, 08A5:15-19.
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something. . . illegal or immoral or indecent the Ombuds [has] to re-
port it.408
An Ombuds added, "if there's anything that comes to me that is
sexual harassment in nature I do contact our [Title IX Coordinator] to let
them know, as well [when] there's anything that is clearly reporta-
ble... ."409 Ombuds who are required by their universities to report in-
stances of sexual misconduct often seek to limit this obligation:
I used the hierarchical arrangement as my justification for not report-
ing [sexual harassment]. I didn't want to [report] unless I absolutely
had to. If push came to shove and for some reason we ended up in lit-
igation or something like that I would have taken the position that I
didn't tell anybody because I didn't see it as . . . [involving a] power
disparity ... .410
Other Ombuds depart from the archetype by participating in infor-
mational meetings with other formal offices. A Title IX Coordinator de-
scribed periodic meetings with general counsel, other formal offices, and
the Ombuds where everyone "go[es] around the room and talk[s] about
what's going on, cases in a general sense, just kind of bounce things off
[one another] so we're in the loop on what's going on."4 1 1 Another Om-
buds noted,
I can go to [the formal office] and say 'are you hearing from the staff
in this department too? Is there anything we can do, maybe we can go
talk to the director of that area. Which one of us has the best rapport
with that person to give them a heads up that there's something brew-
ing ... that they might want to look at.' 4 12
Some Ombuds report to an upper level administrator and have ad-
ministrative functions but do not see themselves as offices of notice. For
example, one Ombuds, despite reporting directly to a member of the
President's Cabinet and having a "very close-knit" relationship, stated
that "[N]otice would have to go either through our Dean of Students of-
fice or through our legal [counsel]."413 The Ombuds then clarified that
the privilege of confidentiality does not belong to the visitor or the Om-
buds, but rather to the office. As a result the Ombuds believed he could
maintain confidentiality while sitting in that role.414
408. Interviewee 2, T4A8:18-22.
409. Interviewee 22, 06A4:19-21.
410. Interviewee 19, 07B12:3-17.
411. Interviewee 3, T13A5:22-25.
412. Interviewee 8, O10Al0:37-41.
413. Interviewee 22, 06A6:26, 18-19.
414. Interviewee 15, 01 1A 4:19-22, 12:17 ("The [privilege of] confidentiality belongs not to
[the visitor] or to me, it belongs to the office, [providing me with the ability to maintain confidential-
ity when in that role].").
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Many of the examples discussed above illustrate how Ombuds re-
spond to pressure from superiors to give a report, thereby violating the
archetype by breaching confidentiality or failing to protect visitors' ano-
nymity. For example, one Ombuds noted that when the formal office
"call[s] me. . . and they ask me if somebody's come to [my] office I will
let them know. If I would say 'I can't tell you, I'm not going to tell you,'
that would not go over very well." 415 In another example, a Title IX Co-
ordinator reported hearing rumors from faculty members, but explained,
"I didn't know who and I didn't know what exactly.... [T]hen the Om-
buds came to me and gave me the who and the what and I took
it . .. from there."4 16
Ombuds who depart from the archetype give priority to reporting
over confidentiality obligations. For example, Ombuds described provid-
ing hypotheticals: "[W]hen I have . . . conversation[s] with our [Title IX
Coordinator], I'll [provide] a list of ... [three] hypothetical offices [with
one of them being the actual office]. [The Coordinator] may have already
heard [about which office it is], and [the Coordinator] has told me that
[it's] very helpful. ... 417 Another Ombuds noted the point at which
they value stopping misconduct over adhering to the archetype:
[W]hen multiple people have reported to me . .. [and] when I see the
same thing from a few different perspectives, I'll begin to believe
that there might be something going on, and I might say to a depart-
ment chair, "You know, I don't know that this is really true, but you
might want to sensitize yourself to this, there might be something out
there. "418
Another noted breaking confidentiality to take credit for a successful
outcome and thus build their professional worth:
[E]verything that I had recommended to the student, unbeknownst to
me, the student followed through [with] in terms of.. .making [it]
happen. I specifically [told] my boss, "[E]ven though there's no men-
tion of the Ombudsman .. . this started in [my] office and I will una-
bashedly take credit for it." 419
Perhaps paradoxically, examples indicate Ombuds often breach
confidentiality in order to build relationships:
So a tough part of this job, listening to some of these things, not be-
ing able to share confidences . . . . I follow[ed] up with the [Title IX
Coordinator to say], "I'm aware this student brought [an issue] to my
415. Interviewee 19, 07A7:44-46.
416. Interviewee 11, T 11A17:11-15.
417. Interviewee 20, 013B6:32-38.
418. Interviewee 23, 03A7:6-7, 14-18.
419. Interviewee 15, 01I B7:24-29.
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attention that your office handled, [because the student was] upset
because he felt like there was no response that was helpful ....
The Title IX Coordinator is an attorney . .. [who] takes a very legal-
istic approach . . . [and] is not one of the people that I can go to and
say "have you been hearing things about [this] department? What's
going on over there? Have we got a faculty member losing it over
there? Do we need as an institution to think about stepping in and do-
ing something over there? Would it help if I went and talked with the
chair or you went and talked with the chair?" [There are a few staff
members in these offices] with whom I have a relationship like
that ... [but their bosses] don't know .... [The staff] trust me and
know that I won't out them and need my input.421
Other Ombuds are clear about confidentiality boundaries, "As far as
sexual assault, which I would consider a serious crime, I say I can't
guarantee confidentiality."422 The lack of certainty regarding confidenti-
ality and the lack of control provided to visitors was often cited as a rea-
son for declining numbers of visitors. For example,
[W]e're not getting as many people coming to this office because we
can't provide them with a level of confidentiality that would ensure
that if they don't want the information disclosed if they were to re-
port sexual harassment, for example, that we would be duty bound to
respect that. . . . I believe that's one of the reasons . . . they don't
come to our office because we can't offer them that blanket confiden-
tiality that they're looking for.423
Ombuds who depart from the archetype undermine visitors' self-
determination as to whether to use formal processes. Many Ombuds do
not offer a choice and directly refer visitors to the Title IX Coordinator.
For example, an Ombuds noted, "Any time that I've dealt with [sexual
misconduct] I've worked with the individual really to get to the [Title IX
Coordinator] and file a complaint."4 24 This is echoed by another Om-
buds: "We [can] explore the different ways to surface the issue, but ulti-
mately I would make it clear [to visitors] that [sexual misconduct] did
have to [be reported] for [everyone's] ... benefit."425 Other Ombuds
attempt to secure their visitors' permission to report or to report the in-
formation anonymously. Often in doing so this "anonymous" infor-
mation makes it possible to identify the individuals involved. Ombuds
also make decisions about when to report that fall outside of their report-
ing requirements:
420. Interviewee 16, 08B9:40-43.
421. Interviewee 8, 010A9:45-10:20.
422. Interviewee 16, 08A6:16-17.
423. Interviewee 19, 07A6:12-16; 07B2:3-6.
424. Interviewee 23, 03A7:19-21.
425. Interviewee 19, 07B4:28-31.
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[T]here are three [exceptions to confidentiality]. One is any time
somebody discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can't keep that
in confidence, or any disclosures of child or elder abuse, that can't be
kept in confidence, and then the other, the third area is if someone
was to disclose that hey had knowledge of somebody's life or health
being at risk, then we would have to disclose that to the appropriate
authorities.... Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If
something doesn't falls in those domains but if I think about it and
over time it's going to do significant damage to the institution I
might decide to do something with that information. But I have to be
careful because people didn't give me express permission to go for-
ward .... [So] if I [go forward it is] because I weighed it and I said
"you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause signifi-
cant damage to the institution" and so part of my job as an Ombuds-
man is to give decision-makers a heads up.426
Another Ombuds similarly described subordinating confidentiality to
anything that would cause "massive disruption" to the institution:
[E]verything is confidential unless there is any sort of self-harm that
is reported or anything that would cause any massive disruption to
the institution. So those are the things that I often say to a student, "I
won't go forward unless you give me permission to use your name,
but if there is any talk of [those] particular things, then I do have to
report it [regardless of your permission]."427
Ombuds frequently described seeking the survivor's permission to
take an anonymous approach, but many expressed ultimately doing
whatever was necessary to get the complaint filed:
[If I were unable to convince a potential victim of sexual misconduct
to come forward] the [next step] would be [to say] "[O]kay, so you're
not willing to do this, can you allow me to, in an indirect way, go to
the department chair and say '[Y]ou need to go to the [Title IX Coor-
dinator] and let them know that there are allegations that this faculty
member is engaging in this kind of behavior."' Kind of going in an
indirect way.... [Another] Ombuds ... told me that we would never
do nothing, we would keep moving forward until this thing got ad-
dressed. That would be my commitment. I would do whatever it
would take.428
Another Ombuds described trying to marshal multiple complaints, not
for the purpose of protecting each individual's confidentiality, but to
provide proof of what might be occurring:
[U]nless some other people come and tell me the same thing I'm not
going to be able to go to the supervisor and have a lot of influence
426. Interviewee 18, 01A9:33-40, 10:10-18.
427. Interviewee 22, 06A4:8-13.
428. Interviewee 19, 07A9:2-9, 13-16.
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because I'm going to be saying "one person told me this and I can't
tell you who it was, and I can't offer you any proof without identify-
ing this one person." [I tell the visitor], "[I]f you've got other [indi-
viduals who have experienced this] . . . have them call me and tell me
that they would like to be included as part of a class who are com-
plaining about this, then I can go to the supervisor and say 'well, I've
had [multiple] people [tell] me the same thing."'
429
When handling new cases, Ombuds often require visitors to fill out
intake forms that this Ombuds described as "formal":
There [is] a formal intake process. The student . . . come[s] to my of-
fice and [we have] intake forms . . . . Basically their basic infor-
mation, student information. We . . . ask them [about] the [type] of
complaint, was it academic, was it judicial, [which] department,
[which] faculty person, was it personal, was it a hostile eva-
-430sion ... .4
Ombuds who depart from the archetype also often require visitors'
sign written waivers of their confidentiality rights:
Sometimes students will waive their right to confidentiality, and I
have them sign a specific waiver . . . that says [the visitor] allow[s]
[and permits me] to speak to person X and Y, sometimes it's as spe-
cific as a name, [and] I can speak to that person and that person
alone. Sometimes they don't know [who I should talk to], they just
say "anyone over in the department," or "anyone you need to [speak
with] to fix this."431
Ombuds who require visitors to sign a waiver of confidentiality often do
so during the intake:
[W]hen a student [comes] in to see me I ask them to first sign a
waiver ... and I would tell them "based on whatever you tell me,
based on your particular situation I may need to talk to people," and I
would ask them to sign off, giving me permission to talk to particular
people or offices about their situation.432
In sum, my interviews with Ombuds thus reveal a complex tug-of-
war between competing impulses. On the one hand, the archetypal Om-
buds model motivates many Ombuds to strictly honor their visitors' con-
fidentiality and interest in self-determination, even when doing so seems
deeply frustrating as abusive sexual predators seem to get away with
misconduct again and again. On the other hand, many Ombuds find ways
to get information to responsible authorities within their institutions-or
429. Interviewee 6, 09B4:14-22.
430. Interviewee 24, 05A9:12-17.
431. Interviewee 14, 04A7:4-9.
432. Interviewee 24, 05A7:2-6.
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are required by their institutions to do so-even though this sometimes
exposes their visitors to the loss of confidentiality that they sought to
avoid by coming to the Ombuds. To encourage reports of sexual miscon-
duct, IOA-conforming Ombuds are essential for compliance with Ti-
tle IX.
B. How to Reform University Ombuds
Many years ago, Paul Verkuil noted how the pervasive model of le-
gal formality is likely to push Ombuds toward greater formality:
The ombudsman's potential as a procedural system is largely bound
up with our commitment to the adversary system. The ombudsman
and adversary systems are substantially competing procedures for the
regularization of informal processes; each is based on a different
conception of the dispute resolution process and reflects different un-
derlying social and political values. While the two systems could co-
exist in harmony if spheres of influence were delineated reflecting
the appropriateness of their respective procedures, the spread of the
adversary system, in response to the perceived commands of proce-
dural due process, into many areas of administrative decisionmaking
has stymied the development of the ombudsman alternative.433
University Ombuds need reform in order to avoid the push of formality.
First, Title IX law and policy must require non-conforming Ombuds
to be mandatory reporters. Non-conforming Ombuds increase the risk of
liability and provide no true alternative to the formal reporting system.
This is especially important given recent evidence that universities only
offer a more accurate portrayal of campus sexual assault during a De-
partment of Education audit.434 The research also demonstrates that au-
dits have "no long-term effect on the reported levels of sexual assault, as
those crime rates returned to previous levels after an audit was complet-
ed."435 Ombuds conforming to the IOA Standards, however, should not
be mandatory reporters. An IOA ad hoc Title IX Task Force, created to
"draw attention to the vital role the confidential ombuds can play on col-
436lege campuses," reached the same conclusion. Fighting the label of
"responsible employee,"437 the Task Force commissioned a report, au-
433. Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 845, 846 (1975).
434. Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault. An Empirical Examination,
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L., Feb. 2015, at 1, I (describing an increase in reports of sexual assault of
approximately 44% during audit periods).
435. Id at 5 (noting previous levels of reporting returned even in instances when fines were
issued for non-compliance).
436. Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership (Apr. 1, 2016) (reproducing Memoran-
dum from Bruce M. Berman, Partner, Wilmer Hale, to Bd. of Dirs., Int'l Ombudsman Ass'n (Mar.
14, 2016)), https://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOAMain/media/SiteFiles/docs/Wilmer-Hale-
memo-and-cover-March-2016.pdf.
437. See supra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
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thored by Attorney Bruce Berman, titled Campus Ombuds as Confiden-
tial Resource for Purposes of Title IX and Clery Act Reporting.438 The
report argues the Ombuds role need not be structured to meet OCR's
definition of "responsible employee," and that OCR's definition of con-
fidential resources does not require an Ombuds be a member of any cer-
tain profession or hold a legal privilege.43 9
For Ombuds conforming to the IOA Standards, universities need to
push for clear confidentiality protections. OCR's Q&A document does
not specifically mention Ombuds and does not provide Ombuds with the
ability to maintain confidentiality." 0 Even assuming OCR approval, sig-
nificant liability concerns arise when organizational actors like Ombuds
are independent of the organizational structure and not mandated to re-
port, yet are able to hear and informally handle sexual misconduct con-
cerns. Although Ombuds promise confidentiality, whether this promise is
legally enforceable beyond OCR requirements remains unclear. The
June, 2016 edition of the Department of Education's Handbook for
Campus Safety and Reporting lists Ombuds in the list of examples of
positions meeting the criteria for being campus security authorities and
thus mandatory reporters."1 Additionally, there is little case law protect-
ing the confidentiality of communications with Ombuds, and often the
level of confidentiality is controlled by the organization itself. No U.S.
state embraces the ombudsman privilege as it is envisioned under the
IOA Standards.442 A federal court common law privilege is sometimes
recognized for employee communications with an Ombuds.4" To receive
protection, Ombuds must widely and consistently publicize information
in print and online that consistently asserts the office's confidentiality.44
Such publications may form the basis for an "implied contract" that im-
plies using an Ombuds program is conditioned on acceptance of the of-
fice's principles."5 Confidentiality is complicated as the level of confi-
dentiality is controlled by the organization employing the Ombuds, creat-
ing potential problems of conflicts of interests and potential breaches of
446confidentiality. Universities and their Ombuds must work together to
438. Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership, supra note 436.
439. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 15 (defining
responsible employee as any employee with the authority to take action to redress sexual violence;
who has been given the duty of reporting incidents of sexual violence or any other misconduct by
students to the Title IX Coordinator; or whom a student could reasonably believe has this authority
or duty); Letter from IOA Bd. of Dirs. to IOA Membership, supra note 436, at 5-7.
440. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 44, at 16-17.
441. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING:
2016 EDITION 4-3 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf.
442. Van Soye, supra note 270, at 128.
443. Kendall D. Isaac, The Organizational Ombudsman's Quest for Privileged Communica-
tions, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 31, 36-39 (2014).
444. HOWARD, supra note 259, at 282-88.
445. Id. at 252-53.
446. Jessica Oser, Note, The Unguided Use of International ADR Programs to Resolve Sexual
Harassment Controversies in the Workplace, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 295-97 (2005).
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craft the contours of the role in a way that ensures confidentiality without
exposing the institution to liability.
To do so, universities must develop specific sexual misconduct re-
porting guidelines for Ombuds. Allowing people to make anonymous
reports of incidents of sexual misconduct may fulfill both Coordinators'
and Ombuds' core goals as long as the reports do not identify, or can
lead to the identification of, any specific person or department. Anony-
mous reporting may enable Ombuds to collect otherwise unreported in-
cidents of sexual misconduct. Title IX Coordinators will then gain im-
portant feedback about weaknesses in policy, procedures, or where im-
provements can be made to better educate the campus about sexual mis-
conduct. Instead of asking questions about their reporting obligations to
reporting authorities, Mandatory Reporters on campus gain an additional
resource to consult regarding their obligations prior to actually reporting.
Ombuds' ability to help visitors think through their informal and formal
resolution options may lead more visitors to make formal reports. In
sum, University Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds must work together
to define the contours of reporting requirements.
CONCLUSION
Although both Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds models presuma-
bly share a preference for eliminating sexual misconduct, the archetypal
offices reflect very different philosophies and mechanisms for handling
complaints. Where Ombuds see absolute confidentiality and the self-
determination it provides as a necessary condition for eliciting and han-
dling complaints in the face of retaliation, Title IX Coordinators reflect a
compliance regime that seeks to elicit formal complaints and then disci-
pline, prevent, and eliminate instances of sexual misconduct.
While some Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators adhere strictly to
their respective archetypes on the matter of confidentiality, many depart
considerably from these commitments. These Ombuds breach confiden-
tiality in the interest of nabbing a perpetrator or reforming a departmental
environment. The Title IX Coordinators naturally depart in the other
direction. Some give priority to the individuai complainant's wishes or
feelings over the institutional interest in investigation and enforcement.
Others misleadingly give the impression of being prepared to maintain
confidences, but only to draw the complainant into letting down her
guard to reveal information that she might not otherwise divulge. As a
result, confidentiality illustrates the tension between individual self-
determination and broader organizational interests.
Universities are struggling to balance institutional concerns with in-
dividual rights. Donna Shestowsky notes self-determination and institu-
tional efficiency often work at cross-purposes, making justice difficult to
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obtain.447 While the Trump Administration will change the contours of
enforcement, colleges and universities must continue to determine the
best practices for complying with Title IX. Until universities (1) find
reliable mechanisms for drawing out complaints and (2) develop con-
sistent, fair means of handling disputes, it will be impossible to address
the deeper rooted social norms related to alcohol abuse and sexual mis-
conduct. Instead of a zero-sum game of reporting or not reporting,
providing confidential sources of reporting can be a means of encourag-
ing greater reporting and providing survivors and alleged perpetrators
with self-determination. Universities need both Ombuds and Title IX
Coordinators.
ATIXA's website describes the confusion surrounding Title IX
work: "[Thirty] years after the Department of Education mandated that
school districts and colleges designate Title IX Coordinators, we're still
not entirely sure what the appropriate role, functions, and expectations of
Coordinators are.""8 The website continues to note the 2011 Dear Col-
league Letter "created a new profession and a new field."449 Given the
current ineffectiveness of the compliance approach, the field needs fur-
ther redefinition. Likewise, Ombuds need to determine whether the IOA
Standards are requirements or merely aspirations. Inconsistent applica-
tion of the IOA Standards of Practice creates significant questions re-
garding the value of university Ombuds. Correctly designed, both formal
and informal complaint mechanisms are necessary to bring campus sexu-
al assault out from the shadows.
447. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549,
551 (2008).
448. About ATIXA and.Title IX, supra note 9.
449. Id.
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The technological developments of recent decades have allowed
companies to collect staggering amounts of consumer data by offering
"free" access to digital products like search engines and social-media
platforms. Scholars in a variety of fields recognize that this practice rep-
resents a new type of market exchange, but our tax laws and tax scholars
have thus far ignored this aspect of the new economy. That inattention
means that transactions in data currently benefit from an implicit exemp-
tion from tax. This Article brings light to that issue by providing the first
analysis of the relationship between the personal-data market and our
domestic tax instruments. That nalysis shows that personal-data transac-
tions do fit within those tax instruments, but that several factors will pre-
vent them from actually being taxed. The resulting tax preference for
data creates a distortion in the market that results in lost tax revenue and
that undermines efforts to reform the personal-data market to better ac-
count for individual privacy interests. This Article considers those issues
and concludes by urging the recognition of the tax preference for data in
the broader U.S. regulatory structure related to data and personal privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The modem Internet ecosystem is largely built on the collection,
analysis, and monetization of consumer data. The business model popu-
larized by companies like Facebook and Google operates by offering
consumers access to desirable digital products in exchange for the oppor-
tunity to collect their personal information. Google, for example, pro-
vides access to its search engine, Gmail, and Google Docs without charg-
ing a cash fee. Instead, it makes money by monitoring consumers' use of
those products and by using the resulting data to sell targeted advertis-
ing.' Of course, Google is just the tip of the iceberg. Individuals now
create data for a wide range of companies in every industry and of every
size. Consumer information is the fuel of the "big data" era.2
I. See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modi-
fied Aug. 29, 2016) (indicating that Google "use[s] various technologies to collect and store infor-
mation when you visit a Google service " for purposes such as generating advertising revenue);
Privacy: Your Data, GOOGLE.COM, https://privacy.google.com/data-we-collect.html (last visited
Aug. 31, 2016) (indicating that Google "store[s] and protect[s] what you create using [its] services");
see also ANNA BERNASEK & D. T. MONGAN, ALL YOU CAN PAY: How COMPANIES USE OUR DATA
To EMPTY OUR WALLETS 61-66 (2015) (discussing Google's scanning practices with respect to its
Gmail service).
2. Some uses of those data are positive and some are negative. Just as data can improve how
we address problems in the energy and health sectors, they can be used to discriminate against indi-
viduals or to exploit their personal psychological traits to sell them more widgets. Michael Mattioli,
Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 539-44 (2014) (discussing the potential benefits of big
data); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010,
2021-31 (2013) (discussing the information that is gleaned from the collection of data); Omer Tene
& Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 243-56 (2013) (discussing the range of potential costs and benefits of
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This market reality is well known by technologists and privacy
scholars who have long recognized that data function as an asset, or even
as a currency, in today's world.3 These scholars accept that the digital
products of today's economy are not free even though they are provided
without a cash charge. Instead, consumers buy access to those products
with their data.4 Some analysts even explicitly characterize this practice
as a new form of barter transaction.5
The recognition of this market reality and the growth and prolifera-
tion of the market in personal data have spawned a significant literature
regarding the intersection of personal data, privacy, and the Internet.6
Scholars have also evaluated the impact of this data economy on our
nation's consumer-protection and antitrust laws.7 Others have looked at
big data); Adrienne LaFrance, People's Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used Against
Them, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/1 1/google-
searches-privacy-danger/413614.
3. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET CLASS 18-
19 (2011) [hereinafter WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA],
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFITTCPersonalDataNewAssetReport_2011 .pdf; WORLD
ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA: STRENGTHENING TRUST 7 (2012) [hereinafter
WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRUST],
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF ITRethinkingPersonalDataReport 2012.pdf; James C.
Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2013). The role of personal data in the new economy has been long
recognized. See JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN
CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES, at xiii (1999) ("In many respects, we are moving from an era of
competition on the Internet, which represented the battle for traffic, into a new era in which the
defining battle is that for customer profiles. The winners and losers in this new era will be deter-
mined by who has rights to on-line [sic] customer profiles.").
4. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 1129-31; Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington,
Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608
(2014).
5. Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty
with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 39, 82 (2013); Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2004); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 255. This recognition goes well beyond the academe. See Brad Meehan,
Responsible Personalization: How Brands Can Build Trust with Consumers, ADVERTISINGAGE
(Aug. 7, 2015), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/responsible-personalization-brands-build-
trust/299843/AdvertisingAge (labeling the exchange of information for access to web services as
"the bartering of information" and noting that personal data are used "as a currency to 'pay for'
information"); Press Release, Canadian Council of Pub. Relations Firms, Personal Data and Brand
Trust: A Modem-Day Barter System (July 15, 2015, 16:08), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/personal-data-and-brand-trust-a-modem-day-barter-system-515487331 html (discussing
consumers' willingness to barter with their data); Doug Laney, The (Possible) Tax Advantages of
Bartering with Information, GARTNER BLOG NETWORK (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/the-possible-tax-advantages-of-bartering-with-information/.
6. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives, Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1374-75 (2000); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in
Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2003); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The
Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153, 1154-56
(2011); Paula Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126-28
(2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 16 10-
13 (1999); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2056-59; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-90 (2002); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 240-41.
7. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 97, 97-100 (2013) (discussing consumer privacy law and big data); Cooper, supra
note 3, at 1129-30 (discussing privacy considerations in antitrust issues); Hoofnagle & Whittington,
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the impact of this use of data on our Fourth Amendment protections.8
Notwithstanding this vast literature and the broad recognition of the role
of data as an asset in today's economy, however, the market for personal
data has been virtually invisible to our tax system and to our tax scholars.
The only meaningful analyses of the tax consequences of the personal-
data economy have occurred in the international arena, but those anal-
yses have largely focused on the digital economy, writ large, rather than
on the specific impact of the use of data in that economy.9 They have
also focused narrowly on the ability of firms to shift value to jurisdic-
tions with low or no tax and the resulting impact on the global allocation
of the corporate income-tax base.10 That more limited focus has meant
that some very basic questions have gone unexplored. Are personal-data
transactions taxable events under U.S. tax laws? If so, would it be possi-
ble to tax them? Should we tax them? Are there consequences that stem
from not taxing them?
The failure to consider these questions is remarkable. The personal-
data market is one in which nearly every U.S. taxpayer is taking part and
one from which they derive great value. The unique aspects of the per-
sonal-data economy also raise critical questions regarding the design of
our tax systems for the future. The purpose of this Article is to explore
those issues by analyzing how the personal-data economy intersects with
the U.S. tax system. Doing so serves several purposes. First, it introduces
the tax community and tax scholarship to the personal-data market. Se-
cond, it introduces tax considerations to those evaluating the personal-
data market. Finally, it evaluates the dynamic relationship between the
tax and data worlds. In that vein, it demonstrates how the personal-data
market is escaping and undermining our domestic tax instruments and
how we might change those tax instruments to compensate. It also evalu-
ates how our taxes might impact the evolution of the personal-data mar-
ket. To the extent that the current system provides a tax preference for
the use of data," that tax preference might well work as a tax penalty on
the development of a data market that is more protective of individual
supra note 4, at 657-59 (evaluating consumer-protection and privacy issues); John M. Newman,
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151-52 (2015) [hereinafter
Newman, Zero-Price] (discussing antitrust issues in "zero-price markets"); Nathan Newman,
Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 402-05
(2014) (evaluating antitrust implications in Google's use of user data).
8. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technolo-
gies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004); Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]; Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1264 (2004). See also Omer Tene, What Google Knows:
Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1470-72 (2008).
9. See infra Section II.A (discussing recent reports published by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development and researchers hired by the French government).
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. A "tax preference" in this context means a tax-favored status in the form of an implicit tax
exemption for transactions involving data. See infra Section III.B.
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privacy interests. This Article is therefore important both for those inter-
ested in tax policy and for those interested in the structure and evolution
of the personal-data economy. The two are inextricably intertwined, for
better or for worse.
This Article proceeds in three main Parts. Part I provides back-
ground information on the personal-data market and the existing non-tax
analyses of that market. Part II then looks at how the international tax
community has analyzed personal-data exchanges and at how those ex-
changes should be characterized for domestic tax purposes. It disagrees
with the construct that the international community has adopted and ar-
gues that a market-exchange model is appropriate. It then analyzes the
theoretical tax consequences of that characterization and evaluates the
practical impediments that will prevent the taxation of those transactions
under that construct. The conclusion of that analysis is that there is, and
will likely continue to be, a tax preference for the use of data as a curren-
cy.
Part III turns to the available options for addressing the unavoidable
intersection between tax, privacy, and the personal-data economy. It first
looks at how we might either (1) modify our current tax instruments to
best ameliorate the tax preference for data, or (2) use new tax instru-
ments to address that preference or to promote beneficial data practices.
That analysis necessarily evaluates the tax system against the current
personal-data economy. This Article also, however, examines how our
tax systems will likely impact the data economy of the future. It discuss-
es several current movements to modify the personal-data economy to
better account for individuals' privacy interests and analyzes how they
interact with the current personal-data tax exemption. Part III calls for a
more comprehensive approach to privacy and data regulation in the Unit-
ed States, and Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Personal-Data Market
Data collection is ubiquitous in today's society. The technological
advancements of recent decades have allowed companies to collect and
monetize a staggering amount of data on individual consumers. We now
create data when we go online, drive, exercise, turn on the lights, and
even wash our clothes.1 2 The data market is not new, of course. Compa-
12. See, e.g., THERESA M. PAYTON & THEODORE CLAYPOOLE, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIG
DATA 77, 87, 127-28, 173-74 (2014); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REv. 85, 98-104,
108, 112, 114-15, 117 (2014) (discussing the extensive data created by the "Internet of Things");
Kyle Vanhemert, This Brilliant Washing Machine Is a Roadmap for the Internet of Things, WIRED
(Apr. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/this-brilliant-intemet-connected-washer-is-
a-roadmap-for-the-internet-of-things/.
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nies have long collected consumer data like names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers. The data collection of today's economy is simply more
efficient and varied. Instead of asking consumers to fill out notebooks
tracking their television viewing habits, for example, consumers are di-
rectly tracked through their cable boxes.13 Similarly, Internet Service
Providers and websites can collect consumer data as individuals use the
Internet.14 Retailers also directly track consumer behavior through the
use of store loyalty cards and checkout scanners.
This modem data collection serves many different functions. There
are some data aggregators that collect data only to resell it. Those firms,
often referred to as data brokers, gather data directly from consumers,
from other data aggregators, or from publicly available sources and then
sell access to those data to other firms.1 6 There are also some data aggre-
gators that collect and use customer data solely to better market their
own products. For example, a local grocery store might collect data
simply to better understand its customers and how they respond to cou-
pons or sales. One of the most significant data-collection practices in the
modem economy is done by businesses whose activities fall somewhere
between these two extremes. That type of data collection occurs as part
of a multi-sided platform and is the business model used by companies
like Google and Facebook.
13. Shalini Ramachandran & Suzanne Vranica, Comeast Seeks to Harness Trove of TV Data,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-seeks-to-harness-
trove-of-tv-data-1445333401; Time Warner Cable Subscriber Privacy Notice, TIME WARNER CABLE
(Apr. 2016), http://help.twcable.com/twcprivacynotice.html (indicating that the company collects
many types of data from subscribers, including "the programs, features and services" that they use).
14. LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT You DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS
AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 19 (2012) (discussing a lawsuit against an intemet service provider
that allowed the monitoring of its subscriber's internet usage); PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note
12, at 189-91, 205-06; see also Solove, Digital Dossier, supra note 8, at 1098-1100 (discussing the
ramifications of the collection of personal information by, among others, cable companies and Inter-
net Service Providers on the government's ability to gather information); Privacy Policy,
NETZERO.NET, https://www.netzero.net/start/landing.do?page=www/legal/privacy#I (last updated
Nov. 12, 2014) (listing the vast amounts of information collected by the company including a user's
browser, software on computers and mobile devices, processor type, operating system, IP address,
websites visited, and location data); Website Privacy Policy, TIME WARNER CABLE,
https://www.timewarnercable.com/en/our-company/legal/privacy-policy.html (last updated Sept.
2012) (noting that the company collects information on the websites that customers visit, their IP
addresses, computer hardware and software, and "other Web usage activity and data," among other
classes of data).
15. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 1, at 76-79; Timothy R. Graeff & Susan Harmon,
Collecting and Using Personal Data: Consumers' Awareness and Concerns, 19 J. CONSUMER
MARKETING 302, 304 (2002) (discussing the use of store loyalty cards to collect personal data).
16. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 1-3 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-
brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (discussing the data-broker industry). The data-broker industry
includes companies like Acxiom, which licenses business data (e.g., names, telephone numbers,
business classification code, location information, etc.) and personal residential data (e.g., telephone
numbers, names, addresses, mobile use, etc.). See Business Data, ACXIOM,
http://www.databyacxiom.com/business-data.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2016); Residential Data,
ACxioM, http://www.databyacxiom.com/residential-data.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
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The multi-sided platform is at the heart of the digital economy and
is defined by a business that serves two distinct but complementary cus-
tomer bases: (1) consumers who use a digital product, and (2) advertisers
who pay for access to those consumers.17 Google, for example, provides
a wide range of products to consumers, including its e-mail service, digi-
tal mapping software, online word-processing software, web browser,
search engine, social-media sites, and media offerings.18 Instead of
charging users a cash fee for access to those services, it collects data
from them, and it uses those data to sell targeted advertising.19 It thus
uses one side of its business model, the provision of digital goods to con-
sumers, to facilitate another side of its business model, the generation of
advertising income.
The importance of this business model is reflected in Google's fi-
nancial performance. In 2015, Google derived approximately 90% of its
revenue, over $67 billion, from advertising.20 This has led some to opine
that Google's product is actually its users and not its digital software
offerings.21 Google is not alone in this of course. Popular social-media
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram all operate in the same
way. They offer "free" products but generate revenue by collecting and
monetizing users' information. Other websites, like many news websites,
operate similarly, with customer data and advertising as the revenue
drivers.22
17. See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1987, 1994-96 (2008) (discussing the multisided platform).
18. Products, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/about/products/ (last visited Aug. 29.
2009).
19. Evans, supra note 17, at 1997-2002 (discussing Google's advertising revenue and busi-
ness model).
20. Alphabet Inc. & Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter
Google Annual Report],
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/googl 0-k2015.htm (re-
porting that approximately $67 billion of Google's $75 billion in revenue in 2015 resulted from
advertising). This has led some to the conclusion that individual users are Internet companies' prod-
ucts, rather than their customers.
21. PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 12, at 33-34 ("In most instances, when you use free
services, what's really for sale is you and all the digital data nuggets you provide when you use the
service."); Scott Goodson, If You're Not Paying for It, You Become the Product, FORBES (Mar. 5,
2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/03/05/if-youre-not-paying-for-it-
you-become-the-product/ ("If you're not paying for it; you are the product." (citation omitted));
Jonathan Zittrain, Meme Patrol. "When Something Online is Free, You're Not the Customer, You're
the Product," HARV. BLOGS: FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheintemet/2012/03/21/meme-patrol-when-something-online-is-
free-youre-not-the-customer-youre-the-product/ (exploring the source of this sentiment).
22. Some online newspapers have even started using so-called "survey walls" to collect data
as payment for access. Under the survey-wall method, a consumer is required to answer some basic
research questions before she is granted access to a website. Unsurprisingly, Google is at the fore-
front of this method of data acquisition. PAUL MCDONALD, MATT MOHEBBI & BRETT SLATKIN,
GOOGLE INC., COMPARING GOOGLE CONSUMER SURVEYS TO EXISTING PROBABILITY AND NON-
PROBABILITY BASED INTERNET SURVEYS 3,
https://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/static/consumer-surveyswhitepaper v2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2016). Google even competes for this business by touting its ability to ask
fewer questions of users because it can infer information about a respondent by using the respond-
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The data being collected by these firms are often classified into
three types-volunteered ata, observed data, and inferred data.23 Volun-
teered data are the data that consumers actively provide to data aggrega-
24tors. This can be their names, birthdays, addresses, places of work, and
the things that they "like." 25 Observed data include data that are gathered
based on a consumer's behaviors and activities and are collected without
the knowledge or special effort of the consumer.26 They are collected
through the use of various technological tools, like cookies, flash cook-
ies, browser fingerprinting, GPS tracking, deep packet inspection, and
history sniffing.2 7 Some companies are even tracking users through
smartphone applications that "listen" for ultrasonic pitches that are em-
bedded into television advertisements.28 Given the variety of these da-
ta-collection tools, there are many different types of observed data.
Those include information regarding what individuals purchase, the In-
ternet links that they click on, what they search for, the Internet browser
that they use, what music they listen to, how long they hover over arti-
cles or headlines, and the types of advertisements to which they re-
spond.29
The final category of data, inferred data, is comprised of data that
can be inferred based solely on a consumer's information profile.30 For
example, a data aggregator may be able to infer that an individual is
ent's IP address and a cookie that it places on the respondent's machine to track the respondent's
web history. Id.
23. WORLD EcoN. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 7.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Of course, some data that users contribute are not necessarily personal at all. When a user
discloses a relationship or a meal with another person, for example, he or she discloses personal
information of that other person as well. We could thus question how effectively the law can be
tailored to allow individuals full control over their data or whether those data are really worthy of
protection at all. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 24, 86 (2013) (recognizing that European Union (EU) privacy protections fail to take
this issue into account); Steven L. Willborn, Notice, Consent, and NAonconsent: Employee Privacy in
the Restatement, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1423, 1423, 1425-27 (2015) (noting that some information
is simply not "private" and worthy of legal protection).
26. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 14.
27. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track": Advancing Transparency
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCi. & TECH. 281, 288-89,
292-96, 298-99 (2012) (discussing these different online-tracking technologies).
28. Dan Goodin, Beware of Ads That Use Inaudible Sound to Link Your Phone, TV, Tablet,
and PC, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/11I/beware-of-ads-that-use-inaudible-sound-to-link-your-phone-tv-tablet-and-pc/.
29. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRUST, supra note 3, at 18 ("Observed data is created as
a result of a transaction between an individual and an organization-location data from a mobile
phone, credit card transactions, purchase history at a retailer, etc."); Ryan Calo, Digital Market
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1003-04 (2014) (providing a list of information that
websites can collect from consumers); Andrew Griffin, Facebook News Feed Algorithm to Track
How Long Users Spend Reading Stories, INDEPENDENT (June 15, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-news-feed-algorithm-to-
track-how-long-users-spend-reading-stories-10320715.html; Steve Rosenbush, Facebook Tests
Software to Track Your Cursor on Screen, WALL STREET J.: CIO J., (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:15 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/30/facebook-considers-vast-increase-in-data-collection/ (discuss-
ing the types of tracking that Facebook and other online websites perform).
30. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 7, 14.
TRANSACTING IN DATA
pregnant based on her recent web searches and her in-store purchases.31
It may also be able to determine a person's credit worthiness based upon
whether he purchased felt pads for the bottom of the legs of his kitchen
32chairs.32 Inferred data thus represent a type of educated guess about an
individual.
The different types of data collected and their different uses raise a
number of questions regarding the personal-data market. These include
whether consumers understand the implications of that market and
whether consumers are being adequately compensated for their data.
These aspects of the personal-data market have been explored in the
technology and privacy literature as well as in the popular press. The
following Section provides some background on that literature with a
specific focus on how it has viewed the personal-data exchange and the
evolution of the personal-data economy.
B. Existing Analyses of the Personal-Data Market
The scope and importance of the personal-data market is well
known in the technology and privacy sectors. The World Economic Fo-
rum, for example, has a long-running project called "Rethinking Personal
Data,"33 which has resulted in a series of reports that evaluate the person-
al-data market and its impact on society.34 Those reports broadly recog-
nize that personal data has emerged as a new asset class that impacts our
entire society.35 They also recognize that personal data are becoming "a
primary currency of the digital economy."36 Other analysts repeat these
observations. Some have gone so far as to call data the "lifeblood of the
new economy,"3 and there is a widespread recognition that personal data
are being used as consideration for access to the digital products of to-
day's economy.3 Both academics39 and the popular preSS40 recognize
31. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html? (discussing how retailers use
inferred data and relaying the remarkable story of the father who became aware that his high-school-
aged daughter was pregnant when Target sent her coupons for baby-related items).
32. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 14; Strahilevitz, supra note 2,
at 2021.
33. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 18.
37. PIERRE COLLIN & NICOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 33 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter FRENCH REPORT],
http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/06/Taxation-DigitalEconomy.pdf; EUROPEAN DATA
PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 191 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2013); WORLD ECON. FORUM,
TRUST, supra note 3, at 7; GEORGE 0. M. YEE, PRIVACY PROTECTION MEASURES AND
TECHNOLOGIES IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ASPECTS AND STANDARDS 173 (2012); Anupam
Chander & Uyhn P. L8, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 721 (2015); Schwartz, supra note 5,
at 2069-70; Joe Callahan, Data: The Oil in Today's New Economy, FIRST INSIGHT: BLOG (July 17,
2015), http://www.firstinsight.com/blog/data-the-oil-in-todays-new-economy.
38. See, e.g., European Data Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Opinion on Privacy and
Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data 8-10 (Mar. 2014),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opini
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that access to "free" digital products online is not free at all, but that con-
sumers pay for that access by relinquishing their data.4' Some analysts
even recognize that consumers are involved in a new type of barter ex-
change.42
The growth of this new type of personal-data exchange has led to
broad discussions regarding the inherent tradeoffs between maintaining
personal privacy and the benefits that individuals receive from disclosing
their personal information.4 3 Theoretically, consumers can make eco-
nomically rational decisions to exchange their data or their privacy for
access to digital products, and some scholars feel that government need
ons/2014/14-03-26_competitition law bigdataEN.pdf; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2056-57;
Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm'n, Speech at the Innovation Conference Digital,
Life, Design: The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modem
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release SPEECH-12-26 en.htm ("Personal data is the currency of today's digital market."); Adam
Fisch, There's a New Currency in Town and It's Not the Malawian Kwacha or Azerbaiani Manat,
HUFFPOST TECH. U.K.: THE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:04), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/adam-
fisch/new-currencyb_6721866.html; David Zax, Is Personal Data the New Currency?, MIT TECH.
REV. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/426235/is-personal-data-the-new-
currency/.
39. Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 608 (noting that "free" online services "carry a
hidden charge: the forfeit of one's personal information"); Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., Your Brows-
ing Behavior for a Big Mac: Economics of Personal Information Online 189 (May 13-17, 2013)
(research paper prepared for the Twenty-Second International World Wide Web Conference),
http://www20l3.wwwconference.org/proceedings/pl89.pdf; Christopher Riederer et al., For Sale:
Your Data by: You (Nov. 14-15, 2011) (research paper prepared for the Tenth ACM Workshop Hot
Topics in Networks (HotNets-X)), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/-mani/hotnetsX-final85.pdf.
40. For example, when Microsoft released Windows 10 in mid-2015, it provided the software
to existing Windows customers without charge. Commentators had no trouble recognizing that the
software was not actually free, but that consumers were paying for this new software with their data.
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Windows 10 Isn't Spyware but It Wants Your Data, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 5,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/personal-technology/2015/08/05/windows-10-isnt-spyware-
but-it-wants-your-data/; Laurie Segall, Your Private Data Pays for 'Free' Facebook and Google,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 28, 2011, 6:56 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/28/technology/googledataprivacy da /; Natasha Singer, Sharing
Data, but Not Happily, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/technology/consumers-conflicted-over-data-mining-policies-
report-finds.html; Ben Wright, Do You Want Free Facebook or a Say in Where Your Personal Data




41. A recent Pew Research Center study found that consumers did seem to understand that
they were trading data for benefits. LEE RAINIE & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PRIVACY
AND INFORMATION SHARING 6-7 (2016), http://www.pewintemet.org/2016/01/14/2016/Privacy-and-
Information-Sharing/.
42. See sources cited supra note 5.
43. See Laura Brandimarte & Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Privacy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 547 (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds., 2012)
(discussing the "economics of privacy"); JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER,
ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC'N UNIV. OF PA., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY 4-9 (2015),
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacyl.pdf; Ryan Calo, Privacy and Mar-
kets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 658 (2015); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene,
Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2013) ("Finding the
right balance between privacy risks and big data rewards may very well be the biggest public policy
challenge of our time.").
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not interfere to mandate particular data-protection practices." Others,
however, feel that individuals are not able to fully participate in the mar-
ket for their data. They argue that informational asymmetries, behavioral
biases, and structural problems in the data market prevent that market
from functioning effectively.45
Recent research tends to suggest hat consumers are indeed unhappy
with how their personal data are being collected and utilized.46 Consum-
ers have continued to allow that collection and use, however, because
they have felt that they had to do so if they wanted to be fully engaged
members of today's society.47 That is beginning to change though, and
there are significant efforts being directed toward modifying how Inter-
net commerce is conducted. The Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard, for example, runs a project named ProjectVRM.4
That project focuses on the concept of vendor relationship management
(VRM) which is focused on making consumers empowered economic
actors with respect to their data.49 The project urges the development of
technology that allows individuals to more fully control their own data
and how others use those data.5 0 The focus is on giving consumers con-
trol of their relationships with vendors instead of simply being economic
units for vendors to capture.5 1 Consumers could do this if they could col-
lect and control their own data, if they had the ability to selectively share
those data, or if they could control the conditions under which others
44. See Brandimarte & Acquisti, supra note 43, at 552-55; Calo, supra note 43, at 655-57
(discussing these propositions).
45. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior, in
THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 165, 165-66 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds.,
2004); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About
Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY 363, 364-65 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008); Brandimarte &
Acquisti, supra note 43, at 555-57, 564; Calo, supra note 29, at 1013-15; Calo, supra note 43, at
650-51; A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1728-37 (2015); Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880-
81(2013).
46. MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/; TUROW, HENNESSY & DRAPER, supra note 43, at 3.
47. TUROW, HENNESSY & DRAPER, supra note 43, at 4 ("[T]he larger percentages of people in
the population who are resigned compared to people who believe in . .. tradeoffs . . . indicate that in
the real world people who [exchange] their data [for benefits] are more likely to do it while resigned
rather than as the result of cost-benefit analysis."); see also Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at
1158 (concluding that people would have to live "as Information Age hermits, without credit cards,
banks, Internet service, phones and television" if they did not want to share their information with
third parties).
48. Project VRM, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/projectvrm
(last updated July 5, 2016).
49. Id. (vendor relationship management is in contrast to "customer relationship manage-
ment," which focuses on how vendors can best capture consumers).
50. See PROJECT VRM, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/projectvrm/MainPage (last updated
Sept. 4, 2016).
51. DOC SEARLS, THE INTENTION ECONOMY: WHEN CUSTOMERS TAKE CHARGE 164-65
(2012).
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could use their data.52 A number of digital products currently incorporate
these VRM concepts.
One specific VRM-like proposal is to create cash markets in which
individuals can sell their personal data. For example, noted author and
computer scientist Jaron Lanier has suggested a world where individuals
receive micro-payments each time their data are used.54 Others focus on
the development of personal-data banks or vaults where consumers store
and sell access to their data.5 Scholars have explored this type of market
development by experimenting with cash markets for data in laboratory
experiments.56 Others have created, or are creating, firms that actually
provide that service.57 Some businesses also have developed platforms
that provide compensation for data without using the data-bank model.
The now-defunct social-media platform "tsu," for example, shared its
advertising revenue with users based on their activities on the site.5 A
similar platform, Bonzo Me, pays users 80% of the advertising revenue
that is derived from their posts.
59
Those changes to the data economy are being explored as responses
to generalized concerns regarding personal privacy, but they might also
be compelled due to individuals' increased use of technology that blocks
tracking and online advertising. Those actions directly undercut the
advertising side of the multi-sided business model and could require that
businesses move towards a cash-subscription model or a model that al-
52. Id
53. VRM Development Work, PROJECT VRM,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/projectvrm/VRMDevelopment Work (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).
54. JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE 317 (2013).
55. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92, 99-100;
Tom Simonite, Sell Your Personal Data for $8 a Month, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/52462 1/sell-your-personal-data-for-8-a-month/.
56. See Christina Aperjis & Bernardo A. Huberman, A Market for Unbiased Private Data:
Paying Individuals According to Their Privacy Attitudes, FIRST MONDAY (May 2012),
http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4013/3 2 0 9#pl; Riederer et. al., supra note 39,
at 1; Jacopo Staiano et al., Money Walks: A Human-Centric Study on the Economics of Personal
Mobile Data I (Sept. 13-17, 2014) (research paper prepared for the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp 2014)),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.0566.pdf.
57. Consumers Could License Their Data, WARC (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.warc.com/LatestNews/News/Consumerscould-license-their-data.news?ID=361 11;
Zax, supra note 38. Companies that offer this service include DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com (last
visited Oct. 16, 2016), and PERSONAL BLACKBox, http://pbb.me/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
58. TSO, https://www.tsu.co/about (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
59. What Can You Do on BonzoMe?, BONZO ME (Sept. 17, 2014), http://bonzome.com/what-
can-you-do-on-bonzome/.
60. See PAGEFAIR & ADOBE, THE COST OF AD BLOCKING: 2015 AD BLOCKING REPORT
(2015), https://downloads.pagefair.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015_report-
the cost of ad blocking.pdf; Ted McConnell,. Don't Let Viewers Renege on the Social Contract,
MEDIAPOST (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:17 AM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/257938/dont-let-viewers-renege-on-the-social-
contract.html (discussing ways to discourage ad-blocking); With Ad Blocking Use on the Rise, What




lows users to take more control of their data. Regardless of the approach
taken, though, individuals will have to pay for their desired digital prod-
ucts one way or another. Along these lines, some have advocated for
cash-subscription options for websites, including Facebook.6 1 Those in-
dividuals would rather pay with cash than with their data. One research
firm even predicted that 2016 would be a "tipping point," with more
companies offering paid, ad-free subscription models.62
In sum, it is clear that the personal-data market is of great economic
importance and that it raises significant issues regarding personal priva-
cy. The market is receiving considerable attention by consumers, privacy
scholars, and technologists. It has thus far, however, gone largely unno-
ticed by our tax system and by our tax scholars. Part II of this Article
remedies that omission.
II. PERSONAL-DATA TAXATION
The personal-data market is a critical part of today's economy, but
that market has largely escaped the attention of the tax community. The
only real tax analysis of the personal-data market has been done by the
international tax community in the context of reports regarding the taxa-
tion of the digital economy more broadly. This Section explores that
analysis and discusses how transactions in data should be treated for U.S.
tax purposes. The latter discussion includes analyses of (1) the theoreti-
cal tax consequences to individual consumers as data providers; (2) the
theoretical tax consequences to businesses as data aggregators; and
(3) the pragmatic factors that will impede the taxation of personal-data
transactions as they occur today.63
A. The Personal-Data Market, the Digital Economy, and Global Taxa-
tion
The modern economy presents many challenges for our global tax
systems. Multi-national firms are able to use complex corporate struc-
tures and international tax rules to direct their profits into jurisdictions
61. See Calo, supra note 29, at 1047-48 (considering this option for consumer-protection
reasons); Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg, Let Me Pay for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-mark-zuckerberg-let-me-pay-for-
facebook.html; Dear Software Companies, Please Let Me Pay You Money, CREATIVE REALIST (Dec.
18, 2012), http://www.creativerealist.com/post/38234666233/dear-software-companies-please-let-
me-pay-you; Mark Schaefer, Dear Facebook. Please Let Me Pay You., BUSINESSGROw.COM,
http://www.businessesgrow.com/2013/02/07/dear-facebook-please-let-me-pay-you/ (last visited
Sept. 3, 2016).
62. Harriet Taylor, Privacy Will Hit Tipping Point in 2016, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2015, 8:35 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/privacy-will-hit-tipping-point-in-2016.html (discussing a privacy
report issued by Forrester Research).
63. The tax analysis of this article presumes that data aggregators are subject to corporate
income tax and that data providers are individuals subject to the personal income tax. This is done
for the purpose of simplicity only.
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with low or no tax." This has motivated significant tax scholarship that
analyzes how to best modify our international tax rules to ensure that
multi-national firms' profits are taxed at some desired level.65 The use of
personal data in the modem economy adds to the general challenges fac-
ing global taxation because it gives firms another way to build value that
is difficult to assign to a particular activity or jurisdiction. For this rea-
son, the commercialization of personal data has been recognized in two
recent reports that more generally analyze the global tax issues created
by the digital economy-a report issued by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development in 2015 (the OECD Report)66 and
an earlier 2013 report commissioned by the French government (the
French Report).67 Both of those Reports recognize that personal-data
transactions are a key component of the digital economy and address the
difficulty of determining how those transactions should be characterized
for tax purposes.68
The OECD Report very briefly does the latter and notes that those
transactions could be seen either as taxable barter transactions or as "free
goods" transactions.69 The Report does not detail the tax consequences of
those constructs or analyze whether one is preferred over the other.70
Instead, the Report suggests that the characterization issue is not of great
importance because the value that personal-data transactions create will
64. See Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Owner-
ship Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207, 207-10 (2015) (referencing the general scholarship and de-
bate regarding U.S. corporate tax avoidance). See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 9-10 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E.
Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Frame-
work, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 675 (2015); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV.
699, 701-02 (2011).
65. , See generally ARTHUR COCKFIELD ET AL., TAXING GLOBAL DIGITAL COMMERCE (3d rev.
ed. 2013) (broadly evaluating the impact of the digital economy on global tax systems); Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, supra note 64; Kleinbard, supra note 64; Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of
Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011).
66. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1: 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter OECD REPORT],
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-economy-action-
1-2015-final-report 9789264241046-en. The OECD Report was issued as part of its Base Erosion
and Profits Shifting Project that it initiated in 2013. Id. at 3. That project included a 15-point Action
Plan to "ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities take place and value is created." Id.
Action I of that Action Plan called for research into ways to "address the tax challenges of the
digital economy." Id. at 11. One outcome of that call was the publication of the 285-page OECD
Report. See generally id That report discusses much more than just personal data of course. It
broadly discusses the challenges that the digital economy, including the use of personal data in that
economy, presents with respect to both direct taxes like income taxes, and to indirect taxes like
consumption taxes. See generally id.
67. In 2012, the French government commissioned a comprehensive report on the impacts of
the digital economy on that country's tax system. The resulting report, the French Report, was issued
in January 2013, and specifically identified personal data as the "common denominator" and the
"core of value creation" in the digital economy. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 35.
68. See generally id.; OECD REPORT, supra note 66.
69. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 104.
70. See id.
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ultimately be taxed when data aggregators convert it into advertising
income.7 1 For reasons discussed below, this is not a satisfactory way of
handling the issue.72
The French Report provides a relatively more robust analysis. It de-
tails how the modem economy has been built on the "regular and sys-
tematic monitoring" of consumers who are not being provided with any
monetary payment for the resulting data.73 It also reasons that those data
are "free or nearly free" to data aggregators because the data are collect-
ed as a "positive extemalit[y]" of an online application that can be pro-
vided by those firms at a near-zero marginal cost.74 The Report's focus
on these factors results in its adoption of a "free-labour construct" under
which consumers are treated as unpaid laborers-and not as beneficiaries
of a market exchange.75 This is not to say that the Report does not con-
sider other potential tax constructs. It does.76 Among the models consid-
ered are those that would incorporate some sort of taxable-exchange the-
ory, but the Report concluded that none of those constructs fit the per-
sonal-data exchange in a workable way.77 The Report did also specifical-
ly raise the question of whether individual users would have tax conse-
quences under a market-exchange theory if one took that construct to the
"extreme."78 That possibility was dismissed quickly even though the
Report did recognize that individual consumers do get access to online
applications in exchange for their data.79
The adoption of the free-labor model seems to be best explained by
the motivation for the Report. The authors of the Report were focused on
determining how France could best respond to the new economy and
multi-national firms' aggressive tax planning.80 They were not asked to
find a model that best reflected economic reality. It is thus not surprising
that the authors would adopt a model that narrowed the inquiry to data
aggregators and that ignored the tax consequences to consumers. 8 In
doing so, however, the Report was far more limited in scope than this
Article is intended to be, and we can fairly question the extent to which
its analysis is helpful to that goal.
71. Id.
72. See infra Section I.A. 1.
73. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 2.
74. Id. at 49.
75. Id. at 2, 49-54, 79, 102, 114-16.
76. Id. at 79-80.
77. Id. at 79-84.
78. Id. at 116. This was done in the span of one sentence in the text and in one sentence in a
footnote. Id.
79. Id. at 81. This, of course, creates an inconsistency. The report posits that consumers are
not being paid for their data, that companies are not being paid for their digital products, but that
both are receiving something valuable from the other. See generally id
80. Id. at 1-3.
81. Id. at 2-3.
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Properly categorizing personal-data transactions requires us to rec-
ognize that consumers actually do receive compensation for their data.
They generally do not receive cash, but they benefit immensely in other
ways. The wide range of "free" digital products that are available today
is staggering. We live in a world where all of humanity's accumulated
information-and Pok6mon Go-is readily available at a moment's no-
tice. We pay for hardware to access that information, but the information
and entertainment is provided without a cash fee. Consumers are undeni-
ably getting something in return for their data. In fact, economists have
valued the consumer welfare gains from "free" online products at ap-
proximately $100 billion per year in the U.S. alone.82 To claim that con-
sumers are getting nothing from the deal is thus inaccurate.83
It is equally inaccurate to say that data aggregators are getting free
labor from consumers. Although Google does get each additional user's
data for a very low cost, its near-zero marginal cost is a function of
providing a digital product, not of the personal-data market. Digital
goods are largely non-rivalrous; they can be replicated infinitely, at low
cost, and without any drain on the primary resource.84 The marginal cost
of selling software on a CD-ROM includes the cost of a disk, manufac-
turing time, and packaging. The marginal cost of providing another per-
son access to online software involves some incremental burden on serv-
er space, but that is it. Having a near-zero marginal cost, though, does
not mean that digital goods have no cost. Firms spend significant sums
to develop products that consumers will use repeatedly.86 It is critical that
82. Erik Brynjolfsson & Joo Hee Oh, The Attention Economy: Measuring the Value of Free
Digital Services on the Internet 3 (Dec. 16-19, 2012) (research paper prepared for the Thirty-Third
International Conference on Information Systems),
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 045&context-icis2012.
83. This is, of course, not to say that consumers are being adequately compensated for their
data, just that they are being compensated in some amount. See supra notes 44-45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the challenges preventing a perfectly functioning market for personal data).
84. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 30; Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 620-
22; Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1138. The nonrivalrous nature of digital goods is consistent with the
nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property and data. See Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the
Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IowA L. REV. 631, 661 (2010) ("Infor-
mation by its nature is nonrivalrous, meaning it can be used by many people at once without deple-
tion."); Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1940-42 (2014) (describing the nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property);
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1050-51
(2005) ("Information is what economists call a pure 'public good,' which means both that its con-
sumption is nonrivalrous-my use of an idea does not impose any direct cost on you-and that it is
not something from which others can easily be excluded."); see also Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World
Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 466-71 (2015) (discussing the impact of technology on
scarcity).
85. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 29-30 (noting that information goods do not have
fixed, marginal costs and that the fixed costs can be "quite high"); Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra
note 4, at 622-24.
86. Google Annual Report, supra note 20 (revealing that Google and its parent company spent
over $16 billion on research and development in 2015); see also Facebook, Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116000043/fb-
12312015xlOk.htm (revealing that Facebook had a "cost of revenue" of almost $2.9 billion in 2015
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a business using a multi-sided platform provide users "with a fluid, reas-
suring and stimulating experience."8 Absent those factors, its flow of
data ceases and its business will fail. It is therefore incorrect to claim that
data aggregators receive data for free. They might have great economies
of scale, but they do pay for their data. The free-labor construct is thus
inappropriate, at least for data aggregators who utilize a multi-sided
business model.
The sum of this analysis is that the utilization of a free-labor model
in international tax analyses should not guide how we think about per-
sonal-data transactions for domestic tax purposes. The actual functioning
of the personal-data market supports the adoption of a market-exchange
model under which we recognize that firms acquire data by providing
consumers with access to desirable digital products and that consumers
use their data to acquire access to those products.89
and also spent nearly $5 billion on research and development; Facebook's cost of revenue "consists
primarily of expenses associated with the delivery and distribution of [its] products").
87. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 53 (such a service "makes it possible to infiltrate the
data-to-day activities and even the private life of individuals"); Nadezhda Purtova, The Illusion of
Personal Data as No One's Property, 7 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 83, 107 (2015).
88. The free-labor construct might be more apt for data aggregation that occurs in connection
with other types of exchanges. A consumer purchasing internet or cable television access, for exam-
ple, will pay a cash subscription charge, but he or she will also likely be monitored and will transfer
personal data to the service provider as he or she uses its product. ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 19
(discussing a lawsuit against an intermet service provider that allowed the monitoring of its subscrib-
ers' intemet usage); PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 12, at 189-91; Ramachandran & Vranica,
supra note 13. In this situation, the traditional commercial exchange might incorporate the exchange
of data into the cash price charged. It is also possible, however, that the data exchange might be
unknown to the consumer and that the consumer might not be able to understand or be able to extract
the value of the data that he or she is transferring. This would be consistent with scholarship showing
that consumers are poorly informed participants in the data market, are often unaware that hey are
market participants at all, or are simply resigned to providing their data. See supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text; see also Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and
Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 860-63 (2014)
(discussing the many forces working against a competitive market for personal data). We thus might
be more comfortable with the free-labor construct in the context of exchanges where consumers are
paying a cash price for their benefit of choice.
89. This article has thus far focused on individuals as exchanging their personal data for
access to digital goods, but it is not necessarily clear that this characterization is accurate. To start, it
is not clear that personal data is something that can be owned or that such ownership is transferable.
The proper characterization of data has been discussed for years in the property and privacy litera-
ture, and some advocate for a property construct for personal data, but those data do not necessarily
fall within our classical conception of property. They certainly are not currently protected as proper-
ty. See, e.g., BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 1, at 194-200; Cohen, supra note 6, at 1374-77;
Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1130-52; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2094-2116; Solove, Digital Dossi-
ers, supra note 8, at 1112-15. Data also share some qualities with goods and some qualities with
services. Like goods they can be stored and delivered from a location other than where they are
produced. Like services, however, they are intangible. MICHAEL MANDEL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY
INST., BEYOND GOODS AND SERVICES: THE (UNMEASURED) RISE OF THE DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY
1-2 (2012), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/10.2012-
MandelBeyond-Goods-and-ServicesThe-Unmeasured-Rise-of-the-Data-Driven-Economypdf.
The uncertainties regarding how to characterize data make it a bit uneasy to accept a construct under
which individuals are transferring those data as payment for access to digital goods.
The type of data involved might also further undermine a construct under which consum-
ers are deemed to be selling their data. Volunteered data, for example, certainly look like something
that an individual transfers to an aggregator. Those data represent information held by the individual
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B. The Personal-Data Market and Domestic Taxation
1. Personal-Data Transactions and the Income Tax
Determining whether a particular event results in taxable income
begins with Internal Revenue Code (the Code) § 61, which provides that
gross income includes "all income."90 The Supreme Court has noted that
Congress intended to "exert . . . the full measure of its taxing power" in
enacting that definition and has interpreted it to mean that income in-
cludes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion."91 That is a very broad formulation,92
and the fact that money does not exchange hands is not dispositive.9 3
Indeed, barter transactions are clearly taxable under the Code.94 Our in-
come tax laws treat a party to such an exchange as if she had traded her
goods or services for cash and then used those funds to purchase the
good or service from the other party to the exchange. 95 The key to under-
standing and evaluating the tax consequences of a barter transaction is to
break it into its component parts. For example, a lawyer who trades her
and purposefully given to the aggregator. Observed ata, on the other hand, look much different.
Those data are captured through the effort of the aggregator and may have been previously unknown
to the individual-the speed at which they type in a comments section or their responses to behav-
ioral prompts for example. The individual as data transferor looks less apt on those facts. They look
much more like a service provider.
This characterization issue is interesting in the abstract but becomes important only if one
determines that individuals have income from engaging in personal-data transactions. That issue is
considered in depth below. See infra Section IIB. 1.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012). "Gross income" ultimately becomes "taxable income" after the
application of deductions and personal exemptions. 26 U.S.C. § 63 (2012). The tax analysis of this
Article presumes that data aggregators are subject to corporate income tax and that data providers
are individuals subject to the personal income tax. This is done for simplicity only.
91. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955). State income taxes gener-
ally defer to the Code in determining a taxpayer's income that is subject to tax. See 2 JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 20.02 (3d ed. 2000). This Section will
therefore focus on the federal income-tax laws, but taxpayers with federal taxable income would
likely have state income-tax consequences as well, to the extent that they were subject to such a tax.
92. There is an academic debate about whether the § 61 formulation provides a rule or a
standard. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295,
330 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income]; Alice G. Abreu & Richard K.
Greenstein, It's Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the Definition ofIncome, 13 FLA. TAX REV.
101, 101-02 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The Rule of Law as a Law of Stand-
ards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53, 55 (2015); Lawrence
Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829,
829-30 (2012). This debate and its implications for the taxation of personal-data transactions will be
discussed in greater detail below with respect to the taxation of data providers under the barter-
exchange model. See infra Section IIB..1.
93. Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code does allow for the deferral of gain on certain
exchanges of property, but multiple conditions must be met for that deferral provision to apply. See
26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012).
94. See 26 U.S.C. § 83(a), (b) (2012) (providing rules for the inclusion in gross income of
gains from the receipt of property in exchange for services); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended
in 2003) (providing that the fair market value of property or services received in exchange for ser-
vices is included in gross income); Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60. See generally Robert 1. Keller,
The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441 (1982) (broadly discussing the taxation
of barter exchanges).
95. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.
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legal services for painting services is treated as if she had provided legal
services for a cash fee and then used that income to purchase the painting
services.96 Her tax consequences from engaging in the barter are the
same as if she had engaged in those two separate transactions.
This barter model applies easily to the personal-data transactions of
today's economy. Under a market-exchange model, data aggregators sell
access to their digital products in exchange for personal data, and con-
sumers sell their data in exchange for access to digital products. No cash
is exchanged in those transactions, but each side transfers something of
value to the other. As a result, our tax laws dictate that data providers
should report income on the sale of their data and that data aggregators
should report income on the sale of access to their digital products. The
occurrence of a taxable event is relatively clear as a conceptual matter.
This basic analysis is not meant to suggest that he tax analysis is
that limited. Many other considerations come into play, both for data
providers and for data aggregators, and the following Parts look more
closely at the particular issues that arise on each side of the exchange.
a. Income Tax, Data Providers, and the Market-Exchange
Model
The practical impact of the conclusions above should not be lost on
readers. Treating personal-data transactions as barter exchanges means
that individuals who post something on Facebook or who use Gmail are
engaged in taxable transactions. It means that each entry into a search
engine is a taxable sale of data and a taxable sale of access to that digital
product. That result may be surprising at first, but should not be particu-
larly provocative to those familiar with economic or tax analyses. Indi-
vidual personal-data exchanges are the equivalent of two separate market
transactions, and we would absolutely tax them if they occurred in those
two steps. For example, Facebook could run two independent business-
es-one that paid individuals to take part in experiments and another that
sold access to its social-media platform. If it ran those two distinct busi-
nesses, we would have no trouble saying that individuals who received
compensation for participating in the experiments had taxable income.97
The analysis should be no different when the steps are combined and
individual users are paid for their data with direct access to the website.
This conclusion is at the heart of the entire barter-exchange doc-
trine. Exchanges of value have tax consequences regardless of whether
96. Id.; Keller, supra note 94, at 443 (discussing the "two-payment approach" to characteriz-
ing barter transactions).
97. See O'Connor v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 571 (2012) (finding that compensation
received for participating in a medical research study was includable in the recipient's gross income
under Code § 61).
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the exchange is facilitated by currency.98 Any other rule would make tax
avoidance too simple. Service providers, whether employees or inde-
pendent contractors, could just demand payments of tax-free, in-kind
benefits rather than of taxable cash compensation. That result would
clearly be problematic-except as an intended subsidy.
The conclusion that individuals generate income from personal-data
barters is straightforward once one adopts the market-exchange model.
More broadly, however, that conclusion is the same under general tax
principles, even if one does not feel comfortable with using the barter-
exchange characterization.99 Under a more general analysis, the basic
question is still whether an individual consumer who receives access to a
"free" digital product has received an "accession to wealth" in the Glen-
shaw Glass sense. 1 0 As noted above, that formulation appears incredibly
broad, and there is some resulting discussion regarding whether "in-
come" under the Tax Code is as broad as an economic concept of income
or whether pragmatic factors result in a tax definition of "income" that is
more narrow.
Under a broad, economic theory of income, though, the ability to
access Google Docs or Facebook is a benefit that is clearly realized
without the taxpayer having paid for its value in cash. If the benefit re-
ceived were a copy of Microsoft Word, we would have no problem iden-
tifying the fact of a taxable event. The answer should be no different, as a
conceptual matter, simply because the benefit is provided digitally. A
consumer who receives a free digital product is in an economically supe-
rior position to one who has to pay cash for that same product.
This conclusion is fine as a normative matter, but our positive law
does provide a number of exclusions from gross income for gains that
constitute income in the economic sense. Gifts, for example, are acces-
sions to wealth in the broad sense, but they are not taxed.'0 ' Certain
fringe benefits are treated the same way.1 02 Indeed, the statutory exclu-
98. This is clear as an abstract normative matter, but the receipt of in-kind benefits has always
presented troubles for discussions of how to define and measure income. See HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 53
(1938).
99. Some might, for example, contest that individuals can enter into a taxable exchange if
they are unaware that it is occurring or if they did not actually possess the information being bar-
tered. Some may just reject the idea that individuals are engaged in a market transaction out of hand.
100. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). This statutory exclusion might come to mind for certain read-
ers that are not intimately familiar with the tax laws. One could argue that companies are effectively
making a gift to users when they give them access to their products without charge. For tax purpos-
es, though, gifts are transfers made with "detached and disinterested generosity," and the intent of
the donor controls in making that determination. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)
(citing Comm'r v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). A transfer of access to a digital product in
exchange for data is not a gift under that standard. The transferor of access to the product is doing so
out of self-interest.
102. 26 U.S.C. §§ 119, 132 (2012). Courts have also allowed certain non-statutory exclusions
from gross income that are more consistent with a standard-based conception of § 61. In United
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sion for de minimis fringe benefits under Code § 132 appears to be a
close fit for the gains derived by individuals in personal-data transac-
tions. 103
The de-minimis exclusion applies to "any property or service the
value of which is . .. so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable
or administratively impracticable."'4 That standard takes into account
the frequency with which the benefit is provided.05 As a result, a single
meal might have de minimis value, but might fail to be de minimis if pro-
vided every day.1 06 That construct could apply well to consumer gains
from data transfers because of the values involved and the difficulties
inherent in tracking those exchanges. The value of a single visit to Pin-
terest or WebMD hardly seems large enough to make accounting for it
reasonable or practicable. The analysis is different, of course, for users
who log into their Gmail accounts daily or who store a large number of
photographs on Facebook's servers. Nonetheless, some might still feel
that the de minimis exemption should apply in those situations because of
the values and administrative difficulties that would be involved with
taxing the resulting gains.
The de minimis construct is certainly appealing, but it is not perfect-
ly applicable to personal-data barters. First, there are qualitative differ-
ences between the typical de minimis fringe benefit and personal-data
gains. The former are generally provided either (1) as a side benefit of an
existing relationship (as in the case of coffee in an employer's break
States v. Gotcher, for example, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a case in which a married couple received
a free trip to Germany. 401 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1968). The cost of that trip was paid by Mr.
Gotcher's employer and by the Volkswagen Company, which was attempting to induce him into
investing in a Volkswagen dealership. Id. at 119-23. The court determined that no statutory exclu-
sion from gross income applied, but that the receipt of the trip was not taxable regardless. Id. at 124.
The court reasoned that the benefit was not taxable because Volkswagen provided the trip for its
own benefit and not to personally benefit Mr. Gotcher. Id at 123-24. The court also relied on the
fact that the benefit was business in nature-Mr. Gotcher's activities were oriented around business
matters, not pleasure. Id. at 122. The court also found it compelling that Mr. Gotcher did not have a
choice to go on the trip. Id. at 123.
One could argue that taxpayers engaged in personal-data barters hould not have income
under a Gotcher-like analysis. The providers of digital products do so to benefit themselves and not
their users. The most significant problem with applying Gotcher, however, is that the benefits that
individuals receive in personal-data barters are not like the highly controlled business trip that Mr.
Gotcher received. They are inherently personal and controlled by those individuals. See Abreu &
Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 311-12 (critiquing Gotcher as "not withstand[ing]
rigorous analysis" and thus providing more reasons why its analysis should not be extended to per-
sonal-data transactions). Facebook does not guide users through its social media site to show off its
capabilities. Consumers use that product at their leisure and as they wish to derive some personal
benefit. For these reasons, a Gotcher-like analysis should not result in the conclusion that personal-
data gains are not includable in a taxpayer's gross income even though that case did apply an extra-
statutory exclusion from gross income. See Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 123-24.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(4), (e)(1) (2012).
104. Id That Code provision is specifically directed at benefits provided to employees, but a
Treasury Regulation issued under that section extends the term "employee" to include all recipients
of such a benefit. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-l(b)(4) (as amended in 1993).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6 (as amended in 1992).
106. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6.
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room) or (2) in an effort to induce the creation of a new business rela-
tionship (as in the case of free samples at your local grocery store). Per-
sonal-data exchanges typically do not fall within either situation. The
benefit received by a data provider is the entirety of the compensation
that she receives for engaging in a business relationship with a data ag-
gregator-it is not received as incident to an existing commercial rela-
tionship. Additionally, the "free" digital products of the Internet are often
not provided to induce a future purchase of that very product.0 7 Face-
book does not give a free month of access to its social-media site in order
for it to sell a year's worth of access. It provides ongoing access as part
of a continuous data exchange.
We must also recognize that looking at each individual instance of a
personal-data barter fails to account for the aggregate value of the digital
products received by taxpayers over the course of a year. Treasury Regu-
lations explaining the de minimis rule give examples like "occasional
cocktail parties" or "coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks." 08 Digital prod-
ucts that are continuously available are different. First, they are not an
occasional splurge; they represent a significant aspect of the economy
and how we spend our free time. Again, economists have estimated that
the free services of the Internet create over $100 billion of consumer
surplus in the United States each year.1 09 The issue is not that personal-
data transactions have no or de minimis value; it is that the value is
spread among many micro-transactions.o That makes administering a
tax on those transactions very difficult, but it does not change the fact
that those transactions do generate value for data providers."
107. This is different for businesses that offer free applications as an incentive for users to
purchase in-app upgrades or improvements. That business model is labeled as the "freemium" mod-
el. See Vineet Kumar, Making "Freemium" Work, HARV. Bus. REv., May 2014, at 27-29,
https://hbr.org/2014/05/making-freemium-work (explaining the "freemium" business model). The
game "Clash of Clans" is an incredible example of this business model. The game can be download-
ed for free, but players can purchase in-game upgrades. That approach has been wildly successful as
the game generated $1.8 billion of revenue in 2014. Stuart Dredge, Clash of Clans Heads 2014's
Billion-Dollar Mobile Games - Open Thread, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014, 2:30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/09/clash-of-clans-billion-dollar-mobile-games.
How the Tax Code should apply to the provision and receipt of these freemium services is certainly
worth considering, but cannot be undertaken within the confines of this Article.
108. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6.
109. Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 3. Others have valued a single Gmail account at
over $3500 and have estimated that its value grows by over $1000 each year. Jay Garmon, What is
My Gmail Account Actually Worth?, BOSTINNO (July 25, 2012, 4:56 PM),
http://bostinno.streetwise.co/channels/what-is-my-gmail-account-actually-worth/. The valuation
method used was based upon the time that it would take for a person to recreate the data in one
account and uses U.S. Department of Labor statistics on the average annual salary in the United
States. Id. That method is obviously questionable because much of an e-mail account is data that is
of no value to a person. In that vein, it is worth noting that the company providing this estimate is in
the business of selling data-backup services. Nonetheless, the time that we spend using digital prod-
ucts does evidence how important and, hence, how valuable they are to us.
110. Thanks to Shu-Yi Oei for this observation.
111. There is, admittedly, some tension between this analysis and how de minimis fringe bene-
fits are often defined in practice. Continuously available coffee or tea in an office breakroom certain-
ly shares many of these same characteristics. They are provided in a number of micro transactions
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This issue is central to broader discussions regarding how technolo-
gy has changed the generation of income in the modem economy. Tech-
nology allows individuals to sell slivers of their time or their assets to
various parties rather than simply working for one employer or dedicat-
ing their assets solely to business use. They can drive for Uber at night or
on the weekends. They can use Airbnb to rent out their homes when they
are traveling. The result is that income is generated in smaller sums and
in greater numbers of transactions than when one has a single source of
compensation. The value of those transactions might be insignificant
alone, but meaningful in the aggregate. This does not mean, however,
that we exempt the income from each transaction as de minimis. Rather,
we tax their aggregate value.1 12
None of this analysis is meant to suggest that personal-data transac-
tions should be taxed like income from the sharing economy. Rather, the
point of discussing these issues is to recognize that we cannot simply
raise our hands in defeat as income generation becomes fragmented or
fails to be mediated by large players. We cannot allow technology to
erode our tax bases by default in this way. It is thus no answer to say that
we can do nothing because personal-data gains are de minimis. Those
gains still constitute income in the broadest sense, and we must consider
their impact on our tax system.
This point applies equally to the application of a more flexible con-
ception of income under the Code. The analysis provided to this point
has assumed that Code § 61 extends to all economic income, as suggest-
ed by the Glenshaw Glass formulation. Some argue, however, that
Code § 61 does not extend to all income despite the broad language used
by the Supreme Court in that case. Professors Alice Abreu and Richard
Greenstein, for example, have argued that the concept of "income" under
Code § 61 is more malleable and subject to societal influences.'14 They
point to the failure of the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) to tax the
receipt of child support payments, free samples, and record-breaking
home run balls as evidence that the definition of "income" is a standard
and their collective value might be quite high at the end of the year. Perhaps, then, personal-data
gains are not so different than existing de minimis fringe benefits. That observation is apt, but is not
necessarily problematic for the preceding analysis. First, scholars recognize that the concept of tax-
free fringe benefits has expanded in recent years and may need to be reconsidered. See Jay A. Soled
& Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the Taxation ofFringe Benefits, 91 WASH. L. REV. 761,
764-65 (2016) (discussing the expansion of employer-provided fringe benefits in recent years).
Second, personal-data gains are different from free cups of coffee for other reasons. Again, the
typical cup of coffee is provided incident to an existing commercial relationship, as noted above.
Further, tracking personal-data gains may be much more practicable than tracking how many cups of
tea an employee drinks. The very nature of the digital economy means that the required information
is being collected and stored in some fashion. But see infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the potential
challenges created by the ability of Internet users to hide their true identity).
112. This is achieved, practically, through the imposition of information-reporting mecha-
nisms. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 (2016).
113. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
114. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 339-48.
2016] 167
DENVER LAWREVIEW
that is much different than the broad rule suggested by Glenshaw
Glass."5 They conclude instead that noneconomic values impact the def-
inition of income."1 6 Under their theory, the IRS must consider equity,
efficiency, and administrability in determining what benefits constitute
income under the Code.117
One could easily conclude that the receipt of "free" digital products
in today's society does not generate income under this standard-based
conception. The theoretical income that results from accessing those
products would seem to be income that the federal government would
have difficulty taxing without creating a "firestorm of controversy" much
like the theoretical income realized when one catches a record-breaking
home run ball." 8 More specifically, we might reasonably conclude that
the benefits being received by individuals are not taxable transactions
given concerns of equity, efficiency, and administrability. Indeed, those
concerns are discussed below in this Article's analysis of why individu-
als' gains from personal-data transactions ultimately will not be subject
to tax.119 It may very well be, then, that personal-data gains will not be
included in taxpayers' gross incomes, even though they constitute in-
come in an economic sense. It is imperative to recognize, though, that
excluding them from income under that theory is excluding them due to
practical concessions and not because they are not accessions to wealth.
That is a critical distinction for purposes of this Article and will be dis-
cussed in much greater detail below.
In the end, personal-data transactions appear to plainly result in
economic income to individual taxpayers because the benefits received
by taxpayers in those transactions are accessions to wealth in a broad
sense. Those transactions would therefore be taxable if Code § 61 is as
broad as Glenshaw Glass suggests. 120 If, however, Code § 61 provides a
more flexible standard, it might be that those transactions would not re-
sult in income that is taxable, but they would generate income nonethe-
less.
115. Id at 298-99, 344.
116. Id at 346.
117. Id at 345; see also Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Virtual In-
come, 75 TENN. L. REV. 695, 736-41 (2008) (discussing the ability to pay as a pragmatic limitation
on the economic income that should be subject to federal income tax); Leandra Lederman, "Stranger
than Fiction": Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1620, 1658-70 (2007) (applying similar
considerations to the question of whether income from activities in "virtual worlds" like Second Life
should be taxable).
118. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 342.
119. See infra Section I.C. The lack of a fair market value, or the incredibly small value, for
the benefits received in personal-data barters might be enough for some to conclude that hey do not
result in gross income under the Code. See Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Tax-
ing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 25-28 (2007).
120. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955) (concluding that the
term "income" includes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion").
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b. Income Tax, Data Aggregators, and the Market-Exchange
Model
Just as the market-exchange model has tax consequences for indi-
vidual taxpayers, it has tax consequences for data aggregators as well. As
described above, application of that model suggests that data aggregators
should be viewed as engaging in taxable barter exchanges through which
they sell access to their digital products in exchange for consumer data.
Theoretically, they would report income on the sale of that access and
take a tax-cost basis in the data that they acquire.121 Those conclusions
follow naturally from established law and do not seem quite as troubling
as the conclusion that individual consumers hould be taxed on their per-
sonal-data gains. Data aggregators are, after all, engaged in intentional
commercial behavior.
The more difficult question that arises with respect to the data ag-
gregators' income is where it should be reported. Data aggregators will
most often operate in multiple jurisdictions, which means that they will
be subject to various rules dictating how to divide their income among
those jurisdictions.122 Those rules effectively apportion taxing power
based on how that income is characterized. For example, the Code pro-
vides that income derived from the performance of services is sourced to
the place where the services are performed, while the sourcing of income
121. A taxpayer's basis in an asset is generally his "cost" for that asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1012
(2012). When taxpayers obtain an asset in a taxable transaction, the taxpayers obtain a tax-cost basis
equal to the amount included in their income even though they do not necessarily pay a cash price
for that asset. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-2 (as amended in 2003) (providing that a taxpayer has a basis in
property acquired in exchange for the performance of services equal to the fair market value of the
property received); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-1(e) (as amended in 2003) (recognizing that taxpayers obtain
basis in an asset when they pay tax on the receipt of that asset); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-2(a) (as amended
in 2016).
122. The mechanics by which income is divided among jurisdictions go well beyond what is
needed in this Article, but some basic information will assist one who is new to international or
multistate taxation. To begin, the Tax Code generally taxes U.S. citizens and residents on their
worldwide income. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 61 (2012); see also JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ Bl.03 (25th ed. 2016). They are allowed foreign tax credits,
however, for foreign taxes that they pay on their foreign-source income. 26 U.S.C. § 904 (2012);
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra ¶ B4.01. The result of those rules is that the U.S. essentially cedes taxing
power over that income to the foreign jurisdiction. When the taxpayer is not a U.S. citizen or resi-
dent, the U.S. only taxes the taxpayer's U.S.-source income or income that is effectively connected
with a U.S. trade or business. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra ¶ C1.02[l]. These rules are often modified by
tax treaties that provide rules particular to residents of the contracting countries. Id. ¶ C4.01 [1].
Regardless, the function of the source rules is to effectively divide taxing power over a taxpayer's
income among the jurisdictions involved.
In contrast to this method of dividing taxing power at he national level, U.S. state corpo-
rate income taxes generally divide a taxpayer's income by the use of an apportionment method.
Under that system, income is not generally attributed to a particular jurisdiction and taxed by that
jurisdiction. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶¶ 8.01, 8.04. But see id. ¶ 8.04 (ex-
plaining that certain types of income are "allocated"). Rather, a business's income is apportioned
among the states by looking at the mix of a taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales around the coun-
try. Id. ¶¶ 8.05, 8.15. The precise weight given to each particular factor differs by state and can
sometimes be zero. The result is that 100% of a taxpayer's sales could be attributed to State A, but if
100% of its property and payroll are in State B, it could pay tax on only one-third of its income to
State A.
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from the sale of physical inventory depends on a number of factors, in-
cluding whether the inventory was created or acquired.12 3 U.S. states
apportion income according to different rules as well, and states' rules
are not consistent with one another. For example, different rules apply to
the apportionment of income from services,124 but states generally appor-
tion income from inventory sales to the state where the property is deliv-
ered.125
That issue is of critical importance to our understanding of the taxa-
tion of data aggregators' gains from personal-data transactions. A typical
personal-data transaction is one in which a consumer uses a cloud-based
website in exchange for personal data.1 26 The data aggregator in that situ-
ation should be viewed as selling access to its software for data. The re-
sulting income would therefore be taxed in accordance with where in-
come from the sale of that type of access is sourced. The problem, how-
ever, is that the proper tax classification of income from the sale of ac-
cess to cloud-computing services is unclear under international and state
tax laws. Scholars recognize that such income could be treated as being
derived from the sale of a service, a sale of a product, a lease, a license,
or some mixture thereof.12 7 That issue has not yet been resolved, so we
cannot be sure where a data aggregator would source its income from a
personal-data barter. Obviously, the resolution of that issue will impact
123. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(3), (a)(6), 862(a)(3), (a)(6), 863, 865 (2012); see also KUNTZ &
PERONI, supra note 122, ¶ A2.03 (discussing the sourcing rules that apply to different types of in-
come).
124. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 411-23.
125. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶12.02.
126. This is often labeled as a transaction involving "software as a service," or "SaaS." PETER
MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011),
http://nvipubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf
127. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 242-43, 300-02; OECD REPORT, supra note 66,
at 104-05; Walter Hellerstein & John Sedon, State Taxation of Cloud Computing, J. TAX'N, July
2012, at 27-31; David J. Shakow, The Taxation of Cloud Computing and Digital Content, 140 TAX
NOTES 333, 333-50 (2013). See generally Orly Mazur, Taxing the Cloud, 103 CALIF. L. REV. I
(2015). The question of how the tax rules should characterize and source income from the sale of
digital products is important, but beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth mentioning, however,
that income from personal-data transactions differs from the income from other sales of cloud com-
puting or software as a service transaction in many ways. For example, in the cash market, consum-
ers generally purchase access to a digital product for some set period of time, and the price is fixed
for that period. In a personal-data transaction, however, the transaction is ongoing, and the purchase
price rises with each use. Professor Mazur has recently reasoned that characterizing the sale of
access to online software as services income may be appropriate, in part, because of the retailer's
ongoing responsibility to maintain its software and its concomitant shouldering of the risk of soft-
ware failure. See Mazur, supra at 24-25. Part of the access fee thus looks like an upfront payment
for technical services to keep the website or software operations. That component is not generally a
part of the usual personal-data transaction, however, because users do not prepay for future use.
Individuals generally have no ongoing right of use, and they pay with new data each time they use a
digital product. This is important not because it suggests that personal-data transactions should not
result in services income to the data aggregator, but to highlight that the analysis of how to source
that income might be different when we discuss transactions involving data rather than cash. The
market transactions are not the same.
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how those barters are taxed, and that consequence should be kept in mind
as those analyses move forward.
2. Personal-Data Transactions and the State Sales Tax
Income taxes are obviously of great importance in the United States,
but sales taxes also play a critical role in most states' finances. It is thus
worth briefly considering whether personal-data transactions are theoret-
ically subject to those taxes. To start, state laws are generally drafted
broadly enough to apply to sales of taxable products for consideration of
any kind, so barter transactions are taxable if the items being swapped
are taxable.128 The question therefore becomes whether personal data or
digital products are taxable when sold. Those are more difficult ques-
tions. 129 Sales of data and digital products have historically not been in
the tax base because state sales taxes were adopted in the 1930sl30 and
thus applied primarily to the sale of tangible personal property and to
some services.131 Obviously, though, the rise of the Internet and digital
commerce have caused sales of digital products and services to displace
sales of tangible goods, and states have struggled with whether and how
to reform their taxes in response.132
To date, sales of data have escaped legislative attention, but many
states have now extended their consumption taxes to include digital ver-
sions of goods that would be taxable if sold in physical form.1 33 That has
generally included digital books, music, and video games.'34 Some apply
very technical rules to digital software transactions generally.'3  A few
states have more recently considered expanding those taxes to specifical-
ly cover cloud-computing transactions more broadly.136 In 2015, for ex-
128. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, T 19A.04[2][c]-[d].
129. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 411-21, 423 (broadly discussing the issues
involved when determining whether and where cloud computing services are subject to state sales
tax).
130. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, 1 12.02.
131. Id. T 12.04[l].
132. Id. ¶ 13.06[l]. See generally Martin Eisenstein & Michael Carey, Transaction Taxes on
Information Technologies: The Threat, 74 ST. TAX NOTES 689 (2014).
133. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(C)(iii)(a) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 139.200(1)(b) (West 2016); MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-26 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-
2701.16(9) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-3(a) (West 2014) (amended 2016); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-6-233(a) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 77.52(1)(d) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-15-103(a)(i)(P)
(2016); see also 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶¶ 13.06[1], 19A.04[2][c][vii]
(discussing the application of sales tax to digital products under states' laws and under the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement).
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(C)(iii); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.010(9),
139.200(l)(b) (West 2016); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 27-65-26(3)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2701.16(9);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:32B-2(zz), 54:32B-3(a) (West 2014) (amended 2016); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-6-233(a)-(b); WIS. STAT. § 77.51(la), (3p)-(3pc), (17x) (2016); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-15-
101(a)(xliii), 39-15-103(a)(i)(P) (2016).
135. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 134.
136. Arthur R. Rosen & Hayes R. Holdemess, Cloud Computing. An Update, 77 ST. TAX
NOTES 355 passim (2015); Mark Peters & Greg Bensinger, States Eye Taxes on Streaming Video




ample, the City of Chicago extended its personal property lease transac-
tion tax to certain cloud-based services through an administrative ruling
by the city's Department of Finance.1 37 It also extended its transaction
tax on "amusements" to digital services like Netflix.s38 Tennessee has
extended its sales-tax statutes to apply specifically to remotely accessed
software.13 9 The Washington Business & Occupations Tax-a gross re-
ceipts tax-applies similarly.140 Other states have acted to the contrary
and completely exempt cloud-based software from their sales taxes.14 1
The debates about whether and how to tax these transactions are
ongoing and multifaceted.142 We can be sure, however, that attention to
this issue will only grow as the economy shifts further into the cloud.
Once states do extend their sales taxes to those digital products, the ques-
tion will be whether and how to tax that access when it is provided in
exchange for data rather than for cash. Again, bartering for a taxable
good or service does not eliminate the state sales tax, so personal-data
transactions would be taxable unless some other statutory exclusion ap-
plied.143
1440095146; Jeff John Roberts, The Taxman Comes for Cloud Companies like Netflix, and Confu-
sion Reigns, FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/cloud-computing-
tax/. Most states' laws have not specifically addressed cloud computing, but some states do exclude
cloud-computing transactions from their tax base, whether by statute, regulation, or administrative
guidance. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, $ 13.06A[2] (comprehensively ana-
lyzing the application of state sales taxes to cloud-computing transactions).
137. CITY OF CHI., DEP'T OF FIN., PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASE TRANSACTION TAX RULING
No. 12 (2015),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/suppinfo/TaxRulingsandRegulations/Leas
eTaxRulingl2-06092015.pdf. The City has delayed implementation of that tax. See generally David
Sawyer, Chicago Delays Lease Tax Implementation for Cloud Computing, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 596
(2015).
138. CITY OF CHI., DEP'T OF FIN., AMUSEMENT TAX RULING No. 5 (2015),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/suppinfo/TaxRulingsandRegulations/Amu
sementTaxRuling5-06092015.pdf.
139. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-231(a) (2016).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.050(6)(c)(i) (2016); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-
15503(203)(a) (2016).
141. This has occurred through statute, regulation, or other administrative guidance. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-102(15)(c)(I)(C) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 63-3616(b) (2016); MO. CODE
REGS. ANN. tit. 12, § 10-109.050(3)(I) (2016); NEB. DEP'T OF REVENUE, NEBRASKA SALES AND
USE TAX GUIDE FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE 3 (2011), http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/info/6-
51 1.pdf; WYO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, COMPUTER SALES AND SERVICES (2014),
http://revenue.wyo.gov/ComputerSalesandServices.pdf
142. See generally Paul Jones, Online Services Tax Trend Raises Concerns, 77 ST. TAX NOTES
916 (2015).
143. Including personal-data barters in the tax base does not mean, of course, that taxing them
would be easy. Issues of valuation, identification, and enforcement would be prominent. See infra
Section II.C. Determining how states would tax multijurisdictional consumption of digital products
would similarly be an issue. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 298-99 (providing examples
that illustrate the difficulty of imposing a consumption tax on the cross-border consumption of
digital goods). Collecting the tax would also be significantly impacted by the constitutional limita-
tions imposed on state taxing power under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has
long held that states do not have the power to compel vendors to collect their sales taxes unless the
vendors have a physical presence within their boundaries. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309-19 (1992) (discussing the Court's nexus standard under the Dormant Commerce Clause).




The preceding analyses established that personal-data transactions
generate tax consequences for individual consumers and for data aggre-
gators, at least at a theoretical level. Whether they will generate actual
tax consequences depends on several other factors, and that issue is dis-
cussed further below. Notwithstanding that analysis, the theoretical ac-
count of personal-data taxation that has been presented herein is im-
portant for many reasons. First, as discussed above with respect to the
taxation of individual data providers, the structure of the data market
provides a nice glimpse into the broader pressures that the modem econ-
omy is placing on our traditional tax instruments. Just as the sharing
economy and the decentralization of income generation have placed
pressure on tax reporting, the ability of individuals to consume leisure
goods by selling slivers of their data or time puts structural pressure on
our income tax. As an offshoot of that idea, personal-data transactions
represent a further blurring of the line between business and personal
activities, which is a critical distinction in our current Tax Code.1" Final-
ly, personal-data transactions provide companies with an immense op-
portunity to shift their tax burdens among jurisdictions or to avoid tax all
together. To the extent that the sale of digital products is not taxed until
the acquired data are monetized, companies have a greater ability to de-
termine their own tax obligations by intentionally planning where and
how that monetization occurs. These consequences are explored more
fully in Part III.
C. Practical Impediments to Taxing Personal-Data Transfers
Notwithstanding the previous analysis, it is not particularly difficult
to appreciate that personal-data transactions are unlikely be taxed, at
net. See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 484-86 (2012); Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax
Compliance: The Use-Tax Experiment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1107, 1107-10, 1114 (2015). Congress
is currently evaluating legislation that would change that rule, but it continues to restrict state author-
ity and the outlook for Congressional intervention is bleak. A data aggregator that sold access to its
digital good in exchange for personal data might therefore be outside the reach of the state taxing
authority even if the transaction were included in the tax base.
It is also important to note that current rules in the U.S. might place a burden on individu-
al taxpayers to report and pay the tax of their own accord in this situation. Every state with a sales
tax has a compensating use tax, which applies when the purchaser does not remit the required
amount of tax to the vendor. Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 151-
60 (2015) (comprehensively discussing the state use tax). That can occur when a purchase was
originally tax exempt, when the vendor fails to collect the tax as legally required, or when the Con-
stitution protects the vendor from the state's authority to require the collection of that tax as dis-
cussed above. Id. at 155-57 (discussing the various situations in which use taxes apply). Individual
consumers would thus have an obligation to pay use tax on the access of digital goods in exchange
for their personal data if their state's laws were drafted broadly enough. Of course, few individuals
know of or pay the use tax. Id. at 153-54 (discussing current data on use-tax compliance). Thus, it is
fair to expect that virtually no one would pay a use tax on their personal-data transactions if those
transactions were, indeed, subject to tax.
144. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) (providing a deduction for business expenses), with 26
U.S.C. § 262 (2012) (denying deductions for personal expenses).
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least in their current form, in the United States. There are a host of prac-
tical impediments to taxing those transactions under the theoretical con-
struct outlined above. Many of those impediments mirror the factors that
make taxing the digital economy difficult more generally (e.g., sourcing,
jurisdiction, administration, etc.). This Section, however, focuses on
some of the major obstacles and policy considerations that apply specifi-
cally to implementing a tax on data transactions. Some of those apply
equally to the imposition of tax on data aggregators and on data provid-
ers, while others apply more clearly only to the latter. In total, these in-
clude (1) seemingly insurmountable valuation problems; (2) the difficul-
ties of line drawing; (3) the distribution of the resulting tax burden; (4)
the anonymous Internet; and (5) the lack of political will. These factors
collectively undermine the ability of a tax on personal-data transactions
to meet the equity, efficiency, and administrability goals that are the
hallmarks of tax-policy analyses.14 5
1. The Uncertain Value of Personal Data nd the Digital Products
That They Buy
Perhaps the biggest barrier to applying our existing tax instruments
to personal-data transactions is the problem of how to value the personal
data and the digital products being traded. One obvious requirement for
the reporting of income is that the amount of income be determinable.146
Reporting income based upon an objective "fair market value" is well
engrained in our tax system.147 That can be difficult in the barter context,
however, because no cash is used.148 The tax law generally resolves that
problem by having taxpayers reference market transactions in the same
goods or services. Thus, if a lawyer generally charges $250 an hour, a
barter including an hour of her services would generate $250 of in-
come.149 This approach does not apply cleanly to personal-data barters,
however, because there has often never been a cash market for the bene-
fits traded on either side. There have never been real cash markets for
personal data and no one has ever paid to Google something or to use
Facebook or Instagram.50
145. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 497-98
(2009) (labeling these three factors as "the traditional tax policy goals"); Lederman, supra note 117,
at 1658 (noting that these three factors are "[tihe tax policy concerns usually considered in evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of a tax or provision"); Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less. Justifying
and Reforming Tax Law's Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1082 (2012)
(identifying these factors as the "three traditional criteria of tax policy analysis").
146. See Camp, supra note 119, at 25 ("Taxpayers cannot report as 'gross income' an econom-
ic abstraction.").
147. Id.
148. See Keller, supra note 94, at 448-51, 454-55, 457 (discussing a variety of valuation
theories in the barter context).
149. Id at 443-44.
150. The lack of a cash price for such products has resulted in some confusion regarding the
nature of the economic exchange outside of the tax area as well. For example, at least one court has
determined that state consumer-protection laws do not apply to individuals engaged in personal-data
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Valuing those products is also difficult because personal-data trans-
actions are generally ongoing rather than static. Even though a consumer
might get a similar benefit from Microsoft Word as she does from
Google Docs, she purchases those products in very different types of
transactions. A purchase of Microsoft Word involves an initial cash out-
lay that entitles her to access the software for some set period of time.151
Google Docs, in contrast, is purchased on a pay-as-you-go basis. A user
creates an account with an initial outlay of data, but need pay nothing
more if she does not use the product. Each time she does use the product,
though, she receives a greater benefit and compensates Google with
more data. That dynamic makes it difficult for us to make direct compar-
isons between the value of old economy goods and their digital, bartered-
for-data counterparts. The products may be similar, but the commercial
transactions underlying their sale are not. It is thus difficult to take valua-
tion guidance from transactions in the old economy.
One method that economists have used to value the "free" digital
products of the Internet is to value consumers' access to those products
by valuing the time that they spend using them.152 That approach works
well in getting a rough idea of the value that individuals place on those
online products. It does not tell us, however, what Google or Facebook
could charge in a cash market. Under the economists' approach, we view
consumers as paying differential amounts based on the value of their
time, 153 but cash markets do not operate in that way. Generally, a seller
demands a fixed price, and people who demand the good at or above that
price buy. The method used by economists measures the consumer sur-
plus, not the market price.154 The method also fails to recognize the dif-
ferent values that individuals might place on their time in different con-
texts. A person who makes $20 an hour at her job might use Facebook
transactions because they did not pay for the resulting service. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra
note 4, at 658. This has led some to argue that companies like Facebook should have to declare a
price for its product. Id. at 661-62. The zero-price construct also creates confusion for antitrust
analyses. See generally Newman, Zero-Price, supra note 7, at 198-206.
151. Historically, that period of use would be perpetuity, but Microsoft now markets cloud-
based access through which a consumer purchases the right to access the product for a more limited
duration. For example, one can purchase a year's worth of access to Microsoft's Office 365 for
seventy dollars a year. Buy Office, MICROSOFT.COM, https://products.office.com/en-us/buy/office
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
152. E.g., Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 2-6; Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow,
Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent Using Them, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 108, 108 (2006);
Jacques Bughin, The Web's 6100 Billion Surplus, MCKINSEY Q. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mediaentertainment/the w bs _and 8364100 billion surplus.
153. Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 5 (stating that their model assumes "that the oppor-
tunity cost of leisure is higher for high income people").
154. Consumer surplus is the aggregate value of the difference between what consumers are
willing to pay for a product and the amount that the market demands. N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 135-41 (6th ed. 2012). The market price, in contrast, is based on
the aggregate supply and demand curves in the relevant market. Id at 77-78. A consumer might
therefore value an item at $20, but the market overall might demand a price of only $15. In that
situation, we would say that the product has a market value of $15, a subjective value of $20, and
that a purchase of the product results in a consumer surplus of $5 for our one consumer.
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for half of an hour to get a reprieve from work, but it is unlikely that she
would pay $10 for that pleasure. She just needs a break. It is a matter of
biology, not market preference. Determining a value under this method
therefore might be informative of the massive importance of the digital
products that are provided in today's economy, but it does not help estab-
lish market values for those products for tax purposes. Placing a market
value on the "free" digital products of the Internet is thus very difficult.
It is equally difficult to value the personal-data involved in those
exchanges. To start, each individual datum is largely worthless to an
aggregator. It is the network effects that result in significant gains to the
aggregator when enough data are collected.'5 5 Further complicating mat-
ters is the fact that the ultimate value of personal data to an aggregator
includes the value generated by that aggregator through the use of its
algorithms or other data-management tools.156 The monetized value of
those data is not the value of the raw data, and isolating the value of the
raw data may be impossible. Indeed, none of the economists interviewed
in connection with the French Report were able to provide a method for
determining that value. 57 An OECD report issued in 2013 explored the
variety of available methods for valuing personal data but noted signifi-
cant differences and potential difficulties with each.58 Ultimately, the
report looked to new developments that would create market-based esti-
mates of data's value.'59 Amusingly, the report noted that "[b]etter data is
needed to understand the economic value of personal data."'60
Valuing data barters is also difficult because of the non-rivalrous
nature of the data involved.'6 ' Data can be replicated infinitely without
any loss to the original source. That factor makes it impossible to apply
our traditional valuation metrics. Again, to value barter exchanges, we
generally look at the price at which the bartered goods or services are
traded in the cash market. An asset that sells for $50 is bartered for $50
worth of goods or services. A person would not barter that asset for $15
worth of services and deprive herself of the other $35 of value. With
personal data, however, she may have no qualms providing her $50 of
data for a benefit worth $35. She can simultaneously sell her data to an-
other buyer to generate more benefit. This makes it impossible to deter-
155. See OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 101 (discussing the importance of network effects
in the digital economy).
156. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1113.
157. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 117.
158. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL
DATA: A SURVEY OF METHODOLOGIES FOR MEASURING MONETARY VALUE 4 (2013) [hereinafter
OECD 2013 REPORT], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/exploring-the-
economics-of-personal-data_5k486qtxldmq-en; see also Jeff Lawton, Can You Quantify the Value of
Your Data?, COST MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2015, 2015 WL 3456813.
159. OECD 2013 REPORT, supra note 158, at 33.
160. Id. at 5.




mine the value for personal data, and to apply the traditional approach to
valuing barter exchanges. Data do not have a singular value.
Overall, the valuation issues with respect to personal-data transac-
tions seem to effectively preclude their taxation, at least on an individual-
transaction basis. Unless and until a market price develops for personal
data or for the digital products that are the tools of data collection, it may
be impossible to set their value. That means that we will likely be unable
to apply our traditional tax instruments directly to those exchanges de-
spite their theoretical inclusion in the tax base.162
2. The Expansive Scope of Data Transactions
Taxing personal-data transactions would also be difficult due to the
challenges of defining the transactions to which such a tax applied. The
mind can run wild once one starts thinking about taxing data transactions
and in-kind benefits. Two academics discussing their papers at a confer-
ence are engaged in a data barter. So are two parents exchanging ideas
about which children's shoes are the most durable. Are those taxable
exchanges of data? What about a person who watches television? Does
he have a taxable accession to wealth? 63
This is clearly a problem if one seeks absolute academic tidiness.
As a practical matter, we will never tax two individuals who share tips on
how to best mow their lawns or how to cook a favorite dish, so how can
we ever tax an individual who shares that same information in exchange
for access to a web forum? Realistically, however, we draw lines all of
the time in tax law.M An underinclusive rule is better than a woefully
underinclusive rule or no rule at all. We might thus say that sharing ideas
at a conference is as much of a taxable transaction, theoretically, as using
Google Docs, but we might feel that it is okay to tax the latter and not the
former.
As a concept, then, drawing lines is fine. The difficulty is drawing
lines that actually capture the transactions that we want to tax (presuma-
162. It is worth recognizing that existing law already accounts for situations where directly
valuing the barter exchange is impossible. Keller, supra note 94, at 495 (discussing the application
of the open-transaction doctrine to this situation). In that situation, the taxation is delayed until a
barter participant monetizes the asset that was obtained. Id. Our current tax rules applicable to data
aggregators effectively provide this result. They are taxed when they monetize the data by selling
more products, selling advertising, or by generating gain in some other way. The open-transaction
doctrine does not apply so well to data providers, however, because they do not monetize the digital
products that they receive in the barter exchange. They consume them.
163. Many jurisdictions across the globe do impose taxes based on the receipt of public televi-
sion. Kimberly Massey, License Fee, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 1358-59 (Horace Newcomb
ed., 2d ed. 2004); Tim Masters, How is TV Funded Around the World?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-26546570. Those taxes are nominally a payment in
exchange for the television programming, but they function the same as a tax on the benefit that the
television provides.
164. See generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999).
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bly transactions with large data aggregators) while leaving the others
untouched (perhaps personal exchanges of information). For example,
we could limit a personal-data tax to transactions (1) that involve digital
transfers of data and (2) that are commercial in nature. Under that type of
standard, a transfer of data for access to Facebook would be taxable
whereas the transfer of knowledge by two doctors having lunch would
not be taxable. What if, however, the doctors e-mailed to share infor-
mation about their recent results with a particular treatment method?
That would suddenly be taxable as an electronic transfer of information
in exchange for a commercial benefit. Limiting our view to digital trans-
fers of business information may therefore not be limited enough.
A more restrained approach might be to exclude data-for-data trans-
fers and only capture transfers of data for other benefits, like access to
digital products. The Code already defers the recognition of gain on cer-
tain transfers of "like kind" assets.'65 We could extend that statutory ex-
clusion to include all personal-data exchanges that involve data on both
sides. That would work to exclude our doctors from taxation, but again
the devil is in the details. Could Facebook argue that it is merely provid-
ing data to its users? What about CNN.com? A data-for-data exemption
might exempt too much.
None of this analysis is intended to indicate that lines could not be
drawn. However, the task would be difficult and the "safest" lines to
draw would be the most tightly drawn and thus potentially underinclu-
sive. If we were to travel down this road, significant work would need to
be done to properly determine the personal-data transactions that were
subject to tax and how to define them. That task could prove immensely
difficult in practice.
3. The Impact of a Tax on Data Providers
The valuation and line-drawing issues discussed above will likely
prevent the direct taxation of either side involved in the personal-data
barter. It is worth recognizing, however, that the imposition of tax on
individuals' personal-data gains would be particularly problematic be-
cause such a tax would likely be (1) one that disproportionately impacts
lower-income taxpayers and (2) inefficient from an economic perspec-
tive.
To start, a tax on individuals' personal-data gains would likely im-
pact lower-income taxpayers to a greater degree than higher-income tax-
165. 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2012). That section applies to particular assets and they must be
held for investment of business purposes. Id. Section 1031 would therefore not apply on its terms to
the personal-data barters discussed in this Article. It is the concept, however, that could be extended
to those transactions.
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payers because, as adjusted for access,66 they use the Internet more for
leisure purposes. 67 To the extent that their leisure time is spent using the
"free" digital products received in personal-data barters, a personal-data
tax would thus likely impact them to a greater degree.16 8 Their leisure
time would be taxable whereas the leisure time of wealthier individuals
would not be taxed.169 The result is a tax that would be regressive, at
least among taxpayers with access to the Internet.170
It seems fair to expect that the use of digital products would decline
dramatically in the face of such a tax. The appeal of wishing a friend
"Happy Birthday" on Facebook would be significantly reduced if it were
accompanied with a tax bill. This would be especially true for users who
have little disposable income. The result would be that higher-income
individuals would continue to enjoy those products at a greater clip than
our lower-income individuals.171
This impact might suggest that a tax on personal data would be
largely inefficient as a reverse Ramsey tax. 172 The demand for the "free"
digital products of the Internet is likely incredibly elastic, especially
166. Our very lowest-income citizens may not have any access to Internet beyond that provid-
ed at public libraries. Usage among that population would naturally be low, but any existing usage
would likely be directed primarily to free digital products.
167. Scott Wallsten, What Are We Not Doing When We're Online?, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 68-70 (Avi Goldfarb et al. eds., 2015); Avi Goldfarb & Jeff Prince,
Internet Adoption and Usage Patterns Are Different: Implications for the Digital Divide, INFO.
ECON. & POL'Y, Mar. 2008, at 2, 14; Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow, supra note 152, at 110-
11.
168. Of course, the actual impact of a tax on data barters would likely be nonexistent for tax-
payers with very low income levels due to the presence of the standard deduction and personal
exemptions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 63(b), 151(a)-(c) (2012).
169. In this way, a tax on data would be a close approximation to taxing the imputed leisure
income of low-income taxpayers, but leave high-income taxpayers without a tax on the imputed
value of their leisure time. See SIMONS, supra note 98, at 52-53 (discussing the imputation of in-
come from individuals' leisure time). The vertical inequity of that result is clear.
170. The actual regressivity of a personal-data tax would depend on the current levels of Inter-
net access among income groups, the use of the "free" digital goods that would generate that tax, and
how many of the impacted individuals were subject to the tax. An empirical assessment of those
factors is well beyond the conceptual goals of this Article.
171. This impact actually highlights one benefit of the current personal-data market-it is
largely egalitarian. Individuals of every income level generally have the same purchasing power in
that market. A high-income individual obtains the same access to Google as a low-income individu-
al. They similarly obtain the same access to Facebook and to Instagram. If we taxed those benefits,
however, they might be taken out of the reach of low-income individuals. The tax cost of those
products would likely have a disproportionate impact on our poorest citizens.
172. A Ramsey tax is a tax directed at goods or services that have the lowest elasticities of
demand. The goal of such a tax is to reduce the distortions that taxes create in the market. See Joseph
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income
Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413, 1420 n.10 (2006) ("Under Ramsey taxation, we should levy a tax on
goods with low elasticity of demand because the quantities consumed are likely to change less when
subject to taxation as compared to goods with high elasticities . . . ."); Terrance O'Reilly, Principles
of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583, 593-94 (2008) (discussing the inverse
elasticity rule); see also F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcON. J. 47, 47
(1927) (analyzing how to design taxes so as to minimize utility losses). A reverse Ramsey tax would
thus be a tax on items with very high elasticities of demand and would maximize market distortions.
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among less-affluent citizens. We can thus fairly question whether such a
tax would serve any role at all.73
4. The Anonymous Internet
Another practical impediment to taxing individuals on their person-
al-data gains is the fact that the Internet operates largely anonymously.174
Some websites do require individuals to provide their identity in ex-
change for services, and users can intentionally give up their anonymity
to access those sites. Users can falsify that information, though, so we
may not be certain that their identities are truly known. Further, it seems
that it is more often the case that individuals can access digital products
without disclosing their identities at all. Many websites do not require a
customer account, and those that do often allow the use of pseudonyms.
Of course, one basic principal underlying this Article is that data
aggregators are able to identify individuals and obtain highly detailed
information based only on their online activities even without the users'
knowledge or consent.175 Websites can track users through their IP ad-
dresses, for example, and combine that information with other known
information to identify the particular user.176 For the majority of users,
then, there may be no true anonymity in a general sense. Knowing an
individual user's identity for marketing purposes, though, is not the same
as knowing that identity for tax purposes. Google might know that your
IP address is being used to conduct a web search, but it does not neces-
173. The efficiency analysis in this paragraph does not even touch on the incredibly high
administrative costs that would be involved with a tax on personal-data gains. Taxpayer compliance
with such a tax would hinge on the existence of a third-party reporting structure for those transac-
tions. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Infor-
mation Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1737-41 (2010) (discussing the im-
portance of third-party information reporting for tax compliance and when its costs are warranted);
see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compli-
ance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697-98 (2007). See generally Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and
Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REv. 675, 679 (2012). The compliance
rate for income that is not subject to third-party withholding or information reporting is estimated to
be less than fifty percent. Theodore Black et al., Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Year 2006
Tax Gap Estimation 1, 3 (Mar. 2012) (Internal Revenue Serv., Research, Analysis, and Statistics
Working Paper), http://www.irs.gov/publirs-soi/06rastgl2workppr.pdf (reporting an estimated
voluntary compliance rate of forty-four percent for income that is not subject to information report-
ing or withholding). That would likely involve either the data ggregator or potentially the data
provider's Internet Service Provider. Either would have difficulty both valuing the personal-data
transactions and identifying the person to whom the information report should be directed. See supra
Section II.C.1 (discussing the valuation difficulties with taxing personal-data transactions); see also
infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the difficulties of the anonymous internet). The sheer volume of the
personal-data transactions that occurs would also create extreme administrative difficulties. In the
end, then, the administrative costs of imposing a tax directly on personal-data transactions would
counsel against the adoption of such a tax unless technological advances significantly reduced these
concerns.
174. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 31-32 (discussing the challenges that online
anonymity presents for tax compliance in the digital economy).
175. See supra Section I.A (discussing observed and inferred data).
176. As noted above, Google touts its ability to identify individual users without having to ask
for identifying information. See McDONALD, MOHEBBI & SLATKIN, supra note 22, at 3.
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sarily know that it was a visitor in your home who entered the inquiry.
Users can also make their IP addresses virtually meaningless for identifi-
cation purposes through t e use of technological tools like proxy servers
or by using services like Tor.177 Data aggregators (assisted by govern-
ment) could perhaps get through those tools of obfuscation in many cas-
es,178 but the process would likely be too costly to be reasonably practi-
cable as a requirement of tax administration.179
It can be debated whether the anonymous Internet is a net benefit or
detriment. What cannot be debated, however, is that the anonymous In-
ternet precludes the comprehensive taxation of individuals' personal-data
gains. We may be able to capture some of them, and maybe the most
valuable among them, but we cannot capture them all. It is simply im-
practical to assume that we can reasonably require digital-service provid-
ers to accurately identify all of their users and those users' access to their
digital products.
5. Political Will
One final impediment to the extension of our current tax instru-
ments to personal-data transactions is the American public's lack of ap-
petite for new taxes, especially those on Internet-based activities. The
public seems to abhor the expansion of the tax base to incorporate digital
forms of "old economy" transactions. We see this in the form of the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act, which prevents the imposition of tax on Internet
access.18 0 We see this in opposition to the collection of sales tax on Inter-
net purchases.'8' We have more recently seen this in the disapproval of
177. Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 15 (2011) (discussing the use
of anonymizing technologies to assist individuals in speaking out against repressive governments);
Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerg-
ing Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 261, 274-78 (2008) (discussing
available anonymizing technologies); About Tor, TORPROJECT.ORG,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (providing infor-
mation about the Tor network).
178. The term "obfuscation" is not used pejoratively in this context. The ability to hide one's
IP address can have significant benefits, whether one is reporting or accessing the Internet from
within a repressive regime or whether one wants to retain their privacy in an overly intrusive Internet
culture. See generally Chander, supra note 177, at 15; Jason Koebler, Public Libraries Will Operate
Tor Exit Nodes to Make the Service More Secure, MOTHERBOARD (July 30, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/public-libraries-will-operate-tor-exit-nodes-to-make-the-service-
more-secure (discussing the debates surrounding, and the benefits of, Tor).
179. Of course, individuals could be taxed on these transactions indirectly through a tax on the
data aggregators. That approach would not require individual users to be personally identified. This
type of indirect-taxation approach is more fully discussed below. This Section, however, is focused
specifically on the difficulties that would be encountered if one desired to directly tax individuals on
their personal-data gains.
180. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681, 719 (1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
181. See Conservatives Oppose So-Called Marketplace Fairness Act, HEARTLAND INST.,
https://www.heartland.org/no-net-tax [https://perma.cc/P2PY-W3NB] (last updated Sept. 18, 2015,
2:43 PM) (listing a wide range of individuals and groups opposed to a federal bill that would allow
states greater authority to require online retailers to collect their taxes); see also DON'T TAX THE
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the expansion of the state sales taxes to streaming services like Netflix or
Spotify.182 The American public cares little for the theoretical complete-
ness of the tax system and seems to care deeply that the Internet be a tax-
free zone. Promoting a tax on Facebook access might just get one black-
balled from the political class. The politics in this area will thus likely
prevent any tax on individuals' or aggregators' personal-data g ins.18 3
III. TAX, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW ECONOMY
The preceding Sections establish that personal-data transactions are
technically taxable transactions, but that practical and political issues will
prevent them being taxed directly.184 That means that our tax system cur-
rently provides, and will continue to provide, an implicit tax preference
for those transactions. Transactions that would be taxable if engaged in
for cash consideration are nontaxable because they are done as digital
barters. That implicit tax exemption has implications both within and
without the field of taxation, and appreciating its existence is thus criti-
cally important for tax and non-tax scholars alike.
Within the tax field, the first takeaway from this conclusion is that
the digital economy has created a new way of generating income that
cannot be effectively taxed, and we must be cognizant of this fact as the
personal-data market continues to evolve. We have already seen signifi-
cant attention paid to the so-called sharing economy and the challenges
that it presents for our current tax instruments.18' Technology will un-
doubtedly continue to create further opportunities for tax-base erosion
INTERNET, https://donttaxtheinter.net/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2016) (compiling news stories and articles
opposing efforts to grant states greater authority to require online retailers to collect their taxes).
182. Kacey Drescher, State Dept. of Revenue to Tax Online Streaming Services, WFSA 12
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.wsfa.com/story/29467470/state-dept-of-revenue-to-tax-
online-streaming-services#.VZfRI9QBBLI; John Pletz, Chicago Tax on Streaming, Cloud Services
Raises Tech Entrepreneurs' Ire, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus. (July 7, 2015),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150707/BLOGS] l/150709902/fear-and-loathing-over-
chicagos-new-cloud-tax.
183. Political pressure might also come as a result of the economic consequences of a unilateral
tax on personal-data transactions by the U.S. government. A tax on data aggregators, specifically,
might be viewed as just one more tax measure undermining the competitiveness of the United States
in the global economy. A market-based tax might eliminate those concerns to some extent, given the
importance of the U.S. populace to the data aggregation economy, but these considerations should be
taken into account. Thanks to Matt Schaefer for raising this point.
184. It is worth repeating that the analysis provided above has focused solely on personal-data
transactions that occur as a part of the multi-sided platform business model of companies like Face-
book and Google. As noted above, there are many personal-data transactions that occur o tside of
that business model, and the taxation of those types of data transactions might not present the same
conceptual difficulties. One prominent example is where cash discounts are given in exchange for
data, like in the context of customer-loyalty programs. Those discounts could easily be tracked and
subjected to information reporting for income-tax purposes. They might also be taken into account
for purposes of state sales taxes. See Gregg D. Barton & Andrea Templeton, The Price of Customer
Loyalty: Rewards Programs and Sales and Use Tax Issues, JDSuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (Sept. 23,
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-price-of-customer-loyalty-rewards-46017/ (introduc-
ing the sales-and-use-tax issues presented by customer-loyalty programs).
185. See generally Oei & Ring, supra note 112, at 1027-30 (analyzing the tax consequences of
the sharing economy).
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within the context of the personal-data economy-and more broadly.
Recognizing the personal-data exemption is thus an important part of
taking stock of the tax base in the new economy.186
The current tax preference for the use of data as a currency also has
implications beyond the erosion of the tax base. Research suggests hat
the market for data suffers from significant inefficiencies and creates
legal issues in the privacy, consumer protection, and antitrust contexts.'87
Some scholars have even shown that large-scale data aggregation and
behavioral psychology could be combined to influence elections global-
ly.' 88 The U.S. government also frequently requests that companies pro-
vide them with information that they have gathered from users of their
applications. 189
The ramifications of personal-data transactions are thus widespread,
and the tax exemption for data has equally broad implications. To the
extent that the tax system aids in the lack of consumer salience of the
commercial exchange, implicitly promotes the use of personal data, or
effectively prevents the development of consumer-favorable data prac-
tices, we must evaluate whether and how to account for those impacts.
The following Sections address those issues. We may not be able to di-
rectly tax personal-data transactions, but that does not mean that we can
do nothing or that we can ignore the impact of our tax system on the
market for personal data. The two are intertwined. Section A provides
insight into how our tax system could best account for the current per-
sonal-data economy. That includes a discussion of (1) how to reform our
current tax instruments to at least indirectly account for the value created
by personal-data transactions and (2) the merit of creating new tax in-
struments that might supplement our current taxes and help to promote
beneficial data practices.
Section B changes the focus. Instead of looking at how the current
personal-data economy should drive changes to our tax system, it looks
at how the current tax system will impact the evolution of the personal-
186. See id. at 1027-29; Soled & Thomas, supra note 111, at 786-90 (analyzing how the
taxation of fringe benefits should be reformed for the modem economy).
187. See generally Calo, supra note 29, at 1003-04 (discussing the potential for market manip-
ulation); Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 608-09 (discussing the impacts of zero-price
market on consumers); Newman, Zero-Price, supra note 7, at 169-70 (discussing the role of anti-
trust law in zero-price markets). See also sources cited supra note 43 (listing a number of articles
that discuss the legal implications of the personal-data market).
1 88. See Robert Epstein & Ronald E. Robertson, The Search Engine Manipulation Effect
(SEME) and Its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections, 2015 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S.
E4512, E4512, http://www.pnas.org/content/1I 2/33/E4512.full.pdf.
189. GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2016); Nick
Bilton, Tech Companies Offer Update on Government Data Requests, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Feb. 3,
2014, 4:29 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/tech-companies-release-government-data-
requests/; Kia Kokalitcheva, Twitter Sees 52% Spike in Government and Copyright Info Requests,
FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/I /twitter-transparency-report/.
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data economy. The current tax preference for the use of personal data is
equally a tax penalty on other types of market exchanges.90 More specif-
ically, it is a tax penalty on a transfer of data for cash. As a result, even if
we would favor the latter for privacy or other reasons, our current tax
system will discourage it. That impact has thus far gone unrecognized in
the current debates regarding the personal-data economy. Section B rem-
edies the resulting void by looking at some predominant visions for the
future of the personal-data market and by analyzing how the tax system
will impact those visions. Section C concludes by calling for the recogni-
tion of the personal-data tax exemption in the broader U.S. regulatory
approach to personal data.
A. Tax and the Current Personal-Data Economy
1. The Role of Existing Tax Instruments
One way to respond to our inability to directly tax personal-data
transactions is to tax them indirectly. The way to do that in the context of
our existing tax instruments is through a tax on the monetization of per-
sonal data by the data aggregators or by their shareholders. Those mone-
tization events would generally include (1) an aggregator's sale of addi-
tional products or advertising based upon those data and (2) the sale of
stock by a shareholder of an aggregator.191 Notwithstanding the ease of
taxing those monetization events, however, it is not a perfect substitute
for taxing the initial personal-data barter.
Deferring the taxation of personal-data gains until a monetization
event could distort the taxes that are paid in several ways, including (1) if
the jurisdiction that would tax the personal-data transaction does not
have jurisdiction to tax the monetization event; (2) if the income from the
monetization event is not sourced to the same jurisdiction as would in-
come from the personal-data barter; and (3) if the monetization event is
subject to a different tax rate than the rate at which the personal-data
gains would be taxed.
To illustrate, assume that a data aggregator makes a taxable sale of a
digital product in the United States in a personal-data barter. Assume
further that the United States would tax the aggregator's income from
that sale if it could conceivably do so. Instead, however, the aggregator is
able to collect the personal data on a tax-free basis-given the limitations
190. Tax scholarship generally recognizes that the difference between a penalty for engaging in
an activity and a bonus for not engaging in that activity is one of framing. Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106, 115 (2006).
191. The receipt of a dividend from an aggregator would also be a monetization event, but one
that seems less likely than the others. See FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 2 (noting the pressure
against issuing dividends in the digital economy). Recall also that the OECD Report minimized the
concerns related to the proper characterization of the personal-data transaction because taxing juris-
dictions' taxation of data aggregators' advertising revenue would match their taxation of the barter
transactions. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 104.
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discussed above-and its shareholders experience a concomitant increase
in the value of their stock. One of its foreign shareholders then sells her
shares and monetizes a portion of the value created by the personal-data
barter. In that situation, taxing that shareholder's monetization event will
indirectly tax the personal-data barter, but in a distorted way. Instead of
the United States taxing the aggregator's gains, the foreign country will
tax its residents' gains.192 That country might also have a preferential rate
for those gains, so even the amount of tax would be lower.193 Taxing the
monetization event as a proxy for taxing the personal-data barter would
thus result in the tax revenue being shifted among jurisdictions and po-
tentially being reduced in amount.194
We could further illustrate these issues by assuming that he data
aggregator used a foreign entity to collect the data and to monetize the
value of those collected data by selling advertising. Under current United
States tax treaties, the U.S. might not have jurisdiction to tax the adver-
tising income of the foreign entity because the firm does not have a
"permanent establishment" within the U.S.'9 5 Further, even if the compa-
ny did have a permanent establishment in the country, our tax rules
might not treat that particular income as subject to U.S. tax. That income
could be classified as foreign-source income under the rules applicable to
services income.196 Due to these rules, taxing the monetization event
would not be a proxy for taxing the personal-data barter. The value cre-
ated by that barter would escape U.S. taxation completely.
192. KUNTz & PERONI, supra note 122, ¶ C3.09. A foreign shareholder is generally protected
from U.S. taxation of its gains on the sale of stock in a U.S. company. Id. Under certain conditions,
however, that gain may be subject to U.S. tax. Id.
193. See ROBERT CARROLL & GERALD PRANTE, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CORPORATE
DIVIDEND AND CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER
DEVELOPED NATIONS 12 (2012),
http://www.theasi.org/assets/EYASI DividendandCapital Gains InternationalComparison Re
port 2012-02-03.pdf (reporting that "[a]bout four-fifths of the OECD and BRIC countries tax capital
gains at rates below the rates applied to ordinary income").
194. This might be true even if the shareholder is a U.S. shareholder. A U.S. individual's gain
on the sale of an aggregator's stock might well qualify as long-term capital gain, which is subject to
a preferential rate of taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(1) (2012). A shareholder could also be tax exempt of
course.
195. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 122, TT Al.04. Countries' tax jurisdiction is often deter-
mined by reference to bi-lateral tax treaties, which typically limit a country's taxing power to firms
that have established a "permanent establishment" within it. Id. TT A 1.04, C4.05. Historically, estab-
lishing a permanent establishment has required certain types of physical presence within a taxing
jurisdiction. Id. ¶ C4.05[2].
196. The Code does not provide a sourcing rule that specifically addresses advertising income.
In the context of "old economy" advertising, advertising revenue has been sourced according to the
U.S. tax rules applicable to services income. See Peidras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A.
297, 312 (1941), nonacq., 1941-1 C.B. 18, aff'd, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942); see also Gary D.
Sprague et al., Federal Taxation of Software and E-Commerce, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) [U.S.
Income Portfolios Library] No. 555, pt. II, § B.3. Under that rule, advertising income is sourced to
the location where the services are performed. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3) (2012). That rule,
of course, may not be appropriate in the digital economy if we desire to shift to a more complete
market-based sourcing regime. See Assaf Y. Prussak, The Income of the Twenty-First Century:
Online Advertising as a Case Study for the Implications of Technology for Source-Based Taxation,
16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 39, 62-70 (2013).
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These illustrations are not meant to suggest that giving attention to
indirectly taxing personal-data barters would be pointless. To the contra-
ry, the issues regarding taxing jurisdiction and the proper sourcing of
income from digital transactions are at the core of the discussions cur-
rently being undertaken with respect to how to tax digital transactions
more generally. Recognizing the role of personal-data transactions in that
economy, however, both adds to the importance of those discussions and
colors how we view those issues. The personal-data barter particularly
adds to the discussions regarding expanding the permanent-establishment
concept beyond physical presences.1 9 7 It also informs our discussions of
how to tax transactions involving cloud-based services. Those transac-
tions often include a payment with data, which means that taxing those
transactions will be done indirectly through the taxation of the data ag-
gregators' sales or advertising revenue. The result might be that we need
to align the rules for sourcing those categories of income as a way to
reduce the tax distortions created by the personal-data exemption.
The sum of this analysis is that discussions regarding how to best
reform our tax systems for the digital age should consider how to best
account for the fact that personal-data transactions are going untaxed. If
we are going to use the corporate income tax on advertising revenue as a
proxy for taxing those transactions, we will need to ensure that he juris-
dictional and sourcing rules reflect that role. Critically, we will also need
to maintain that ax. That realization is one important takeaway from this
analysis-the corporate income tax will play a critical role in the tax
system of the future because it is likely the most direct and comprehen-
sive way of taxing the value derived by personal-data transactions. Its
elimination would significantly reduce the opportunities for our tax sys-
tem to capture that value. A consumption tax is not going to fill that role.
This realization is important because it cuts against a significant
body of work that is aimed at critiquing the corporate income tax as a
normative matter and that often does so in connection with a call for
greater reliance on consumption taxes.'98 It does, however, support the
197. See, e.g., COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 468 (discussing potential expansion of the
permanent-establishment concept to reflect modem business realities); FRENCH REPORT, supra note
37, at 4, 63-64, 113-15 (discussing the challenges that the digital economy creates under traditional
conceptions of a permanent establishment); OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 78-79, 88, 100-02,
106-11, 147-48 (discussing the potential expansion of the permanent-establishment concept to
include digital presences). It is important to note, of course, that the OECD rejected the adoption of
an economic-nexus type permanent-establishment rule in its recent BEPS Project. Id. at 148 (noting
that a digital permanent-establishment concept was not recommended due to the anticipated benefits
from other proposals).
198. The literature critiquing the corporate income tax is voluminous. See Rueven S. Avi-
Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193,
1197 (2004) (noting the extensive critique of corporate income tax and that "no academic has in
recent years mounted a serious, convincing normative defense of why this cumbersome tax should
be retained"); Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1622-23
(2013) ("[O]ne thing that legal scholars and public finance economists agree upon (a rare occasion
indeed), is that corporate taxation, as a legal model, is absolutely inefficient."); Darien Shanske, A
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idea that reliance on different tax instruments is beneficial as a way of
controlling for the weaknesses inherent in each tax.199 The conclusion is
therefore important as we continue to analyze optimal tax design. We
may not like the corporate income tax as a matter of economic efficien-
cy, but it can be used to address the challenges that the digital economy
creates for our personal income taxes and consumption taxes. Further
attention to capital-gains preferences, jurisdictional limits, and the proper
sourcing of income are thus warranted given the continued growth of the
personal-data economy.200
2. The Potential Role for Alternative Tax Instruments
The preceding Part has focused on how current tax instruments
could be modified to address the personal-data economy. It may be,
though, that the best way to approach the current personal-data exemp-
tion is to adopt completely new tax instruments that more directly ad-
dress the personal-data market. Those new tax instruments could help
both to offset lost tax revenue and to encourage the development of bene-
ficial data-protection practices and technology. This approach is consid-
ered in the French Report, the OECD Report, and to an extent by gov-
ernments worldwide.
The French Report specifically suggests a special tax on companies
that collect data through the "regular and systematic monitoring of users'
activity." 201 The tax would apply only to aggregators who monitor more
than a particular number of users, and the report specifically suggests
202that such a tax could be an actual charge per monitored user. The
OECD Report proposed consideration of an "equalization levy . .. as an
alternative way to address the broader direct tax challenges of the digital
economy."203 The report proposed alternative bases for such a tax, in-
New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales
Tax Complement, 66 TAX L. REV. 305, 327 (2013) (noting the "ferocious debate" regarding whether
consumption or income taxes are ideal).
199. See generally David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption,
Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAx L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2015) (arguing that the weaknesses in
one form of taxation can be mitigated through the application of a different form of taxation that
does not suffer the same weaknesses).
200. One other interesting caveat to this discussion is that states' tax systems are currently
much better structured to handle these issues than our federal tax system. This is largely because
states have a greater ability than the federal government to tax firms that have no physical presence
within their boundaries and many already use market-state sourcing methods. 2 HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, TT 6.11[1], 9.18[3][a], 10.07 (discussing U.S. states' taxing jurisdic-
tion, the use of market-state sourcing rules, and the move away from the cost-of-performance stand-
ard); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 161-
87 (2012) (discussing the economic-nexus standard for state taxing jurisdiction); Douglas A. Wick,
A Categorization of State Market Sourcing Rules, 74 ST. TAX NOTEs 351, 351 (2014) ("The cost of
performance method is waning, and market sourcing is taking its place."). In addition, the structure
of the state corporate income tax may allow it to be a rough proxy for the consumption taxes that are
going uncollected on personal-data transactions. Shanske, supra note 198, at 308, 315-17.
201. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 121-23.
202. Id. at 123.
203. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 115-17.
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cluding data gathered from in-country users.204 An excise tax on data
transfers starts to look indistinguishable from a "bit tax," which has been
proposed for years.205
Several countries have also implemented or discussed diverted prof-
its taxes-often referred to as "Google taxes"-that seek to ensure that
corporations do not escape taxation through the use of clever corporate
206structuring. Those diverted profits taxes operate by imposing some
minimum level of tax on companies who are deemed to have engaged in
abusive activities to artificially lower their tax burden.207 Although those
taxes are not specifically tied to the personal-data economy, they would
impact firms that operate in that space and use international tax structur-
ing to avoid income tax on their gains. Other forms of alternative tax
instruments are undoubtedly possible and further thought should be giv-
en to those options.
It is also worth recognizing that a new tax could be used not only to
raise revenue, but also-or alternatively-to positively influence how
data are collected and used. For example, a tax could be structured so
that the actual tax rate is tied to the adoption of certain prescribed stand-
ards.208 For example, the tax rate could be reduced for taxpayers that
implemented best practices published by the government or who provid-
ed more consumer control over their data. The particular tax-rate "trig-
ger" could also be used to help to spur positive technological develop-
ments that might allow greater data protection. In that vein, some have
posited that the technology behind Bitcoin-blockchain-could be used
to allow individuals better control over access to their data.209 An alterna-
204. Id at 116. This type of tax could be viewed as the new-economy version of a severance
tax. U.S. states have long imposed those taxes on the extraction of resources like coal, oil, and tim-
ber. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, if 4.18, 4.18[1]. It might be fair to view per-
sonal data as a natural resource of a source jurisdiction in the digital economy and tax its extraction
consistent with these historic taxes.
205. A bit tax is a transactional tax on the "transmission of digital information." COCKFIELD ET
AL., supra note 65, at 480 n.45. The bit tax proposals have been largely undermined by the practical
concerns inherent in such a tax. Id.
206. Budget 2015. 'Google Tax' Introduction Confirmed, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31942639; Giuseppe Fonte & Gavin Jones, Italy's Renzi Faces
Uphill Struggle over Google Tax Plan, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2015, 11:38 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-italy-tax-internet-analysis-
idUSKCNORUIHS20150930; Michael Herh, Taxing Google: Government to Introduce Google Tax
Next Year, BUSINESSKOREA (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:15 PM),
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/ict/1 2539-taxing-google-govemment-introduce-
google-tax-next-year.
207. Karen Hughes et al., The U.K. Diverted Profits Tax, 123 J. TAX'N 37, 37-39 (2015); J.
Harold McClure & Saumyanil Deb, The Google Tax: Transfer Pricing or Formulary Apportion-
ment?, J. INT'L TAX'N, June 2015, at 61.
208. This approach was also recommended in the French Report. FRENCH REPORT, supra note
37, at 123.
209. Guy Zyskind et al., Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Protect Personal Data
180-84 (May 21-22, 2015) (research paper prepared for 2015 IEEE CS Security and Privacy Work-
shops), http://ieeexplore.iece.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber-7163223; Guy Zyskind et al., Enigma:




tive tax that did not apply where that technology was used might give a
nice nudge to support its development and implementation.2 10 The law
would not require it, but it would promote it.
In the end, this is not the place to promote particular policy goals or
to suggest particular tax instruments to achieve those goals. Further
scholarship should explore those issues. What is important is that we
recognize the interplay between the tax system and our broader policy
goals related to data and data protection. It is possible that we could craft
alternative tax instruments to address both the tax and privacy concerns
raised by the personal-data market.
B. Tax and the Personal-Data Economy of the Future
Many scholars and individual consumers have been unhappy with
the current state of the data market, and they have pushed for a market in
which individuals have greater control over the collection and use of
their data.211 Those efforts have begun to have effect. For example, con-
sumers are now taking advantage of applications that allow them to easi-
212
ly see and block particular tracking programs. Consumers are also
adopting ad blockers in greater numbers.2 13 Those efforts impede the
collection of observed data and undermine the multi-sided business mod-
el by preventing websites from offering better-identified "targets" for
advertising. A recent study suggests that the use of those blockers will
214result in the loss of nearly $22 billion of ad revenue per year.
Of course, when consumers block online tracking and the advertis-
ing that results, data aggregators fail to benefit from offering their digital
products. This has not gone without notice, and that changed value prop-
osition has very recently been recognized as a threat to the "free" Inter-
215net. Some sites have responded by blocking users who use ad block-
210. Importantly, that type of "trigger" might well tie into traditional tax concepts. If a user has
the right to unilaterally and completely revoke their data at any time, we can fairly question the value
of the barter to the aggregator. The aggregator receives an asset, but also grants the provider with a
unilateral call option with a zero strike price.
211. See supra Section I.B.
212. Add-ons, MOZILLA.ORG, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/extensions/?sort=users
(last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (listing a Ghostery, an add-on that blocks tracking programs, as a most
popular extension for the Firefox browser); Owen Williams, You Should Be Using These Browser
Extensions to Keep Yourself Safe Online, TNW (May 18, 2015),
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2015/05/18/you-should-be-using-these-browser-extensions-to-keep-
yourself-safe-online/ (discussing several programs that block tracking programs online).
213. PAGEFAIR & ADOBE, supra note 60, at 1, 4.
214. Id. at 3; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Ad-Blocking Software Will Cost the Ad Industry $22 Billion
This Year, WALL STREET J.: DIGITS (Aug. 10, 2015, 6:28 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/201 5/08/1 0/ad-blocking-software-will-cost-the-ad-industry-22-billion-
this-year/?mod=e2tw; Mark Scott, Study of Ad-Blocking Software Suggests Wide Use, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (Aug. 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/study-of-ad-blocking-
software-suggests-wide-use/.
215. Hayley Tsukayama, Online Ad-Blocking Is on the Rise. That's Bad News for Everyone.,
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/08/10/online-ad-blocking-is-on-the-rise-thats-bad-news-for-everyone/. See general-
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ers.216 Others have moved to a subscription model, and one research firm
posited that 2016 would be a tipping point in that regard.2 17 Its analysis
suggests that more firms might begin implementing a "freemium" model
where consumers can continue to use a basic service for free but also pay
218a fee to avoid tracking and/or advertising.
Some have responded to the personal-data market by pushing for
change in the other direction. Instead of working towards a model where
individuals pay to not be tracked, they have focused on a model under
which consumers are paid cash compensation for their data. This in-
cludes the payment for data stored in "personal data banks" or "personal
data vaults" 219 and micropayments based upon the use of data without the
same centralization of control.220
All of these models address the privacy concerns inherent in the
current personal-data market,221 but they could suffer from a significant
tax disadvantage. To start, the freemium model removes perhaps the
most critical impediment to taxing personal-data barters-the valuation
problem. If Facebook determines a price for accessing its service without
being tracked or subjected to advertising, it sets a value that could be
used for tax purposes. A tax administrator could argue that the fee repre-
sents the market price for the digital product or the personal data normal-
ly traded for that product and that a consumer who purchases that good
with their data or their time has an accession to wealth in that amount.
ly PAGEFAIR, https://pagefair.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (providing information about
PageFair, which is a company that seeks to address the interests of advertisers, consumers, and
publishers).
216. Molly Brown, Use an Ad Blocker? The Washington Post Is Now Probably Blocking You,
GEEKWIRE (Sept. 10, 2015, 9:49 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2015/use-an-ad-blocker-the-
washington-post-is-now-probably-blocking-you/.
217. See Daniel Heppner, AdBlock Pressuring YouTube into a Paid Subscription Model,
GAZETTE REV. (Sept. 27, 2015), http://gazettereview.com/2015/09/adblock-pressuring-youtube-into-
a-paid-subscription-model; Taylor, supra note 62.
218. See Taylor, supra note 62.
219. Jerry Kang et a]., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 828-29 (2012) (pro-
posing "personal data guardians" to curate the personal data vaults); Thomas Heath, Web Site Helps
People Profit from Information Collected About Them, WASH. POST (June 26, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/web-site-helps-people-profit-from-information-
collected-aboutthem/2011/06/24/AGPgkRmH story.html; Min Mun et al., Personal Data Vaults: A
Locus of Control for Personal Data Streams (Nov. 30-Dec. 3, 2010) (research paper prepared for the
Sixth International Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies (CoN-
EXT)), http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2010/CoNEXTpapers/17-Mun.pdf; How It Works,
DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com/docs (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); POWR OF YOU,
https://www.powrofyou.com/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); TEAMDATA, https://personal.com (last
visited Oct. 23, 2016).
220. LANIER, supra note 54, at 20, 274-75, 286-87 (discussing the nano-payment approach).
221. They address the privacy concerns only to the extent that (1) personal data are no longer
collected by the data aggregators or (2) consumers are adequately paid for their personal data or,
alternatively stated, their privacy loss. Under a freemium model where consumers merely pay to
avoid advertising, the privacy implications of data collection would not be addressed.
TRANSACTING IN DATA
The introduction of a cash option could thus make it easier to tax those
who do not take that option.222
The data-bank model presents a similar tax problem because it re-
moves several of the key impediments to taxing personal-data sales.
First, it centralizes the transfer of an individual's data so that those trans-
fers are easily identifiable. It also ensures that we know exactly when
and how an individual's data were accessed and what the individual got
in return for that access. Finally, it removes a layer of anonymity and
establishes a third party-the data bank operator-that can be subject to
information-reporting and withholding obligations. These factors might
very well prevent the widespread adoption of the data-bank model. They
could turn a non-taxable barter into a taxable sale with the result that
individuals could see the purchasing power of their data decline by up to
40% or more.223
These results highlight the distortion that the current tax exemption
creates in the market for data and reveal one simple, but critical insight
of this Article-that the current tax preference for personal-data barters
is equally a tax penalty on other forms of market transactions. All else
being equal, the tax law favors the former and places a burden on any
move to the latter. Any suggested change to the personal-data market
will have to take that into account.
These considerations apply even if we assume a personal-data mar-
ket that does not evolve to introduce cash compensation somewhere in
the exchange. The Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) approach,
for example, allows consumers to more effectively barter with their data
rather than allowing them to be paid in cash.224 Doc Searls, a noted tech-
nology author, lays out his view of a VRM world in detail in his book
titled The Intention Economy.225 In that book, he envisions a world where
users take a very active role in the use and dissemination of their data.
For example, they might agree to share their location, purchase history,
and payment data with a coffee shop in order to ensure that their lattes
222. Of course, users who opt to take the "free" version could credibly argue that the benefit
that they receive is worth less than the value of the premium product. To begin, a free version that
suffered from intrusive advertising would certainly have a lower intrinsic value to a consumer.
Second, a user who declined the premium version would necessarily not value that version at its
asking price-they would have purchased it otherwise. The actual valuation would thus depend on
the precise product offering. A subscription fee that only preempted data collection-and not adver-
tising-would be most likely to represent the taxable value of the personal data generally collected
by the aggregator. A subscription fee that only preempted advertising would be least likely to repre-
sent the value of that personal data. The fee in that case would be most related to the negative value
of viewing advertising and not the value of personal data.
223. The top marginal tax rate for the federal income tax is currently 39.6%. 26 U.S.C. § 1
(2012). Many individuals would also have to pay state income taxes on their cash payments, and
some might have to pay sales taxes on the goods that they purchased with that cash.
224. See supra Section I.B (discussing the VRM Project at Harvard's Berkman Klein Center).
225. See generally SEARLS, supra note 51.
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226are waiting for them at the counter when they arrive. They agree to
share those data, however, only if the vendor agrees with how they will
be used.
A data approach where users control their data is one that is con-
sistent with the current expanded use of ad blockers, Do Not Track tech-
nology, and other methods of depriving aggregators of their data or the
benefits of those data. Data providers and data aggregators might find the
VRM approach more palatable than those other approaches, however,
because it might allow for more acceptable advertising, which would
227allow the continued use of the advertising-funding model.2 Consumers,
in turn, might not feel the need to block advertising or all tracking if they
had more control.228
The tax consequences of a VRM approach that focuses on user con-
trol rather than on cash remuneration are more complicated than those
discussed above. To the extent that the personal-data market evolves to
give users more control, but without introducing cash transactions, the
tax system may be unable to tax them for the lack of a method of valua-
tion. However, to the extent that individuals more purposefully use their
data and do so to greater personal benefit, taxation might become more
compelling and perhaps more realistic. Further, to the extent that a VRM
approach relies on a central access point for one's data, then there would
again be one single source of information on the extent of an individual's
data bartering. We would no longer drop data like breadcrumbs as we
travel across the Internet. We would sell them from a storefront.
This Section has discussed only some of the possible futures for the
personal-data market. Regardless of which way the commercial Internet
ecosystem evolves, however, there are at least two questions that we will
need to ask ourselves. First, do the technologies that we are considering
undercut any of the current impediments to the taxation of the personal-
data economy? Second, do those strategies or technologies make it more
compelling that transactions in data be taxed as a normative matter? If
the answer to either is "yes," then proponents of those developments
must address how to handle the potential tax penalty on that type of mar-
ket evolution. For better or worse, the tax system currently provides a
preference for the voluminous, anonymous, obfuscated data-collection
practices that occur online. The impact of that tax preference may very
well be to work against otherwise beneficial developments in the person-
al-data economy, and we must keep that factor in mind as we consider
how to best reform that economy.
226. Id. at 11-12.
227. See Doc Searls, How #adblocking Matures from #NoAds to #SafeAds, HARV. BLOGS: DOC





C. A Unified Regulatory Approach to Personal Data
The personal-data economy impacts many areas of our lives and, as
a result, the effects of the tax exemption for personal data extend far be-
yond our revenue system. The final policy proposal of this Article is
therefore that this tax exemption be taken into account in the broader
U.S. regulatory structure related to personal data and personal privacy.
The tax exemption for transactions in data is a regulatory benefit provid-
ed to the personal-data market, and it should be recognized as such.
The government clearly has non-tax interests in regulating the per-
sonal-data market. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, regu-
lates the data market to protect consumer privacy and data security.229 it
is thus reasonable for the nation's regulatory policies to take a holistic
view of the government's role in that market. As noted above, the per-
sonal-data tax exemption represents nothing more than a regulatory ben-
efit provided to those operating in the personal-data economy. It thus
functions to promote the use of data as a payment method rather than the
use of cash. Viewed in this way, it seems advisable for the government to
take that benefit into account as it evaluates the merits of regulating other
aspects of the personal-data economy. For example, privacy regulations
imposed by Congress or actions taken by the FTC might impose costs on
the data industry, and viewed alone, those regulations might not survive
a typical cost-benefit analysis. Viewed in context, however, those costs
might merely offset the current regulatory benefit provided to that indus-
try by our tax system and thus might function well to offset the ineffi-
ciency that the personal-data exemption represents. Taking into account
the tax benefit provided by the personal-data exemption might therefore




Scholars in a number of fields have evaluated the impact of the
wide-scale data collection, analysis, and commodification that nearly
229. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (Jan.
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf ( iscussing the Commission's efforts to protect consumer
privacy and data security); Calo, supra note 43, at 681-85 (discussing the role of the FTC in this
area).
230. A comprehensive cost-benefit approach for data regulation would also be entirely con-
sistent with how the federal government evaluates regulatory action by executive agencies. See
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-
03 (2012); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 3-4, 6-7 (1995) (describing the origins of the federal government's use of cost-benefit
analyses with respect to evaluating federal regulations); Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 93, 148-52 (2015) (discussing the current status of the
federal rules regarding cost-benefit analyses). Notably, Executive Order 13,563 recognizes that
economic activities are regulated by multiple agencies and calls for coordination across those agen-




defines the modem economy. To date, however, tax scholars and our tax
laws have ignored this market. This Article addresses that void by
providing a comprehensive analysis of how transactions in data should
be viewed for purposes of our domestic tax laws. That analysis shows
that personal-data transactions are market exchanges that fall within the
reach of our nation's tax laws. There are, however, many practical im-
pediments to actually taxing those transactions. The result is that there
now exists, and will continue to exist, an implicit tax preference for the
use of data as a currency.
Our inability-and perhaps unwillingness-to directly tax person-
al-data transactions does not mean that those exchanges should be ig-
nored though. Those exchanges impact how we view and address the
broader challenges that the modem economy presents for our taxing sys-
tems. They might also justify alternative forms of tax instruments that
would indirectly tax their value or that would promote positive social
goals with respect to data collection and protection.
The tax exemption for personal-data transactions also impacts how
we address the market for data more broadly. First, privacy scholars and
technologists working on how to best modify that market to better pro-
tect individual interests must understand that they are working against a
tax system that will promote the status quo. Positive data-management
practices or technologies that allow users to better control or benefit from
their data might very well also reduce the factors that currently preclude
the taxation of personal-data transactions. Finally, at a very basic level,
the tax exemption for those transactions operates as a regulatory benefit
for those transactions. That benefit should be taken into account in the
broader U.S. regulatory structure surrounding personal data, privacy, and
the new economy.
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